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An International Workshop on the near-real-time accoun-
tancy (NRTA) measure was established in December 1980 to in-
vestigate the capabilities and limitations of this measure for 
a large-scale reprocessing facility. The present overview re-
port summarizes the activities and the results of this workshop 
as of July 1982. After establishing the process and accountan-
cy data-base for a 1000 t HM/a reference reprocessing facility, 
the workshop developed simulation models for the sequential 
generation of data for throughput and inventory of plutonium in 
the process material balance area (MBA). A well defined set of 
boundary conditions and parameter values for measurement uncer-
tainties and loss patterns was established, on the basis of 
which a nurober of sequential statistical test procedures was 
evaluated. One important condition for the application of the 
NRTA measure was the stipulation that routinely measured Pu 
inventories in process tanks only, would be used, since more 
than 95% of Pu inventories in the process MBA are in these 
tanks. About 12 kg of Pu, expected tobe the normal inventory 
in six pulse columns, was assumed to be constant. In spite of 
the simplifications made and the fact that mainly simulated 
data were used, these investigations permit the conclusion 
that the NRTA measure provides a greater sensitivity in terms 
of the amounts which can be detected and the timeliness of 
detection, than the conventional material accountancy. Since 
measurements are restricted to process tanks only, routinely 
available measurement techniques can be used. The main thrust 
of R & D activities has to lie in the practical demonstrations 
of this measure under operating conditions, some of which are 
already under way. 
IV 
Zusammenfassender Bericht des internationalen Ausschusses 
zur dynamischen Bilanzierungsmaßnahme 
ZUSAMMENFASSUNG 
Im Dezember 1980 wurde ein internationaler Workshop gegründet, um die 
Leistungsfähigkeit und die Grenzen der dynamischen Bilanzierungsmaß-
nahme (Near-Real-Time Accountancy - NRTA - Measure) zu untersuchen. 
In dem vorliegenden Bericht sind die Arbeiten und Ergebnisse dieses 
Workshops bis Juli 1982 zusammengefaßt. 
Nach der Festlegung der verfahrenstechnischen und Kernmaterialbilan-
zierungsdaten für eine 1000 t Schwermetall/Jahr Wiederaufarbeitungs-
anlage wurden Simulationsmodelle entwickelt, die u.a. das Verhalten 
des Prozeßinventars feststellen sowie die erforderlichen Plutonium-
durchfluß- und Inventardaten für die Prozeß-MBA sequentiell erzeugen 
können. Die so erzeugten Datensätze wurden verwendet, um die Aussage-
fähigkeit von 8 der bisher im Zusammenhang mit der NRTA angewendeten 
statistischen Testverfahren für einige wohldefinierte Pu-Verlust-
szenarien aus der Prozeß-MBA zu prüfen. 
Trotz einiger vereinfachender Annahmen und der Tatsache, daß nur 
simulierte Datensätze verwendet wurden, zeigte die in dem Workshop 
untersuchte NRTA-Maßnahme eine höhere Empfindlichkeit bezüglich der 
rechtzeitigen Entdeckung einer gegebenen Menge gegenüber der kon-
ventionellen Materialbilanzierung. Da die Pu-Messungen in erster 
Linie auf die Prozeßbehälter beschränkt bleiben (da sich mehr als 
95% des Pu-Iventars im Prozeß in diesen Behältern befinden), können 
die für betriebliche Zwecke verwendeten Meßmethoden für die NRTA-Maß-
nahme eingesetzt werden. 
Die Hauptrichtung der zukünftigen Entwicklungsarbeiten sollte in der 
praktischen Demonstration dieser Maßnahme unter routinemäßigen Betriebs-
bedingungen einer Wiederaufarbeitungsanlage liegen. Einige dieser Unter-
suchungen sind bereits eingeleitet worden. 
V 
Title of the maln paper: 
Overview Report of the International 
Workshop on the Near-Real-Time 
Accountancy Measure 
Appendix from Page 25 onwards. 
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INTRODUCTION 
An International Workshop on the near-real-time accountan-
cy (NRTA) measure was established in December 1980 to investi-
gate the capabilities and limitations of this measure for a 
large-scale reprocessing facility. The present overview report 
summarizes the activities and the results of this workshop as 
of July 1982. 
NRTA has been considered by many as one of the promising 
measures which could extend the capabilities of present-day 
international safeguards. However, the fairly large volume of 
published information on this subject in the recent past may 
not always enable the reader to form an objective and unbiased 
opinion on the applicability of such a measure. 
The International Workshop was specially established to 
develop a set of data base and guidelines with the help of 
which the capabilities and robustness of the NRTA measure can 
be investigated. 
Organizations and internationally known experts from 
Japan, the USA and the Federal Republic of Germany, actively 
engaged in this area, were invited to provide advice and in-
formation as well as contribute actively to the workshop. The 
overview report is prepared on the basis of these contributions. 
The contributing organizations and experts actively 
taking patt in the workshop meetings and activities are listed 
on page I. 
The International Workshop has covered up to now the 
following areas: 
(1) Generation of throughput and inventory data for Pu for a 
reference layout of a reprocessing facility with a 
capacity of 1000 t HM/a. 
(2) Measurement and other estimating systems for the genera-
tion of material balance data for the reference facility. 
(3) Simulation of relevant process characteristics of the 
reference facility (in particular the behaviour of in-
process Pu inventory under normal and unstable process 
conditions). 
(4) Establishment of boundary conditions for comparison of 
different statistical procedures for the evaluation of 
the material balance data with regard to different loss 
patterns including a possible diversion. 
(5) Selection of relevant sequential statistical test 
procedures. 
(6) Preliminary comparison of different statistical test 
procedures to evaluate their capability. 
(7) Identification of areas in which specific R & D activi-
ties would be required for demonstrating the possibility 
of implementing NRTA as an international safeguards 
measure on a routine basis. 
In the remainder of this report these subjects are treated 
one by one. 
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1. The r.eference r.eprocessing facilit;y 
An extremely simplified block diagram of the reference 
reprocessing facility is presented in Fig. 1, with some of 
the information relevant to NRTA on throughput and inventory 
of plutonium summarized in TableI I 11. Table II presents data 
on plutonium inventories in various process tanks. 
According to this layout about 95% of the process inven-
tory of Pu is expected to be in about 25 process buffer tanks 
under normal operating conditions. This has been found to have 
important simplifying consequences for the NRTA measure. Since 
the main measurement efforts for assaying Pu process invento-
ry are restricted to these tanks, most of the measurement data 
can be generated with well-tested measurement methods already 
existing for operating purposes for Pu assay in accountability 
tanks in reprocessing facilities. In case the Pu inventories 
in pulse columns become a relevant problem, simplified simula-
tion methods for estimating these inventories could be used. 
2. Measurement systems for the generation of material 
balance data 12,31 
In establishing the requirements and characteristics of 
measurement systems to be considered for the generation of 
the required material balance data for the NRTA measure, a 
nurober of boundary conditions were stipulated: 
The plutonium amounts in inventories and in flows 
to and from the process material balance area (MBA) 
will be determined, as far as practicable, on the 
basis of measurements carried out in connection with 
the normal operation of the facility. 
As the first alternative, only the process tanks 
(and not process equipment or pipelines) will be 
assayed to establish the plutonium inventory in the 
process. Such inventories will be established 
during the operation of the process (physical inven-
tory taking w1thout plant shut-down). 
The plutonium inventories in process equipments and 
pipelines (which correspond to approximately 6-7% of 
the total plutonium inventory in the process) will be 
considered to be approximately constant or fluctuat-
ing within a given range (e.g. ~10%). 
In most of the cases, the throughput and inventory 
of Pu will be assayed in tanks. The following steps 
may be required for a measurement system for deter-
mining the Pu amount in such a tank: 
Homogenization of the solution 
Measurement of the respective tank volume 
Sampling from the tank 






CHARACTERISTICS OF THE 1000 t HM/YEAR 
REFERENCE REPROCESSING FACILITY 
1000 t HM/a 5 t HM/d 
10 t Pu/a 50 kg Pu/d 
(kg) 
Process tanks 525 (feed adjustrnent -
.Process equiprnent 
lPulse colurnns 12 
1 Mixer settler and 
oxidation equiprnent 6 
Evaporator 12 30 
555 
TABLE II. Pu INVENTORY IN TANKS 
(MAIN PROCESS STREAM 
Nurober 
!1st Cycle ACC.TANK 2 




,2nd Cycle 2 AF-TANK 5 
2RP-A-TANK 1 









25 process buffer 
tanks with 
significant 
quanti ties of Pu) 

















Measurement of the plutonium concentration 
Calculation of the plutonium inventory in the 
tank. 
The main investigation was directed to the 
measurement systems involved in the determination of 
plutonium concentration, although the step involving 
sample conditioning could be the decisive one for 
establishing the suitability of a system. This fact 
was taken into account in the total time required for 
a given measurement system). 
The total measurement time including all the steps 
should be, whenever possible, less than the residence 
time of a Pu solution in a tank (e.g. in the range of 
8-24 hours). In this manner the frequency of the 
NRTA will be determined by the inherent process para-
meter involving the residence time of the Pu-contain-
ing solution in a tank and not by the delays in the 
measurement system. In addition, the verification of 
the operator's measurement data could be carried out 
in principle during the time the solution is still in 
the tank. 
The plutonium flows and characteristics of the process 
materials relevant for NRTA, are presented in Table III. 
TABLE III. PLUTONIUM FLOWS, GONGENTRATIONS AND 
ACTIVITIES IN DIFFERENT PROCESS STREAMS 
OF THE REFERENCE FACILITY 


























High active waste (HAW) 
!
'Medium level/low active 
. wastes (MAW/LAW) 
I 
3 
It is to be noted that: 
Both the Pu-concentrations and the radioactivity in the 
different process streams undergo Variations by several 
orders of magnitude. 
The sample material in the different process streams 
in the facility can be broken down into four categories: 
The input solution, 
The end product, 
The liquid waste, 
The solid waste. 
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It has been assumed that for the first three categories 
of solution chemical analytical methods would be routinely used 
whereas for the fourth category (solid wastes) non-destructiv~ 
mea.surement methods would have to be applied. 
Different measurement methods were investigated in the 
context of their application possibilities, for the input 
product and waste streams. 
After taking into consideration the different characte-
ristics of the possible measurement systems, a set of values 
for measurement errors (lcr) were established for carrying out 
the required sensitivity study for the NRTA measure. These 
measurement errors which are somewhat on the conservative side 
are presented in Table IV. For the purpose of this study the 
values for the random (crR) and the systematic (cr8) errors have been assumed to be the same for the reference case. 
TABLE IV. MEASUREMENT ERRORS FOR THE DIFFERENT 
FLOWS AND INVENTORIES IN THE 
REFERENCE FACILITY (crR = cr8l 
Object of measurement 






Inventory in process tanks 









The unmeasured inventory corresponding to an average of 
30 kg of plutonium in the different process equipment and 
pipelines, is assumed either to remain constant or to fluctuate 
by ~10% around the average for the different case studies. 
3. Simulation of relevant plutonium flow and 
inventory characteristics J4-6J 
Model simulation has been considered to play an essential 
role in evaluating the capabilities of the NRTA measure. This 
is of two types. 
The first type deals with the mathematical modelling of 
the relevant plutonium extraction and purification steps in 
the reference facility and simulation of the distribution and 
flows of plutonium in these steps. The input data for such 
simulation studies are obtained from the data base for the 
process layout of the reference facility. This type of 
simulation is expected to indicate the behaviour of the flow 
and inventory of plutonium in the process MBA under start-up, 
normal and some abnormal operating conditions. This process 
model is then used for the simulation of accountancy data for 
establishing MUF values and their associated uncertainties, 
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for different values of measurement uncertainties, 
fluctuations in the inventories and for different throughputs 
and inventories. The accountancy data thus generated in 
the simulation model are then used for applying different 
statistical test procedures for generating safeguards-relevant 
conclusions with regard to the status of the plutonium in the 
process area. The capabilities of such test procedures can 
also be evaluated. 
This type of simulation model is necessary for analysing 
the capability and limitations of the NRTA measure under 
different facility conditions. How much confidence one can 
place in the result of such models depends on how well they 
can simulate the actual conditions prevailing in the facility. 
It is, therefore, important that data based on actual operat-
ing conditions in a facility be used in such models. The 
initial results from such a simulation model are presented 
elsewhere in these proceedings 141. It is tobe noted that 
these models are not required for routine implementation pur-
poses of the NRTA measure. 
The other type of simulation model which can be a subset 
of the first type, deals with the estimation of plutonium 
inventory in process equipment such as pulse columns. Under 
the present series of investigations, the measured data base 
are generated mainly from measurements in process tanks. The 
unmeasured inventories in the process equipment are assumed 
to remain constant or vary within a limited range of +10%. If 
this inventory is found to vary much more under routine 
operating conditions than the assumed rates, the sensitivity 
of the NRTA measure would automatically go down. For such 
cases (which might be remote), some possibility of obtaining a 
value for the plutonium quantity in this equipment on the 
basis of some derived estimates would be useful. Suchmodels 
are expected to be as simple as practicable and to be based on 
a few measurable and verifiable data. If required, they would 
then form part of the measurement systems for generating the 
accountancy data on a routine basis for the NRTA measure. 
Up to now three different types of model for estimating 
the plutonium inventories in the pulse columns of the reference 
facility have been developed. 
3.1 Exponential model 
The exponential model for prediction holdup of special 
nuclear material in pulse columns provides a simplified method 
for approximating the in-column inventories. In this model it 
is assumed that the plutonium concentration profiles in the 
extraction section of the column vary exponentially. The model 
is intended for steady-state operation only and does not take 
into consideration the many complex variables that affect 
column performance and holdup. 
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3.2 Ideal stage model 
In the ideal stage model, the holdup of plutonium in a 
pulse column is estimated by summing up the plutonium amounts 
per stage (i.e. average plutonium concentration x liquid volume 
per stage). The holdup of plutonium in this model is ultimate-
ly a function of.the plutonium concentration and flow rates of 
the aqueous feed and the organic extractant at the input and 
output of the column, the separation coefficient for extrac-
tion, the number of ideal stages and the total volume of the 
column. In this model also, complex effects such as back 
mixing, temperature and molarity dependence of distribution 
coefficients etc., are neglected. 
3.3 Reduced-order linear model 
The reduced-order linear model is a linear inventory 
estimator based on first-order perturbations about an expect-
ed steady-state value. The steady-state inventory value is 
calculated for the expected operational conditions using a 
detailed chemical model that has been validated experimental-
ly for the particular contactor system. Alternatively, ex-
periments can be performed directly to determine the expected 
inventory by bringing the contactor to steady state and then 
draining the contents to holding tanks for measurement. 
The column inventory calculations are based on the 
following assumptions: 
The column is operating near a steady-state 
operating point. 
The column inventory near the operating point is 
linear in the concentrations. 
Goncentration and flow-rate measurements are 
available in near-real time. 
The column inventory at the nominal operating point 
has been previously determined from chemical model 
calculations and calibration experiments. 
A realistic simulation of solvent extraction columns at 
at least near-equilibrium operation is essential if the 
respective models are to be of use for in-process holdup 
estimation or as elements of an overall process simulator. 
In the first stage of the investigations, these three 
models were tested on the basis of the flow sheet data for 
pulse columns for the reference facility. The exponential 
model was also tested for the pulse columns of the Barnwell 
facility, for which experimental data for a uranium stream 
are available \7\. The responses (for plutonium inventory 
changes) of these models to 10% increases in feed and extrac-
tant flow rates and concentrations, show that the holdup 
variations are roughly proportional to the changes in input 
flows and concentrations. Further investigations with realis-
tic operational data are required to demonstrate the useful-
ness of these models. 
-8-
4. Boundary conditions and parameters for comparison 
and evaluation of different statistical test procedures 
During the workshop activities a uniform set of boundary 
conditions and parameters was established for the comparison 
and evaluation of different statistical test procedures. One 
of the difficulties in the past in assessing the capability of 
the NRTA measure using different test procedures, had be~n the 
lack of a uniform set of such conditions for comparison. 
From a !arge number of individual conditions 18-11 I 
the more relevant ones are summarized as follows: 
4.1 Boundary conditions 
4.1.1 The evaluationwill consider a series of 
determinations of the inventories and transfers 
corresponding to a single MBA. Inventories will be 
assumed to be taken at times t. (without stopping the 
operation of the facility) sta~ting at some initial time 





All the data 
All the data subsequent to t 
0 
All the data obtained during some fixed period T. 




Assumed true values ~· of the inventories at 
timet .. In simulatioft studies these are 
derivea from the process simulation. 
Assumed errors of determination of net transfers 
and inventory. These are propagated from an 
assumed set of measurement errors, accounting 
procedures and covariance structure. 
Assumed lasses L. in the periods ßt = 
t.-t. between inventories. These may be 
pfes~n! in known or unmodelled process errors, 
long-term or unmodelled measurement biases, or 
deliberate diversion. 
4.1.3 In this exercise the primary concern is to 
estimate and test hypotheses concerning the 1 .. The ~. are 
modelled since (1) assumptions concerning the§e may effect 
the ability to estimate the L. and (2) in more general 
situations it may be desirabl~ to estimate or test inven-
tories as well as lasses. 
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4. 1.4 Characteristics of lass patterns are to be 
considered. 
a) The evaluation Ls 
during T which may 
or a campaign. The 
this period are of 
affect the ability 
concerned with the total lass M 
be, for example, a calendar year 
individual lass L. = y.M within 
concern only as tfie paEterns, y. 
L 
to estimate and test M. 
b) Within T,to take account of the nature or timeliness 
of lasses, the time period of the initial lass, the 
time at which the amount M was assumed to be available 
and the form of diversion (e.g. abrupt vs protracted) 
will have to be considered. 
c) Because of externally imposed conditions (legal, 
administrative) the evaluation procedures have to be 
concerned with the lasses within T from 'I to 'z 
following T • Several sub-cases need to be consLdered: 
0 
The existence of a base set of data known to be 
loss-free. 
Only the cases 1.>0 will be considered. 
L 
There exists a time , 3 by which detection of the lasses between 't and , 2 should be achieved. 
4.2 Parameters considered for the evaluation of statistical 
methods 
4.2. 1 Definitions 





Raudom error standard deviation Ln 
measuring inventory 
- Raudom error standard deviation in 
measuring net transfers or flows 
cro - Systematic error Standard deviation in 
measuring net transfers. 
Two lass patterns were defined. In lass pattern No. 1 
the lass per time interval is uniform, beginning at interval 
I (one parameter) and extending over m intervals (a second 
0 ) • • parameter • In lass pattern No. 2, I and m are defLned as Ln 
lass pattern 1 except that the lass ~attern is not uniform 
over these m intervals; it alternates by +50% about the central 
value, M/ • -
m The parameter values were defined relative to the value 
for cr , which is fixed at one unit throughout. Also, cr
0 
is 
expre~sed relative to cr , i.e. cr
0
/crc is one of the factors 
varied. c v 
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4.2.2 Parameter values 
In the first phase of the investigations, the following 
sets of pararneter values were selected for uniform lass 
patterns (for both abrupt and protracted). The alternative 
lass patterns (lass pattern No. 2) have not been investigated 
in detail: 
cr = 0. 1 ' 0.55 E 
cr c/ cr E = 2.5 
M ::::: 15' 25 
I = 1 ' 11 ' 21 0 
m = 5, 10 
The cases investigated for the different statistical test 
procedures were 24 in number, consisting of all the possible 
combinations of the above-mentioned parameter sets. In 
addition, for I ~ 11, m = 5, and cr = 0.1 and 0.55, two 
cases were run ~t M = 0 to determin~ the values of the false 
alarm probability, a. The case nurober identification is given 1n 
Table V. 
TABLE V. 
Case cr E 
1 • 1 
2 • 1 
3 • 1 
4 • 1 
5 • 1 
6 • 1 
7 . 1 
8 • 1 
9 • 1 
10 • 1 
11 • 1 
12 • 1 
13 .55 
CASE NUMBER IDENTIFICATION FOR THE 
SET OF PARAMETERS INVESTIGATED 
(crö/crE = 2.5 for all the cases) 
M I m Case cr 
0 E 
15 1 5 14 .55 
15 1 10 15 .55 
15 11 5 16 .55 
15 1 1 10 17 .55 
15 21 5 18 .55 
15 21 10 19 .55 
25 I 5 20 .55 
25 1 10 21 .55 
25 I 1 5 22 .55 
25 11 10 23 .55 
25 21 5 24 .55 
25 21 10 25 . I 
15 I 5 26 .55 
M I m 
0 
15 1 10 
15 1 1 5 
15 11 10 
15 21 5 
15 21 10 
25 1 5 
25 1 10 
25 11 5 
25 I 1 10 
25 21 5 
25 21 10 
0 11 5 
0 11 5 
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5. Description of the statistical test procedures 
investigated 
The values realized for accountancy data were generated 
with the process simulation model for the different parameter 
sets identified under section 4.2, with the assumed uniform 
lass patterns for different values of M. Under the present 
series of investigations these lass patterns were supposed to 
be detected with the help of different statistical hypothesis 
testing procedures. The probability of detection PD was taken 
to be the indicator for the sensitivity of a test procedure for 
a given set of accountancy data parameters, lass pattern and 
the value for a, 
Under this approach the observed material accounting data 
generated sequentially are applied to test the hypothesis H 
of no material lass against the alternative hypothesis H1 o~ material lass. Such tests are of two ty?es: The fixed length 
test in which a predetermined number N of balances are 
observed before deciding between H and H1, and the sequential test in which the possibility of a0 decision is allowed after 
each balance is observed, 
For the purpose of checking the sensitiveness, eight basic 
statistical test procedures were selected amongst those normal-
ly considered for NRTA measures. A short description of these 
tests follows I 11 j. 
5.1 MUF 
The MUF test is a test on the material balance for a given 
period, Letting D. be the observed MUF for period i, lass 
detection is said~to occur if D. exceeds some critical value 
determined by the value of a ana the values of the measurement 
error standard deviations. The MUF test does not take into a 
account any prior history. It is aimed at detecting an abrupt 
lass, one that occurs somewhere within the material balance 
period in question. As a test sequence, the MUF test is applied 
at each material balance period and lass detection over the P 
periods occurs if at least one MUF exceeds its critical value. 
The a value over all P tests is controlled by reducing the size 
of the significance level for each individual test. 
5.2 CUMUF 
The test statistic to be applied in period i is denoted by 
T. and is the sum of the individual observed MUFs beginning at 





• 1 ~ J= 
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At a given point in time, T. is independent of how the 
lasses are distributed throughouf the i periods. This is the 
cited advantage of the CUMUF test. As a test sequence, the 
CUMUF test .is applied at each material balance period, as is 
the MUF test. Clearly, there is a close correlation between 
successive CUMUFs. 
In this study, CUMUF is applied in sequence on the one 
hand, and only at the end of the 35 periods on the other. The 
single test in this latter instance is, of course, more 
powerful than is the 35th such test applied as the last test 
in the sequence. However, this increase in power is counter-
balanced by the lack of timeliness, i.e., the inability of 
the test to detect lasses that occur early in the sequence 
of time periods. 
5.3 Uniform diversion (D ) 
u 
The test statistic is designed to detect uniform lasses. 
Since uniform lasses over a number of successive balance 
periods were the primary lass patterns studied in this phase, 
it would be expected that the uniform diversion test statistic 
would exhibit good detection capabilities in this study. 
The linear statistic in question is the minimum variance 
unbiased estimate of uniform lass. Specifically, in this 
study, the statistic was defined for each group of four 
successive MUFs. It is a moving weighted average of four such 
MUFs, and it is clear that successive test statistics would be 
closely correlated. 
The weighted average is derived as follows. Let 
Ti = a1Di+a2Di+l+a3Di+2+a4Di+3 
where the a. ' s sum to I f or j =I , 2, 3, 4. The a. 's 
are chosen to minimfze the variance ofT .• The first test 
statistic is calculated at the end of th~ fourth balance 
period. 
When j=l-4 as here, the calculation of the a.'s is quite 
simple. For more complex cases, calculational algotithms are 
helpful. The oft-mentioned Kalman filter is a calculational 
algorithm used in this instance. 
5.4 CUMUFR 
CUMUFR is an acronym for cumulative sum of standarized MUF 
residuals, It is designed to detect changes in lass patterns. 
A uniform lass that occurs in all balance periods would not be 
detectable with the CUMUFR test. 
The MUF residual for period i, MUFR., is defined as 1. 
MUFRi = Di- E(Di/D 1, D2 , ..• , Di-l) 
where E(D /D D D ) ' ' i I' 2' ••• , i-l 1.s an appropr1.ate 
function of D1 D D chosen such that ' 2' .•. , '-1' 
minimal variance. The stanaardized MUF residual 
linear 
MUFR. has 
is fÖund by 
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dividing MUFR. by its standard deviation cr., and the 
CUMUFR test sfatistic for balance period kLis found by 
summing MUFR./cr. from 1 to k. 
The tim~ s~ries of MUFRs is a linear transformation of 
the time series of MUFs. They can be calculated exactly by 
applying this transformation or approximately through use of a 
Kalman filter. 
The CUMUFR test may be applied as a two-sided test or as a 
one-sided test. In a two-sided test application, periods of 
lasses followed by periods of no losses would also be 
detectable, whereas for a one-sided test, only periods of 
lasses following periods of no losses would be detectable. 
Note that in applying the CUMUFR test sequence, use is 
always made of all the MUF data extending back to period 1. 
This is a principal distinction in this study between CUMUFR 




Like CUMUFR just discussed, D is aimed at detecting 
changes in loss patterns. Unlike cflMuFR, in this study n was 
fixed at 5, i,e. at the end of each balance period, and 
beginning with period 6, the current MUF is compared with some 
constant ß times the sum of the 5 previous MUFs where ß is 
chosen to minimize the variance. Specifically, the test 




D.+5 - ß L D. 
L • 1 J J= 
where ß is a simple function of the error variances in 
measuring net transfers and inventories. 
In this study, the testwas applied as a one-sided test. 
Thus, a period of losses followed by a period of non-losses 
would not be detectable. 
5.6 Sequential probability ratio test 
The sequential probability ratio test is related to the 
CUMUF test in that the test statistic is the cumulative sum of 
the MUFs. However, the test is now a sequential test in the 
true sense of the word, as distinguished from a sequence of 
fixed length tests. 
With the sequential test, when the value of the test 
statistic is calculated at the end of each period, the 
decision is made to either reject the hypothesis of no loss 
(i.e. declare that a loss has been detected), accept the 
hypothesis of no loss, or continue testing. When the hypothesis 
of no loss is accepted, then the test is restarted, and all 
prior data are ignored. This restarting of the test and de-
letion of prior data is what distinguishes the sequential pro-
bability ratio test from the CUMUF test described earlier. With 
the CUMUF test, the MUF data extending backward to period I 
are always retained. 
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5.7 Modified pages test 
The rnodified pages test is also a sequential test in that 
the test rnay be restarted with all prior data elirninated when 
the accurnulated evidence indicates that there has been no 
loss of material. 
where 
For the rnodified pages test, the test statistic is 
c. = 
J 
T. = C. - rnin. C. 
1 1 J J 
t (Dk-8). 
k=l 
In effect, the test statistic is the current CUMUF minus 
the largest previous CUMUF, 8 being a constant. 
The upper threshold (critical value) is a function of sorne 
pararneter, A, which controls the false alarrn rate, and of the 
period nurober i. The lower threshold is zero for the rnodified 
pages text. 
5.8 Truncated sequential CUMUF 
Like the sequential probability ratio test, the basic 
statistic is the curnulative surn of the MUFs. Also, the test 
is sequential in nature, This test procedure is called a 
truncated one because after a fixed nurober of material balance 
periods, a decision rnust be rnade as to whether or not a loss 
has occured. 
In evaluating this test procedure, a saddle-point solution 
is also found. The saddle point solution gives a guaranteed 
efficiency in the sense that it gives the detection probability 
corresponding to the least favourable loss pattern, i,e, it 
reacts to a diversion scenario in which the adversary chooses 
an optirnurn strategy. 
6. Test results 
Eleven statistical test procedures were investigated in-
cluding sorne variations and cornparisons of the eight basic 
testing procedures described under Section 5 for the 26 sets 
of pararneter variations indicated in Table V. These eleven 
cases are identified in Table VI. 
6.1 Cornparison of results 
The results of investigations of the eleven statistical 
test procedures are surnrnarized in Table VII. As rnentioned 
earlier, the investigations in this phase were restricted to 
















IDENTIFICATION OF STATISTICAL TEST 
PROCEDURES INVESTIGATED 
Case type 















Sellinschegg I 131 
CUMUF; sequentially Sellinschegg I 141 
performed fixed length 
test 
CUMUF (35); fixed 
length test at the 
end of 35 periods 
CUMUFR Test; one-
sided sequential 
test with power one 
Sellinschegg I 141 
Sellinschegg I 141 
Sequential Probability Markin I 151 
Ratio Test 
Modified Pages Test Markin I 151 
The results presented in Table VII illustrate some 
interesting points. Remembering that in this phase the 
simulation model has assumed that the inventories in the 
process columns would remain constant and that the systematic 
error components for the inventory measurements would cancel 
out (because of the fact that these data are generated as the 
difference of two measured values), the results aretobe 
considered as indicating the highest sensitivity to be expected 
from the statistical test procedures, using the measurement 
data for the reference facility for the assumed uniform lost 
patterns. 
a) The cases 25 and 26 give the actual a-values. When 
comparing detection probabilities, these differences 
should be kept in mind. Ideally they should be all about 
0,05 for a fair comparison, but it is difficult in some 
cases to fix a precisely in advance. This would mean 
that for a = 0.05 the PD values for the test procedures like 
TABLE VII. 
Case TS-1 TS-2 -
1 1.000 .340 
2 .995 .695 
3 .750 .993 
4 .435 . 750 
5 .299 .993 
6 .192 .745 
7 1.000 .894 
8 1.000 .999 
9 1.000 1.000 
10 .985 1.000 
11 .780 1.000 
12 .539 1.000 
13 .301 .038 
14 . 103 .043 
15 .048 .272 
16 .042 .082 
17 .033 .270 
18 .031 .085 
19 .736 .037 
20 .236 .046 
21 .084 .829 
22 .063 . 184 
23 .046 .829 
24 .039 • 185 
25 .027 .045 
26 .023 .043 
DETECTION PROBABILITIES PD FOR PARAMETERS 
IDENTIFIED IN TABLE V. AND STATISTICAL TEST 
PROCEDURES IDENTIFIED IN TABLE VI. 
TS-3 TS-4 TS-5 TS-6 TS-7 TS-8 -- -- -- --
1.000 .687 1 1.0 1.0 .52 
.991 . 211 1 1.0 1.0 .52 
1.000 .682 .978 1.0 .9 .52 
.994 .207 . 811 1.0 .72 .52 
1.000 .678 .53 1.0 .57 .52 
.995 .204 .355 1.0 .48 .52 
1.000 1.000 1 1.0 1.0 .88 
1.000 .616 1 1.0 1.0 .88 
1.000 1 .000 1 1.0 1.0 .88 
1.000 .608 1 1.0 .99 .88 
1.000 1.000 .989 1.0 .96 .88 
1.000 .601 .909 1.0 .89 .88 
.296 .257 .583 1.0 .27 .09 
.094 . 120 .20 .99 .07 .09 
.255 .256 .06 .98 .05 .09 
.085 . 120 .052 .87 .05 .09 
.246 .256 .052 .96 .05 .09 
.080 . 120 .051 .90 .05 .09 
.785 .699 .763 1.0 .78 .13 
.239 .267 .494 1.0 .22 . 13 
.706 .700 .209 1.0 .09 . 13 
.206 .267 .088 1.0 .08 • 13 
• 710 .700 .064 1.0 .08 • 13 
.198 .266 .055 1.0 .08 . 13 
.034 .041 .05 .051 .035 .051 
.024 .044 .05 .050 .027 .050 
TS-9 TS-10 TS-11 
1.0 .92 1.0 
1.0 .27 .94 
1.0 .93 1.0 
1.0 .27 . 91 
1.0 .92 .96 
1.0 .29 .80 
1.0 1.0 1.0 
1.0 .95 1.0 
1.0 1.0 1.0 
1.0 .97 1.0 I 
~ 
Ol 
1.0 1.0 1.0 I 
1.0 .96 1.0 
.23 .36 .08 
.10 . 17 .05 
.98 .42 .08 
.92 . 18 .05 
.97 .42 .08 
.93 . 17 .05 
.72 .83 • 16 
.26 .40 .11 
1.0 .85 • 12 
1.0 .41 • 10 
1.0 .85 • 1 1 
1.0 .41 .10 
.051 .05 .05 
.051 .05 .05 
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TS-1, TS-3 and TS-7 could be lligher than those obtained 
in the present cases. 
b) It is to be noted that the test sequences TS-1 and TS-7 
should give identical results with the TS-1 results 
calculated by the multivariate normal distribution and 
the TS-7 results by simulation. Taking into account the 
differences in the a values, the agreement is good. 
c) The parameter cases 13-18 represent the warst cases 
considered since the uncertainties with throughput 
measurements are increased by a factor of about 5 for the 
same value of M=lS compared to the other cases. There is 
in general a reduction in P values for almost all the 
test procedures excepting Tg-6 (cumulative sum of MUF 
residuals),in which the detection probabilitites remain 
fairly high. 
d) Test 6 in fact shows the highest probability values 
for all the 24 cases investigated in this phase. 
6.2 CUMUFR test 
Since the particular test procedure TS-6 provided the 
highest set of probability of detection values investigated 
so far, this test was investigated in some more detail in 
the frame of the NRTA Workshop I 131. Using the values of 
Case 6 in Table VII as a basis, the results of these 
additional investigations are illustrated in Fig. 2, top 
diagram, taken from I 131. Gonverted to the data of the 
reference facility, Case 6 would correspond approximately to 






















2. 1 kg Pu 
0.21 kg Pu 
I day 
21 periods 
15 (equivalent to ~30 kg of Pu) 
(Nos. refer to the Nos. in Fig. 2) 







M = 0 (to obtain a) 
Figure 2 illustrates a number of aspects in connection 
with the test procedures TS-6. They are mainly summarized from 
li 31 • 
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a) For abrupt diversion patterns (loss patterns I, 2, 3) the 
PD is above 95%. 
b) For protracted diversion patterns (loss patterns 4, 5, 6, 
7) the PD increases with increasing balancing intervals, 
i.e. from ~25% to 78% when the balancing intervals m are 
increased from I day to 10 days. 
c) This sensitivity is obtained by assuming that the lass 
patterns start after 21 zero loss periods. (I =21) 
0 
d) However, the main message which one gets from these 
illustrative examples as well as from those given under 
Table VII, is the fact that this type of NRTA measure brings 
about a significant improvement in the capability of 
material accountancy (in respect of detection probability 
for a given amount and detection time), over that for the 
conventional type of material accountancy. This remains 
valid in spite of the simplified assumptions made in this 
phase of the investigations. This basic fact is also 
illustrated through another in-depth work carried out by 
Ikawa I I6l using the Barnwell reprocessing facility (BNFP) 
as the reference facility. One other important conclusion 
in that study is the suggestion that if the present 
chemical process were carried out in two parallel lines 
with half the processing capacity each, the detection 
capability for protracted diversion might be significantly 
improved. 
7. Conclusions 
The NRTA Workshop has completed its act~v~t~es involving 
simplified simulation models of the data for the reference 
reprocessing facility with IOOO t HM/a. Inspite of the 
simplified assumptions and the fact that the capability of the 
NRTA measure could be investigated on the basis of mainly 
simulated data with little experimental validation, a number 
of generalized conclusions can be drawn. Some of these 
conclusions which are similar to those drawn by a group of 
concultants at an IAEA consultants meeting on this subject and 
reported upon by Lovett I 171, will not be repeated here. 
7.1 Measurement systems for the type of NRTA measure 
investigated in the workshop i.e. sequential generation 
of the required material accountancy data sets, on the 
basis of Pu measurements in process tanks only (and not 
in process equipments), can be based on currently 
available technology. 
7.2 Required statistical test methods for evaluating the 
material accountancy data in generating safeguards-
relevant conclusions are available. 
7.3 The sensitivity of the NRTA measure, in terms of amounts 
which can be detected with a given set of probability 
values and timeliness, is higher than that possible for 
conventional type of material accountancy measure. For 
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the type of NRTA measure investigated, this sensitivity 
will go down with high fluctuations of estimated 
Pu inventories in process equipments. 
7.4 The main thrust of the R&D activities have tobe in the 
direction of the validation of simulation models with 
actual operational data. 
The in-depth activities on the basis of which the results 
presented in this overview report could be generated, were 
possible only through the support of the involved organizations 
and the excellent cooperation of the participants. 
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MINUTES OF THE FIRST MEETING 
of the Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
1. List of Participants: ANNEX I 
2. Agenda: ANNEX II 
3. Main Results of the Meeting 
The purpose and boundary conditions covering the R+D activities for 
near-real-time accountancy measures (NRTA) were explained by Mr. Gupta. 
The main points are summarized in ANNEX IIIa,b (a: discussion paper 
on R+D activities for near-real-time accountancy measures, b: Intro-
duction to the Meeting). 
It was emphasized that the capabilities and limitations of the NRTA 
measures are to be established on the basis of well-founded R+D activ-
ities by international expert groups working in this field. These 
activities would not prejudice in any way the future application 
possibilities of near-real-time accountancy measures. 
3. 1.2 ~~~~E~g~~-~~~!1!~Y 
Mr. Voß introduced the flow sheet for the 1000 t U/a reference facility. 
Mr. Küchle used the throughput and inventory data from this flow sheet 
to illustrate the influence of different measurement accuracies on the 
uncertainties of MUF values from such a facility. Only the systematic 
error components of a measurement system are relevant in this connect-
ion. For a wide range of values for systematic errors for the different 
throughput streams and the inventory, that for the measurement of 
plutonium in the accountability tank was found to be the most import-
ant single value determining the MUF uncertainty. 
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Mr. Rough (IAEA) described shortly the practice of NRTA at the two 
Hanford reprocessing facilities (the first facility operating during 
the period 1952-1962, the second facility operating from about 1958 on-
xva'l!d). The inventories of plutonium in the running. facilities were estab-
lished monthly rnainly by using measurement data for the process tanks 
(volume, density and acid concentrations). These measurements were 
made routinely tfor process operation. Mr. Rough was responsible for 
the measurement.quality program and MUF evaluation in these facilities. 
He also reported on the NRTA method proposed for the AGNS-Barm7ell facil..:. 
ity. Recently, the operators of this. facility described this method in the 
course of a seminar at the IAEA Headquarters, Vienna. According to 
them, the process tanks and equipment in the B·arnwell facility are 
instrumented in such a way that the total inventory in the process 
area can be assayed and registered at frequent intervals without stop-
ping the plant operation. The same measurement data base as in the case 
of Hanford facilities, i.e. volume, density and acid concentrations, 
is used for this determination. The procedure has been demonstrated 
with uranium in the B·arnwell facility. 
Following three working groups were established to identify and prepare 








M. Küchle (KfK) 
J. Shipley (LASL) 
R. Avenhaus (Hochschule der 
Bundeswehr München) 
The respective rapporteurs gave a short introduction on their subject 
at plenary meetings. The participants then separated into working groups 
to prepare the recomrnendations. The recomrnendations were discussed 
at plenary meetings to incorporate modifications, if any. The intro-
ductory remarks by M. Küchle and the recomrnendations of the working 
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groups are presented in ANNEXES IV a+b (Intrbductory Remarks, M. Küchle; 
Measurement Techniques), V (Simulation) and VI (Evaluation Method-
ologies). A summary of recommended R+D tasks is presented at the end 
of each of annexes IVb, V and VI. 
3.3. 1 The organizations and experts invited so far to participate in the 
different R+D activities were identified. 
(1) Measurement techniques: 
IAK, INR, IHCh, IRCh, PWA (KfK); Los Alamos (U.S.A.) 
(2) Input data for process simulation: 
DWK; GWK; IHCh (KfK) 
(3) Data on operating characteristics for the reference facility 
(e.g. fluctuations on process inventories, hidden inventories, 
losses, etc., for plutonium): 
DWK; GWK; IHCh (KfK) 
(4) Simulation activities: 
EKS, IDT (KfK); Mr. Canty (KFA); Los Alamos (assistance and advice) 
(5) Evaluation methodology: 
EKS, IDT (KfK); Mr. Avenhaus (Hochschule der Bundeswehr München); 
Battelle/U.S.A. (C. Bennett); Los Alamos; JRC Ispra (CEC); 
IAEA (Rough); J. Jaech (EXXON) 
(6) Verification strategies: 
EKS, IDT (KfK); Mr. Avenhaus (Hochschule der Bundeswehr München); 
IAEA (Lovett) 
3.3.2 The workshop emphasized the need for realistic plant operation 
data and recommended a close collaboration with the facility designers 
and operators having experience. 
It was also recommended that an active participation of the safeguards 
organisations IAEA and EURATOM be ensured particularly in the field 
of evaluation, verification, requirements and strategies. In particular, 
experienced inspectors should be involved in the workshop. 
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3.4 !!~~-~~~~~~!~ (starting point: January 1981) 
The specifications for the different R+D activities will have to be 
completed within the next two months. 
- The first model on process simulation should be completed approximately 
in about 6-8 months time. 
- The first screening a~d evaluation of the different statistical 
methodologies would have tobe .completed within the next 2-3 months, 
before starting detailed actions on a nurober of specified methods. 
- The second meeting of the workshop is expected to be held during the 
period of early May to middle of May 1981 before the ESARDA symposium 
in Karlsruhe. 
It is expected that the first ~esults of the R+D activities in this area 
will be presented in a series of papers at the IAEA Safeguards Symposium 
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ANNEX I Participants 
Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
Affiliation Plenary Working Working 
Group I Group 2 
JRC Ispra X X 





KFA/KuU X X 
KfK/PWA X 
LASL X X 
KfK/IHCh X X 
KfK/EKS X X 
KfK/IHCh X X 
GWK X X X 
IAEA X 
TU X X 
KfK/INR X X 
GWK X X 
DWK X X 
KfK/EKS X 
KfK/IRCh X X 
KfK/IAK X X X 
KfK/IRCh X 
KfK/EKS X 
LASL X X 
KfK/IDT X X 
KfK/PWA X 
KfK/EKS X X 
Working Preparation 
























Dec. I I 
Dec. 12 
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ANNEX II Agenda 
Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 




9:00 - 12:00 
14:00 - 17:00 
9:00 - 12:00 
14:00 - 17:00 
9:00 - 12:00 
14:00 - 17:00 
9:00 - 12:00 
December 8-12, 1980 
Subject Discussed 
Plenary session 
- Opening remarks 
- General presentation of the objectives of 
the workshop meeting 
~ Working Group 1: .Measurement Techniques 
~ Working Group 2: Simulation 
~ Working Group 3: Evaluation Methods 
Plenary session 
- Discussions on recommendations of the working 
groups 
- Future course of work 
- Concluding remarks 
Preparation of the minutes of the meeting 
(with limited attendance) 
The main workshop meeting concluded on December II at 17:00. 
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ANNEX IIIa 
Discussion Paper on Required R+D Work 
Prepared for Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
1. General 
D. Gupta 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
F.R. Germany 
The purpose of the present meeting is expected to be twofold: 
- 'l'o identify the area in which R+D work will be required to establish 
the capability and limitations of the near-real-time accountancy measure 
under operating conditions in connection with international safeguards 
for a large scale reference reprocessing facility 
- To formulate R+D tasks (objectives, subject ma~ters tobe treated, 
results to strive for, distribution of activities for the identified 
tasks etc.) . 
2. General Boundary Conditions 
2.1 Reprocessing Facility 
The flow sheet and the layout of a 1000 tU/a reprocessing facility, developed 
by DWK/KfK, F.R. Germany, will form the basis for these investigations. 
2.2 The near-real-time accountancy (n.r.t.) measure will be applied only to 
the process area of the reference facility for the plutonium flows and 
inventories. 
2.3 Determination of Plutonium Amounts 
The plutonium amounts in inventories in and in flows to and from the 
process area will be determined as far as practicable, on the basis of 
measurements carried out in connection with the operation of the facility. 
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2.3.1 As the first alternative, only the process tanks (and not process 
equipment or pipelines) will be assayed to establish the plutonium 
inventory in the process. Such inventories will be established during 
the operation of the process (physical inventory taking without plant shut 
down). 
2.3.2 The plutonium inventories in process equipments and pipelines (which 
correspond to approximately 6-7 % of the total plutonium inventory in 
the process) will be considered to be approximately constant fluctuating 
~ithin a given range (for example ~ 5-10 %). In case plutonium amounts 
will be assayed in process equipments for operational reasons, consideration 
could be given to the use of such values as a possible alternative for 
providing credibility to the assumed values for plutonium content in the 
process equipment and pipelines for n.r.t. accountancy purposes. 
However, such values could be used only if they could be verified by the 
safeguards organizations and the use of such values would not cause a 
hindrance or a disadvantage to the facility operators. 
2.4 Independent Verification 
In general all the relevant steps required for the implementation of n.r.t. 
measures on a routine basis (for example measurement systems, calibration 
methods, statistical evaluation method for data for providing safeguards 
relevant statements etc.), should be verifiable by safeguards organizations 
with regard to the credibility. 
3. Measurement Basis 
In identifying the R+D areas for measurement systems for the n.r.t. accountancy 
measure, a nurober of points will be worth considering. Some of them are indicated 
below: 
3.1 Nurober of Steps in a Measurement System 
In most of the cases, the throughput and inventory amount of Pu ~ill be 
assayed in tanks. Following steps may be required for a measurement system 
for determining the Pu amount in such a tank: 
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- Sample taking from a tank 
- S ample transfer to the analytical measurement system 
- Pretreatment of the sample 
- Measurement of Pu concentration (along with the associated calibration 
procedure) 
- Measurement of volume (associated with calibration procedure) 
- Calculation of Pu-amount in the tank. 
The less the number of intermediate steps, the less also is the: 
- Number of the sources of error in the measurement 
- The possibility of falsification 
- Number of steps requiring verification by safeguards organizations. 
3.2 The Measurement Time 
The total measurement time including all the steps should be whenever possible, 
less than the residence time of a Pu-solution in a tank (e.g. in the range 
of 8-24 hours). In this manner the frequency of the n.r.t. accounting will 
be determined by the inherent process parameter involving the residence 
time of the Pu containing solution in a tank and not by the delays in t.be 
measurement system. Besides,. the verification of the operators measurement 
data could be carried out in principle,during the time the solution is still 
in the tank. 
3.3 Random and Systematic Errors 
Preliminary investigations indicate that the MUF uncertainty (0MUF) 
for n.r.t. accountancy is determined mainly by the systematic error component 
of the measurement uncertainty for Pu amounts in the input accountability 
tank. The contributions of the random error component of this measurement 
system as well as the expected systematic and random errors of all the 
other measurement systems (e.g. inventory, product, waste) to the aMUF are 
rather insignificant. At present the systematic error component of araund 1 % 
(1 0 value) at the input accountability tank, has been found mainly to arise 
from the Volumetrie and analytical measurement sources. A reduction in the 
systematic errors at these steps could be extremely useful. 
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3.4 Calibration Possibility 
In principle, the possibility of calibration for all the measurement 
systems in a n.r.t. accountancy may have tobe foreseen. However, the 
importance of calibration for the different systems may be completely 
different. for different throughput and inventory measurements. For example 
recalibration possibility may not be necessary for inventory (process tanks) 
measurements. A calibration system in case it becomes necessary, must be 
operable during the operation of the process area and easily verifiable 
by the safeguards organizations. 
3.5 Data Generation and Verification 
In establishing the different tasks for creating the measurement basis, 
main emphasis is to be placed on the possibility of the realization in a 
facility tmder routine operation. Besides, the data sets generated have 
to be available to the safeguards organizations in a verifiable form. 
A large part of the investigative R+D efforts will have to be directed to 
this area. 
4. Simulation 
4.1 Objectives: To simulate the relevant accountancy data after taking into 
con~ideration real operating conditions. 
4.2 Subjects of Simulation 
4.2.1 The behaviour of the inprocess inventory such as the range of fluctuation, 
uncertainty, minimum available inventories under routine operating 
conditions which may be verified through measurements, influence 
of the fluctuations of the unmeasured part of inventory on the measured 
part etc. Such simulations may have to be carried out under start-up, 
normal operating and abnormal conditions. 
4.2.2 Simulation of different accountancy data for establishing uncertainty 
in MUF, trends etc. for different values of measurement uncertainties 
(both systematic and random) , fluctuations in the inventories, absolute 
amounts of throughputs and inventories etc.; establishment of trends in 
the uncertainty of data base and different types of influences on the 
MUF values. 
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4.2.3 Simulation of different diversion strategies under the given set 
of process inventory and throughput conditions to establish capabilities 
and limitations of n.r.t. accountancy measure with regard to these 
diversions. 
4.3 Sources of Information for Simulation 
Sources of information on different topics with regard to simulation 
should be derived to the maximum possible extent from practical experience 
as well as realistic data from operating facilities. 
4.4 Experimental Verification of Simulation Data 
The simulated data will have to be validated under real operating conditions. 
Therefore, a part of the R+D activities may involve possibilities of 
verifying the simulated data. 
5. Statistical Evaluation of the Data Generated 
5.1 Objective: On the basis of the data set produced by n.r.t. accountancy measure, 
the safeguards organizations will have to prepare a statement with regard 
to a possible diversion. For achieving this objective, the first question 
to be answered is the form of the final statement, expressed in the context 
of the proposed goals of the safeguards organization. Since these goals 
are expressed on the basis of abrupt and protracted diversions, a final 
statementwill have to address to both these possibilities. Therefore, 
such a statement should be made at least for the following types of diversion 
strategies. 
5.1.1 Abrupt Diversion 
A diversion may be considered to be abrupt if an amount M be diverted 
within a period of 1-2 weeks (or less). 
This diversion has to be detected within 1-3 weeks after the total amount M 
has been diverted. 
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5.1.2 Protracted Diversion 
A diversion may be considered to be protracted if this diversion is 
carried out over a period greater than 2 weeks during a whole calendar 
year. This diversion has to be detected within 1-3 weeks after the total 
amount M has been diverted but in any case before the end of the calendar 
year. 
5.2 Evaluation Formalism 
The evaluation formalism has to be designed in such a manner as to enable 
the safeguards organizations to initiate activities in a timely manner or 
to clarify anomalies which may be caused by different types of process 
fluctuations and losses or by different types of diversion strategies. 
5.3 Probabilities of False Alarms and Non-Detection (a, ß) 
A number of alternatives may be available for the choice of a and ß. 
They could be for example: 
- To establish different a values for different diversion strategies 
- To establish the same a value for all the diversion strategies. 
The capabilities and limitations of n.r.t. accountancy could be analyzed 
on the basis of a parametric study for different a ß alternatives 
for the given reference facility. 
The possibility of using estimates for determining trends could also 
be investigated. 
5.4 Short Detection Time 
A detection time can be considered to be short if a detection can be made 
within 1-3 weeks after a given amount has been diverted in an abrupt fashion. 
Short detection time should not be treated separately but together with 
the diversion strategy to be considered. Therefore, the question in connec-
tion with the short detection time would be: 
- If a given amount M is diverted during 1-2 weeks, what would be the 
minimum probability of detection with which such a diversion could 
be expected to be detected for a given false alarm within l-3 weeks 
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after the diversion of the complete amount of M has taken place. 
- How could the probability of detection be improved? 
5.5 Protracted Diversion 
The capability of near-real-time accountancy with regard to protracted 
diversion could be considered for two boundary cases. 
- Case 1 
The Operator plans to divert a small but the same amount continuously 
during a given period of time (for example one year) . What would be 
the minimum amount which could be detected as diverted for a given 
values for a and S? 
How could this amount be reduced? 
- Case 2 
The plant operator plans to divert a given amount M over a longer period 
of time than two weeks and distributes this amount randomly over a calendar 
year. \Yhat would be the minimum probability of detecting the amount M 
within 10-30 days after the diversion of the total amount M has been 
completed for a given a. 
How could the probability of detection be improved? 
5.6 Establishing the Areas for Future R+D Tasks 
After an agreement is obtained on the types of diversion strategies and 
principals of methodology to be utilized, it is desirable to have agreement 
on the specific methods which should be utilized for evaluating the data 
base obtained by n.r.t. accountancy measures. 
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ANNEX IIIb 
Introduction to the Workshop Meeting 
on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
D. Gupta 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
F.R. Germany 
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PURPOSE OF THE MEETING 
- IDENTIFY AND SPECIFY R+D ACTIVITIES WITH EXPERIMENTAL 
VALIDATION 
- TO ESTABLI SH 
- CAPABILITIES AND LIMITATIONS OF NRT-ACCOUNTANCY MEASURE 




- MEASURES TO PROVIDE A VERIFIABLE DATA BASE TO SAFEGUARDS 
ORGANISATIONS FOR ENSURING CONTINUITY OF KNOWLEDGE ON FLOW 
AND INVENTORY OF PU IN A LARGE-SCALE REPROCESSING FACILITY 
- WITH A VIEW TO 
- ENABLE THESE ORGANISATIONS TO MAKE SAFEGUAROS-RELEVANT 
STATEMENTS ON POSSIELE DIVERSION STRATEGfES ON THE BASIS 
OF THIS DATA BASE 
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BOUNDARY GONDITIONS 
1000 T U/YR, REFERENGE FAGILITY 
MAXIMUM POSSIELE USE OF MEASUREMENTS MADE IN ANY GASE FOR 
PLANT OPERATION 
PU-INVENTORIES MAINLY IN PROGESS TANKS 
ALL STEPS LEADING TO DATA BASE MUST BE VERIFIABLE BY 
SAFEGUARDS ORGANISATIONS 
MINIMUM POSSIELE HINDRANGE TO NORMAL PLANT OPERATION 
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DIVERSION STRATEGfES AND DETECTION TIMES 
- ABRUPT 
- DIVERSION OF AN AMOUNT M OVER A 
SHORT PERIOD: 1-2 WEEKS 
- DETECTION: 1-3 WEEKS AFTER M DIVERTED 
- PROTRACTED 
- DIVERSION OF AN AMOUNT M OVER A 
LONGER PERIOD: 2-52 WEEKS 
IN A CALENDAR YEAR 
- DETECTION: 1-3 WEEKS AFTER M DIVERTED 










Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
H. Küchle 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
F.R. Germany 
1'000 t/a Reprocessing Plant 
Plutonium Inventory in Process Area 
Storage Tanks Process Equipment 
Nurober total Pu content Pu content 
of (kg Pu) (kg Pu) 
4 50 
8 157 9.6 
6 45 7.9 
6 177 6. 1 
2 137 2.5 
26 566 kg Pu 26.1 kg Pu 
95.6 % 4.4 % 
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1000 t/a Reprocessing Plant 
Annual Plutonium'Flow and 
Estimated Cumulative Measurement Error (Systernatic) 
Object of rneasurernent Pu flow Measurernent error (2cr) 
kg Pu/a % kg Pu/a 
input accountabi li ty tank lOÖOO I (0.5) 100 (50) 
product output 10000 0.3 30 
centrifuge waste 20 50 10 
; 
leached hulls 10 100 10 
HAW 40 50 20 
MAW, LAW 3 50 1.5 
hl\M~ = 107 kg (63) 
~ 
if all waste strearns + 100% 114 kg (74) 
period: 1 day 1 week 4 weeks 1 year I 
2cr: 0.54 kg 2.7 kg 10.7 kg 107 kg 
storage tanks. 






Systematic errors in inventory measurements 
storage tanks 566 kg Pu 
process equipment 26 kg Pu 
Assumed error (2cr) 
process equipment 













Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
Recommendations of Warking Group 1: Measurement Techniques 
Participants: S. Flach (KfK/PWA); P. Groll (KfK/IHCh); H.J. Hein (GWK); 
L. Koch (TU); M. Küchle (KfK/INR); E. Mainka (KfK/IRCh); 
H. Ottmar (KfK/IM<) 
I. Running Inventory 
I. I Pu-Inventory in Storage Tanks 
A measurement with a systematic error of 2 a = + 2 % of plutonium concentra-
tion and volume of solution in storage tanks is feasible. 
Sampling of solution can be made within one hour provided that one sampling 
head has not to handle more than 6 samples. Thus, with level measurement being 
continuous the time of inventory is defined well enough. The time required for 
sample analysis is estimated to be one week or less. 
The following diversion scenario was considered to be of primary concern: 
In view of the fact that the inspector can only see the level indicator but not 
the real level of the solution falsification of instrument reading and clande-
stine removal of solution is possible. Same R+D work on verification possibilities 
of the level in process tanks would be required. As an alternative, an independent 
rneasurement of the total liquid flows in the aqueous stream and balance of liquid 
volurnes is proposed for verification of the presence of solution. Neutronmonitors 
or seals shall prevent extraction of plutonium via the organic phase. 
This proposal, if implemented, would require design verification of the process 
area during the plant construction phase. 
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For the highest concentration (50 g Pu/1) 200 1 have to be diverted 
to get 10 kg of plutonium. An abrupt diversion of this volume can already be 
detected by monitaring a few liquid flows, part of '"hich have free access. 
Fo~ detection of protracted diversion about twice the nurober of tanks which 
are used for plutonium assay have to be monitored. 
Alternatively it was proposed to perform the Plutonium assay 1n storage 
tanks by continuous concentration measurements of the tank input flow which by 
integration and combination with the level measurement gives a continuous 
plutonium content reading. The verification problern is similar to the one dis-
cussed above, the concentration measurement can be verified by the inspector 
di rectly. 
As R+D it is proposed to look into the diversion scenario and verification 
technique on the basis of detailed flow sheets. 
A rapid though not very accurate verification of sample analysis is facili-
tated by the straight_foreward and transparent measurement technique in case 
y-absorptiometry or RF-analysis are used. Alternatively 240Pu passive neutron 
counting by the inspector should be considered. Same R+D work in this area is 
still required. 
1.2 Pu-Inventory 1n Process Equipment 
A more careful inspection of WAK data revealed significant short term fluc-
tuations of acid level in tanks (~ 50%). Similarly significant fluctuations of 
Pu-inventory in process equipment has to be assumed. Fortunately for criticality 
reasons just these components that contain large amounts of plutonium are monitared 
by passive neutron counting.Calibration and verification impose serious problems. 
Operational experience with a plant running under normal conditions may be help-
ful. It has to be investigated whether the plutonium accumulation monitors can, 
satisfy safeguards requirements. 
Isotope correlation and a moving plutonium isotope composition discontinuity 
were not considered to be useful tools in the process area because of rework and 
complicated process streams. 
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2. Input Accountability 
A significant improvement in input accountability tank assay beyond 2 0 
does not seem feasible. 
+ I % 
For verification an independent measurement of the total uranium content combined 
with a Pu/U-analysis of I %o accuracy is proposed. Total uranium is determined from 
the fuel element fabricators data corrected for burn up, losses in leached hulls 
and losses in centrifuge waste. A 0.5 % accuracy seems obtainable. 
An independent uranium assay can be obtained from y-absorptiometry. 
238 241 . 
Because of the difficulties encountered with the Pu- and Pu-analys1s 
it is recommended to make the plutonium accountancy via 240Pu instead of total 
Pu. Gonversion to total Pu can finally be made using the input analysis. 
240
Pu 
has also the advantage that it is directly measured by passive neutron counting. 
It is an important R+D effort to look into this proposal in detail. 
Abrupt diversion in the head end area could be detected' by checking the 
isotope correlations of 134cs/137Cs and 244cm/Pu as well as the Xe release. 
134
cs/137Cs is by the burn up correlated with Pu/U which would be changed by 
removal of Pu. R+D work is needed to assess the accuracy and reliability of this 
method. 
3. Waste Measurements 
3.1 Solid Waste 
Determination of residual fuel on leached hulls can be clone in the following 
way: With the fuel element monitor neutron emission per gram of uranium is 
determined and by passive neutron counting at the leached hulls basket the neutron 
emission rate of the hulls is measured and converted into uranium. It is not clear, 
however, whether the Cm to Pu ratio of the fuel is the same as on the hulls. 
To clarify this point is for the moment the most important R+D issue in the area 
-53-
of leached hull monitors. The same 1s true for the 
of passive y-counting. 
144 . . Ce to Pu rat1o 1n case 
Alternatively active neutron interrogation has to be applied by which total 
fissile content is measured. Significant R+D work is needed to assess the 
accuracy of this method under field conditions. 
Active neutron interrogation also has to be applied to plutonium assay of 
filters and centrifuge waste. This method being expensive and inaccurate it 
should be checked whether inductively coupled plasma spectroscopy could be used 
at least for calibration. 
The verification of plutonium content in barrels to which the inspector has 
full access does not impose a principal problern but has serious practical diffi-
culties. 
3.2 Liquid Waste 
From the liquid waste only HAW contains enough plutonium to be of relevance 
for the material balance. Assay should be done by sampling, analysis and volume 
measurement. Automated a-spectrometry is needed and is under development. 
Alternative measurement techniques are inductively coupled plasma and 
laser technique which require R+D work. 
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Summary of necessary R+D effort 
Warking Group 1: Measurement Techniques 
1 . N.unning Inventory 
I. 1 Plutonium inventory in storage tanks 
- Investigation of methods for verification of liquid levels in process 
tanks 
- Study of the possibility of combining tank level measurements with 
continuous concentration measurements of tank input flow for assaying 
plutonium in storage tanks 
Investigation of possible diversion seenarios based on a detailed process 
flow sheet for establishing the verification techniques and alternative 
possibilities (e.g., independent measurement of the total liquid flows 
in the a,queous streams and balance of liquid volume). 
- The use of transparent straight-forward measurement techniques for 
rough verification of sample analysis: e.g. gamma-absorptiometry, RF 
analysis, 240pu neutron counting 
1.2 Plutonium inventory in process equipment 
- Study of the applicability of in-process plutonium accumulation monitors 
as an aid to estimate inventories in process equipment with particular 
attention to the verification possibilities 
2. Input Accountability 
- Investigation of alternative level indication techniques for high 
accuracy in input accountability tank (e.g. "Ruska" method) 
- Analysis of the sources of systematic error components in the measurement 
systems used for the input accountability sample assay, with a view to 
reduce them or to convert them into random error components (e.g. through 
calibration) 
- Study of the feasibility of accounting for 240Pu rather than total pluto-
nium in the process area 
- Assessment of accuracy and reliability of isotopic correlations as a .means 
of verifying operator input accountability data (e,g. checking the isotopic 
correlations of 134 Cs/137 es, 244 Cm/Pu as well as the Xe release) 
3. Measurements for Solid and Liquid Wastes 
- Clarification of the problern of differing Cm to Pu ratio between spent 
fuel and leached hulls, also for the ratio 144 Ce to Pu in case of passive 
gamma counting 
- Investigation of active neutron interrogation methods for solid wastes 
- Investigation of laser and inductively coupled plasma techniques for 
assaying plutonium in filters, centrifuge waste and liquid HAW 
- FtlXther development of the automated alpha-spectrometry for plutonium assay 
in liquid was te 
- Development of different methods for assaying plutonium content in barrels 
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ANNEX V 
Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
Recommendations of Warking Group 2: Simulation 
Participants: F. Argentesi (JRC Ispra); R. Avenhaus (Hochschule der Bundeswehr 
München); M. Canty (KFA); J.E. Foley (LASL); D. Gupta (KfK/EKS); 
H.J. Hein (GWK); J. Lausch (GWK); E. Leitner (DWK); H. Ottmar 
(KfK/IAK); J.P. Shipley (LASL); G. Spannagel (KfK/IDT); F. Voß 
(KfK/EKS) 
PART A - MODEL GONSTRUGTION 
I. Process Model 
A. Information 
1. flowsheet values 
2. variations 
3. operating procedures 
B. Model Equations 
1. tanks 
2. other vessels 
3. diversion (step III.D) 
4. fit the pieces tagether 
C. Translate to Computer Program 
D. Simulate 
E. Display Results 
1. nominal behavior 
2. extremes 
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II. Accounting System Model 
III. 
A. Information 
I. measurement technology 
2. measurement capability 
a. statistics 
b. procedures 
B. Model Equations 
I. error models 
2. materials balance constraints 
3. falsification (step III.F) 
C. Translate to Computer Program 
D. Simulate 
E. Display Results 
I. I, T, MUF 
2. measurement error variances for the composite I, T, and MUF 
Diversion Model 
A. Detect Diversion Strategies 
I. location 
2. time evolution 
a. abrupt 
b. protracted 
B. Choose Diversion Amount 
C. Translate to Computer Program 
D. Insert into process model (step I. B. 3) 
E. Modify Materials Accounting Data 
I. unfalsified (for operator) 
2. falsified (reported to inspector) 
F. Insert into Accounting System Model (step II.B.3) 
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IV. Verification Model 
A. Determine Possible Verification Strategies 
B. Examine the Feasibility of Verification Activities 
C. Quantify the Gapability of Individual Verification Activities 
D. Model Equations 
I. verification errors 
2. relation to accounting system model 
E. Translate to Computer Program 
F. Simulate 
G. Display Results 
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PART B - MODEL VALIDATION 
I. Process Model 
A. Information Sources 
I. process operating histories 
2. operator experience 
3. new experiments 
B. Areas of Particular Cancern 
I. unmeasured inventories 
2. upset conditions 
II. Accounting System Model 
A. Information Sources 
I. instrument designers 
2. operator and inspector experience 
3. new experiments 
B. Areas of Particular Cancern 
I. measurement control program 
2. satisfaction of measurement conditions 
III. Diversion Model 
A. Information Sources 
I. past experience 
2. operators and inspectors 
3. new experiments 
B. Areas of Particular Cancern 
I. feasibility 
2. are warst cases included? 
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IV. Verification Model 
A. Information Sources 
I. past and present procedures 
2, inspectors 
3. new experiments 
B. Areas of Particular Cancern 
I, feasibility 
2, sensitivity to changes in diversion strategy 
3. relation to process operating conditions 
Summary of necessary R+D effort 
Warking Group 2: Simulation 
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1. Collection and, if necessary, generation of reliable data base corresponding 
to actual plant operating conditions and measurement capabilities 
2. Modeling and Validation 
a. process 
b. accounting system 
c. diversion 
d. verification 
3. Effects and Treatment of Unmeasured In\rentories 
4. Individual Verification Techniques 
5. Overall Verification Strategies (related to evaluation methods) 
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ANNEX VI 
Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
December 8-12, 1980 
Reconunendations of Warking Group 3: Evaluation Methodology 
Participants: F. Argentesi (JRC Ispra); R. Avenhaus (Hochschule der Bundeswehr 
München); R. Beedgen (KfK/IDT); W. Beyrich (KfK/EKS); M. Canty 
(KFA); D. Gupta' (KfK/EKS); H.J. Hein (GWK); H. Rough (IAEA); 
J. Lausch (GWK); E. Leitner (DWK); S. Schoof (KfK/IRCh); 
D. Sellinschegg (KfK/EKS); J.P. Shipley (LASL); G. Spannagel (KfK/IDT); 
F. Voß (KfK/EKS) 
1. We consider that the safeguards approach for detecting protracted diversion 
(i.e. for conventional material accountancy) is established. We will investi-
gate the augmenting of these techniques with methods for detecting abrupt 
diversion as the other extreme and diversion strategies between those extremes. 
2. We will fix values for a, and the reference time interval (one year) and 
investigate the behavior of ß as a function of loss amount and detection time. 
3. We will establish the frequency of drawing materials balances (without shut-
down of the facility) to be of the order of the conversion time (less than 
one month). For abrupt diversion this means that the detection time is 
essentially the time between materials balances. 
4. When the testing procedure produces an alarm an investigation at different 
levels should be initiated as opposed to shutting down the plant. These 
levels would involve examination of 
- mistakes in the data 
- bias in the measurement system 
- location of unmeasured lasses 
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~ location of hidden inventory 
- further actions to establish whether there is something missing (e.g. 
clean-out). 
5. We recommend investigation of a few evaluation methods deemed to be 
appropriate by this group including sequential testing procedures. We will 
consider procedures that make use of data from previous time periods under·the 
constraint that the decisions for the previous calendar years will not be 
revised. 
6. As an objective criterion for the optimization of sequential test procedures 
we take the expected detection time for protracted diversion extending over 
12 months or less. 
7. We recommend starting the analysis of sequential test procedures by using 
the CUMUF-statistics. 
8. We will consider the use of specialized estimators in order to investigate 
the loss pattern and a minimum variance unbiased estimate of the loss amount 
within the process operation constraints. 
9. In developing the different test and estimation procedures, it is essential 
that realistic data should be used. The following types of data may influence 
the effectiveness of different test and estimation procedpres: 
- measurement errors 
- fluctuation of process inventories 
- hidden inventories 
- unmeasured losses. 
Appropriate R+D efforts may be necessary to obtain such data. 
10. The resulting procedures should be documented and demonstrated so that 
inspector personnel will understand how to use these procedures as well as 
which data will be required and how to acquire them. 
I 1. The question of verification by international organisations has not been 
covered at present. This point has to be taken up at an appropriate time. 
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Summary of necessary R+D effort 
Warking Group 3: Evaluation Methodology 
The main tasks of the working group are: 
1. Complete definition of the objectives and boundary conditions as first out-
lined in the recommendations 
2. Analysis of sequential test and estimation procedures by using CUMUF 
statistics and a limited number of other evaluation methods and specialized 
estimators 
3. Definition of the input data elements required to implement the procedures 
and acquisition of realistic data sets 
4. T~st the procedures 
5. Determine the effectiveness of the procedures when the data are influenced 
by measurement errors, fluctuation of process inventories, hiddffil inventories 
and unmeasured losses 
6. Document the most effective procedures that can be recommended for use by 
inspectors 
7. Define the verification methodology based on the results obtained from the 
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of the 2nd Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Nuclear Research Center Karlsruhe 
February 24-26, 1982 
I. D. Gupta welcomed the participants (A list of participants is g~ven in 
Annex I). 
2. The provisional agendawas amended by including additional 
presentations (Annex II). 
3. D. Gupta outlined the objectives of the meeting: a) to establish the 
state-of-the-art of Near-Real-Time Accountancy for application in 
reprocessing plants, b) to discuss how to handle the results of the 
workshop for presentation at the IAEA Symposium, November 1982, Vienna. 
J. Lovett pointed out that he could not make any commitments in respect 
of b). He invited proposals until beginning of May 1982. 
4. Results of studies in three main areas (evaluation, simulation, measure-
ments) were presented and discussed. Most of the presentations were based 
on working papers distributed during the meeting (a list of these papers 
~s compiled in Annex III). 
4.1 Evaluation ----------
This topic began with a presentation (C. Bennett) of the general frame-
work in which evaluation studies should be carried out and in which 
different methods should be compared, emphasizing the importance of 
clearly defining the problems under investigation. 
A nurober of statistical test procedures were described and discussed 
in respect of their underlying assumptions and boundary conditions, 
i.e. the problems for which they are principally appropriate 
(J.L. Jaech, D. Sellinschegg, J.T. Markin, R. Avenhaus, N. Nishimura). 
Several speakers also presented numerical results of applying these 
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tests to specific examples and ~n one case to real data in order 
to dernarrstrate the performance of the procedures. It turned out 
that these results were not immediately comparable and it was 
recognized that there is a need to compa~e the sensitivity of 
different test procedures on a common basis. 
4.2 Simulation 
The status of the simulation activities of KfK/KFA was presented and 
compared to the program outlined during the first workshop. For complete-
ness (and in addition to the distributed working paper) some of the basic 
features of the reference plant under study are summarized in Annex IV. 
J. Lovett presented a simple model for estimating the Pu inventory in 
extractors. 
H. Nishimura gave a survey of the simulation activities in Japan. 
E. Mainka compared different measurement techniques for input solution, 
Pu product solution and waste streams in respect of accuracy, effort, 
costs and verifiability. Several participants emphasized the importance 
of sampling errors which in operating facilities often dominate the 
pure measurement.errors in a laboratory. 
H. Würz presented neutron measurement techniques developed or under 
development at KfK for application at extractors in a reprocessing plantr 
These instruments are designed to serve operating purposes and not to 
quantitatively measure the Pu inventory of extractors. Under special 
circumstances these methods might be modified to use them for quanti-
tative estimates. 
G. Hough confirmed that in the past operators in the US were able to 
estimate the Pu hold-up in columns using empirical correlations and 
selected process information. 
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5. Conclusions -----------
Three subgroup papers related to evaluation procedures (Annex Va-Vc) were 
drafted, The discussion in the group led to several clarifications and 
corrections which, however, have not been incorporated in the annexed 
drafts. They are giving a framewerk and ranges of parameters for compar-
ing different test procedures on a common basis. This comparison would be 
carried out under relatively simple assumptions about the process, since 
a) data from the more detailed process models are not yet available and 
b) some of the tests, in their present form, are not suited to evaluate 
the output of such models. The participants concerned will contact each 
other to decide how to proceed further. 
Three other subgroup papers (Annex Vd-Vf) deal with simulation studies. 
They either list areas where contributions to a possible overview 
report could be made or indicate where work in the near future should 
be carried out. It was pointed out that a clear distinction should be 
made betweem column models used in simulation studies for evaluating 
different statistical test procedures and simplified column models 
for estimating the Pu inventories in these columns. It was also recommend-
ed that the actual content of contributions from this area to an over-
v~ew report can be established at a later date, 
-70-
Annex I 
2nd International Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
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Annex IV 
Characteristic Data of the 
Reference Reprocessing Facility RWA-1000 
(presented by F. Voss) 
-74-






































































1.0 I D 
0.4 I D 
3.8 I D 
19.0 I D 
2.7 I D 
1.2 I D 














































PU-INVENTORY IN TANKS 








































REFERENCE REPROCESSING FACILITY RWA-1000 
THROUGHPUT: 
PU-INVENTORY: 
1000 THM/A ~ 5 THM/D 
10 Tpu/A ~ 50 KGpu/D 
3 DISSOLVER BATCHES/D 
1 INPUT BATCH/D 
1 OUTPUT BATCH/2,5 D 
TANKS 525 KG 
PROCESS 
EQUIPMENT 
<FEED ADJ.TANK- PROD.ACC.TANK) 
30.2 KG TOTAL 
11.6 KG PULSE COLUMNS 
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Annex V 
2nd International Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accountancy 
in Large Reprocessing Facilities 
Karlsruhe, February 24-26, 1982 
Warking Papers of the Subgroups 
C.A. Bennett 
R. Avenhaus 
I • LOS S MODELS 
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Annex Va 
1.1 Models which describe the assumptions concerning the data tobe evaluated 
are necessary to provide: 
I) A framework within which to determine tests that are in some 
sense "best" or robust". 
2) A framework for comparative studies based on simulation procedures. 
1.2 The evaluationwill consider a series of determinations of the inventories 
and transfers corresponding to a single MBA. Inventories will be taken at 
times t. starting at some initial time t and continuing indefinitely. 
1 0 
We may wish to consider: 
a) All the data 
b) All the data subsequent to some initial time T 
0 
c) All the data obtained during some fixed period T. 
1.3 The data will be characterized by 
I) Assumed true values ~· of the inventories at timet .• Insimulation 
1 1 
studies these are derived from the process simulation. 
2) Assumed errors of deterrnination of net transfers and inventory. 
These are propagated from an assumed set of measurement errors 
and accounting procedures. 
3) Assumed lasses L. in the periods ~t = t.-t. 
1 
between inventories. These 1 1 1-
rnay be present in known or unmodeled process errors, long term or 
unmodeled measurement biases, or deliberate diversion. 
I .4 In this exercise the primary concern 1s to estimate and test hypotheses 
concerning the L .• The ~· are modeled s1nce (I) assumptions concerning these may 
1 1 
effect the ability to estimate the L., and (2) in more general situations we 
1 
may wish to estimate or test inventories as well as lasses. 
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I.5 Models of the losses which will be considered in this exercise 
are the following: 
I • 5. I We are concerned with the total loss M during some fixed time period 
which may be, for example, a calendar year or a campaign. The individual 
lasses L. y.M within this period are of concern only as the patterns y. 
~ ~ ~ 
e.ffect the ability to estimate and test M. 
T 
I.5.2 As ~n I.5.I, excepted that we are concerned with the nature or timeliness 
of lasses within the fixed period, This may involve: 
1.5.2.1 Consideration of the time period of the initial loss 
I.5.2.2 Consideration of the time at which the total amount M was 
available. 
1.5.2.3 Consideration of the form of the diversion (e.g., abrupt vs. protracted). 
I. 5. 3 We are concerned wi th the lasses in some fixed period T from T 
1 
to 
T 2 following T 0 • This may involve either a large or small fraction of the 
total time periods under consideration. Several subcases will be considered. 
I.5.3.I The existence of a base set of data k.nown tobe lass free. 
(Equivalently, can we assume ~ 0 = 0?) 
I.5.3.2 Whether or not only L. > 0 are considered, 
~-
I.5.3.3 Whether or not there exists a time T
3 
by which detection of the 
lasses between Tl and T
2 
should be achieved. 
I.5.4 Within the model developed in I.5.3, two types of assumptions with 
respect to the lass pattern during T are of interest. Both involve the 
expected value L and the variance 0~ of the lasses. 
1.5.4.I (Diversion Model) . The pattern of lasses suchthat E(L.)=L(or EL.=M) 
~ 1 
is chosen to minimize the probability of detection for the particular test or 
tests being used. This differs from 1.5.1 because the location and length 
of the period T are not stipulated, 
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I .5.4.2 (Process Model) , The lasses 1. are assumed to be characteristic 
1 
of some process characteristics, such as a waste loss, process shift, or 
measurement bias. Typical models include a basic variability oi and an 
assumed shift or drift 1n the expected value of L.,(e.g. E(Li) = ~ 0 , 
t.<T. 1 E(L.) = ~ +8 
1 1 0 ' 
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Annex Vb --------
Report of Subgroup 2 
on Data Evaluation Methods: 
Data Base-Variables and Parameters 
D. Sellinschegg 
J. Jaech 
February 26, 1982 
Two types of parameters are to be considered in the future 
definition of this study. The error structure and the loss 
pattern are specified. 
Error structure 
The notation is consistent with that given in the report 
"Determination of the Detection Probability as a Function of 
Various Loss Strategies: Part 1", J.L. Jaech, January, 1982. 
In addition, the systematic error will be broken down into two 
cornponents, a long terrn and a short term systematic error 
variance as follows: 
where 
2 ao = 
o 2 = L.T. S.E. variance 
w 
2 oe = S.T. S.E. variance 
The ranges of the error parameters to 
future work are as follows, with o = 
n 
be investigated in this 
1 as the base value so 
that all parameter values are relative to 0 • 
n 
0 : 0. 1 to 10 E 
00/oE: 0 to 10 
0 = oe w 
M: 0 to 24 
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The S.T.S.E. will be shifted every T time intervals. The range 
on T will be 
T: 0.1n to n 
Loss patterns 
The losses will be presumed to include unmeasured inventories. 
In the simulation work, the losses can be characterized by 
either specifying expected losses or actual losses, but in the 
analytical studies, only actual losses can be input. 
In the loss patterns, from time t
0 
to ta' the losses (exclusive 
of unmeasured inventories) will be zero for all intervals. In 
the next series of intervals, ta to tb, non-zero losses will 
occur according to patterns defined below. From tb to tn, losses 
will again be zero. 
From ta to tb' the families of loss patterns will be as follows: 
Family 1: abrupt losses occurring in 1-4 intervals with 
varied spacings 
Family 2: Linear losses, increasing, decreasing, or uni-
form patterns: Li+ 1 = CiLi 
(Note that if Ci is 1 for all i, the loss pattern 
is uniform. If Ci > 1 for all i, the losses are 
increasing linearly. If Ci < 1 for all i, they 
are decreasing linearly. If Ci> 1 for i=1,2, ... ,m 
and C. < 1 for i>m, the loss increases initially 
l 





Statistical Test Procedures 
The problern of detecting material loss frorn a nuclear facility ~s 
considered in the context of statistical hypothesis testing theory. 
Under this approach the observed material accounting data are applied 




of material loss. Such tests are of two types: The fixed 
length test in which a predeterrnined nurnber N of balances a.re observed 




, and the sequential test in which the 
possibility of a decision is allowed after each balance is observed. In 
the case of the fixed length test, where only the probability of detection 
is of concern, it is known that the curnulative surn of material balances is 
the optimal test procedure. However, for sequential testing there is no 
corresponding result, so a nurnber of test procedures are considered. 
Sequential testing requires a statistic S(N) of the accounting data, such 
as the material balance or the curnulative surn of material balances, and 
upper a.nd lower decision threshold TU(N) and TL(N), respectively. The 
testing procedure consists of accepting H
1 
when S(N) > TU(N), accepting 
H0 when S(N) ~ TL(N), and continuing to test the data otherwise. Acceptance 
of H
0 
irnplies that the test should be restarted by elirninating a.ll previous-
ly acquired data and resetting the thresholds to their value at N = 1. In 
sorne cases the lower threshold TL(N) = -oo so that the test terrninates only 
when H1 is accepted. 
The sequential tests to be considered share the following attributes: 
1. Require inventory and transfer rneasurernents and their covariance structure; 
2. Assurne the validity of the accounting data; 3, Test the hypothesis H of 
0 
no material loss against the alternative H
1 
of material loss; 4. Allow the 
possibility of a decision about material loss in each balance period; 5. Ernploy 
a decision procedure in which a statistic of the material balance data is 
cornpared to a threshold to detect material lass. These tests are: 
1. Cumulative surn of MUF residuals. This test uses a Kalrnan filter to estirnate 
the material balance and cornpares the curnulative surn of the MUF residuals to a 
power one threshold to detect material lass. This test assurnes a uniform loss 
rnodel. The test statistic is E (MB.-MB.), where MB. is the observed material 
/" . ~ ~ ~ 
balance, MB. in the Kalrnan filter estirnate, and the decision threshold is 
~ 
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T(N) = r (N+M)(A2+Log(N/M+l)] l/ 2 
where M and A control the false-alarm rate. 






compared to the upper threshold KoC(N) where K is chosen to bound the false-
alarm rate. When C(N) ~ KoC(N) a material lass is indicated. This procudure 
makes no assumption about the lass scenarios. 
3. Page
1
s Test. The statistic for this test is S(N) = C(N)- Min C(i), 
where C(i) = 
· i 1 <i<N 
~ (MB.-6), and the upper threshold is h>O. The parameters 
. I 1 J= 
6 and h are chosen to bound the false-alarm rate. Material lass is indicated 
when S(N) > h. In effect S(N) determines the largest CUSUM over all prior 
Observations. 
4. Modified Page 1 s Test. This test uses the Page 1 s statistic S (N) in conjunc tion 
- -J/2 
with the power one threshold T(N) = LN(A2+Log(N)) j where the parameter A 
controls the false-alarm rate. A material loss is detected when S(N)~T(N). For 
this test the lower threshold is 0 and when S(N) = 0 the test is restarted by 
eliminating all previous data and resetting the thresholds to their value 
at time N = 1. 
5. Sequential Probability Ratio Test. Under this test procedure the hypothesis H1 
assumes a uniform lass 
material balances C(N) 
scenario. The test statistic is the cumulative sum of 
= ~ MBi. When C(N) > ~~~ + L~~(A) the hypothesis 
i=l 
N~1 
H 1 is accepted; when C(N) ~ --2
- + Log(B) 
~1 
the hypothesis H is accepted and the 
0 
test 1s restarted; if neither threshold is crossed then an additional observa-
tion is taken. The parameters A and B control the error rates. 
6. Material Balance Test. Each material balance MB. is compared to the threshold 
1 
KoMB., where K is chosen to bound the false-alarm rate. Material loss is 
. d'1 1n 1cated when MB. > K oMB . This test is sensitive to an abrupt lass. 
1 - . 
1 
7. Material Balance and CUSUM Test. The material balance and CUSUM statistics 
are compared separately to decision threshold. A material lass is indicated when 
at least one statistic exceeds a threshold. Gorrelations between these statistics 
must be considered in setting the thresholds to bound the false-alarm rate. 
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Variations of this test are constructed by applying the CUSUM only at energy 
th 
N balance. 
Uniform Diversion Test, This test employs a Kalman filter to estimate the 
material balance. Material loss is detected when the filter estimate MB. 
exceeds RcrMB .. A uniform loss scenario is assumed. 
l 
l 
Several of these tests assume a priori that the loss scenario has a 
specific form. When this assumption is valid these tests perform well in 
detecting material loss; however, when the actual loss scenario does not 
agree with the assumed scenario, test performance is degraded. Tests that do 
not specify a loss scenario should in general be more robust. Among the 
tests considered the cumulative sum of MUF residuals, uniform diversion test 




For sequential tests the duration of testing may either be specified 
a priori or continued until termination occurr when the test statistic crosses 
a threshold. ThePage's test, modified Pag~s test, and the sequential probabi-
lity ratio test terminate only when a threshold is crossed. All other tests 
are terrninated after a predetermined number of balances. 
While each of the tests detects material loss by sensing an increase 
in the material balance, the test statistics may express the increase in 
different forms. The material balance estimates the loss in each balance 
directly, the CUSUM estimates the cumulative sum of the lasses, and the 
Kalman filter estimates the average loss per balance. 
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M. Canty Annex Vd 
G. Spannagel 
Process Simulation for a 
1000 t Reference Reprocessing Facility 
- Objectives 





Data handling and transfer 
- Selected simulation experiments 
Normal operating conditions 
Changes in burn-up 
Unstable process behavior 
Abnormal utilization of buffer capacity 
Diversion strategies and hidden inventories 
- Assessment of results 
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Annex Ve 
Possible Contributions of the 
Measurement Simulation Model Activities 
to the Planned NRTA Overview Report 
Participants of the working group: 
Mr. Hein I WAK 
~1r. Kaiser I EURATOM 
Mr. Nägele I KfK (EKS) 
Conclusions of the discussions: 
1 • The hard core of the planned overview report must be a 
systematic investigation and comparison of the various 
NRTA data evaluation procedures proposed. 
2. Those principal investigations can and should be carried 
out using the simplified simulation models presently avail-
able. 
3. The realistic and therefore much more com9licated simul-
ation programs are not suited nor thought to be used in 
doing these principal investigations. Their purpese is to 
demonstrate the robustness of the conclusions derived by 
these simple simulation models under more realistic assump-
tions for selected special cases. 
4. A meaningful contribution of these simulation activities 
can be made only if these two models can be coupled to-
gether with the NRTA data evaluation program to a complete 
NRTA simulation. model. An independent contribution of the 
measurement system simulation model or of the facility 
operation simulation model as well would make no sense. 
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5. In coupling the currently developed complex simulation 
models together two problern areas arise. Firstly the 
facility simulation model has to be still completed, 
secondly there are some practical, not principal, problems 
to compute the complete covariance matrix needed as model 
information by the NRTA data evaluation program. 
No problems arise in simulating the accountancy data series 
to be evaluated. 
6. As the covariance matrix is nearly insensitive to fluctu-
ations in the inventory and flow Qistributions, it is 
sufficient to calculate it only once and not for every 
simulation run. Therefore, it should be possible to over-
come the practical problems within the time available if 
either 
- the number of material balances is limited to about 50 
or 
the covariance matrix is calculated under simplifying 
assumptions. 
It should be left open at the moment which way has to be 
followed. 
7. If the complex facility model cannot be completed within 
the time available, the simulation runs can also be made 
with the somewhat simpler model already integrated in the 





Incorporation of Solvent Extraction 
into Simulation Studies 
Cf Variation Assumptions: 
- mean value varies slowly over a range of + 40-50 % 
- individual batches vary randomly over a range of + 10-20 % 
- no operator intervention 
Case 1: Above variations appear in MUF as a result of assuming 
that solvent extraction inventory is constant. 
Case 2: Above variations are accounted for by using a simplified 
model for estimating solvent extraction inventories. 
Lacking any better model, assume H = A·Cf, where A is 
a constant to ± 5-10 % and Cf is measured. 
Case 3: As in case 2, but use H = A•Cf+B·Cw. This probably is 
not feasible in terms of Symposium presentations. 
For all cases, compare detection sensitivity under a consistent 
set of values for other parameters, measurement variances, etc. 
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Evaluation of Destructive Measuring Techniques Eligible 




Institut für Radiochemie 
It is the purpose of this paper to evaluate the available 
destructive methods of measurement which are eligible for 
plutonium assay in a large reprocessing plant. The system 
of evaluation relies mainly on the following criteria: 
a) accuracy of the method of measurement 
b) expenditure in terms of work; time required for an assay 
c) costs incurred; costs of equipment and analysis 
d) capability of verifying the method. 
The data obtained in this way possibly furnish basic data 
for elaborating a control system for real-time balancing. 
Before we discuss the individual measuring techniques, the 
boundary conditions of the plant, which are significant for 
the measurement, will be presented. 
General Boundary Conditions for the Measurements 
When striking the plutonium balance in a large reprocessing 
plant, one should rely as far as possible on the measurements 
performed in the framewerk of process control. All con-
siderations start from a 1000 te/a plant whose flowsheet and 
layout have been described in detail in a KfK report / 1 /. 
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The plutonium inventories for the individual process steps, 
which are evident from this block diagram, have been 
summarized in Table 1. 
Table 1: Compilation of the Plutonium Inventory in the 
















603.5 kg Pu 
96.3% 
Apparatus Inventory 




22.5 kg Pu 
3.6% 
With a daily throughput of 48 kg this gives a total stay 
time of 13 days. 
As a result of the agreement saying that in the first line 
measurements also required in process control should be 
employed, the aim is pursued of measuring solely the plutonium 
contents contained in process tanks and not the contents 
or process apparatuses and process lines, respectively. The 
plutonium inventory in the latter two process units can be 
considered to be rather constant in case of trouble-free 
Operation. Variations between + 5-10% are expected. 
In Table 1 only the plutonium product streams have been taken 
into account because the waste streams occurring in the 
process are of minor importance for nuclear safeguards, above 
all if they include irrecoverable plutonium material. 
-95-
Deletion of the waste from the books makes it necessary 
to estimate the plutonium content. Using data gathered 
in practical application such an estimate has been made 
for a large plant 121. The values have been compiled in 
Table 2 and are to serve as a tool in the discussions 
relating to the evaluation of measuring techniques in 
this area. 
Table 2: Compilation of the Plutonium Flow in the Indi-
vidual Process Streams of a 1000 te/a Plant 







Input tank rv10,000 
rv10,000 
1-2 mg/ml ( a-Pu, y-activity) 
End product 
Centrifuge waste 
Fuel clad wastes 






'V 50 )lg/g 
'V 1 )lg/g 
'V > 1 )lg/g 
(a-activity) 
( a ' P, y-activity) 
( a ' P, y-activity) 
( a ' p and y-activity) 
Medium level and 
low level wastes 
( MLW and LLW) 3 rv 1 )lg/g (a, P and y-activity) 
The Measurement System 
Hhen organizing a complete measurement system the following 
partial steps must be taken into account: 
- Homogenisation of the solution 
- measurement of the respective tank volume 
- sampling from the tank 
- sample transport to the analytical measurement system 
- sample conditioning 
- measurement of the plutonium concentration 
- calculation of the plutonium inventory in this tank. 
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The discussion in this report relates to the determination 
of concentration. However, sample conditioning may be the 
decisive step for perfect measurement. This fact is taken 
into account here from the point of view of the time 
required for the assay. 
II. Evaluation of Destructive Methods of Measurement 
Preliminary remarks on the sample material: 
- The plutonium concentration of the individual process 
steps undergoes variations by at least six orders of 
magnitude. 
- The variations of radioactivity likewise cover several 
powers of ten. 
This is the reason why the sample material in the plant 
can be broken down into four categories: 
a) the input solution 
b) the end product 
c) the liquid waste 
d) the solid waste. 
In this report only the material categories a-c will be 
treated because the plutonium contents in solid waste samples 
are measured by non-destructive methods. 
A. Analytical Methods for Input Analysis 
Particular importance is attributed to the plutonium content 
in the dissolver and balancing tank, respectively, of a 
reprocessing plant. Here the first possibility is available 
of analyzing by destructive techniques the plutonium content 




With the light water reactors primarily operating today, 
burnups ~3%, a uranium to plutonium ratio of about 100:1 
must be expected at this point. For 1 g of fuel the 
ß-y activity of such a material is 1 Ci of fission products 
after about two years of decay time. This means that the 
analyses cannot be performed until appropriate shielding 
measures have been taken. Moreover, plutonium must be 
assayed besides an approximately 100 times excess in 
uranium. 
Under the prevailing conditions efforts are being taken to 
further improve the plutonium assay. An alternative con-
sidered consists in improving fission product balancing 
by increasing the accuracy of the uranium assay. Then, the 
plutonium concentration could possibly be determined from 
measurements of the U/Pu-ratio which can be done more con-
veniently. 
Based on the criteria of evaluation indicated at the be-
ginning, the following methods of measurement have been 
selected to fulfil this task. 
-98-
Methods of Input Analysis 
Plutonium concentration 1 - 2 g/1 
Analytical Method Variation Co- Number of 
efficient of Measurements 
the .Method per day 
( 1 0) (8 hours) 
Isotope dilution 'V1.2% 4 
analysis 
x~ray fluorescence 
spectroscopy < 2% 24 
Isotope correlation 
1) teclmique 'V1% 1-16 
Gamma absorptiometry 0.2-0.3%2) 'V16 
REDOX titration <0.5%2) 4 
Emission 
spectroscopy 'V1% 'V30 
Alpha-spectros-
copy 2-3% 2 
Laser RAMAN 5-20% 'V30 





1CX)() expensive, special 
lab required 
simple, wi th 
20 standard sarnples 
expensive or 
5ü-1CX)() simple 1) 
50 simple, wi th 
calibration 
standards 
250 expensive, special 
lab required 
25 simple, with 
calibration 
standards 
100 expensive, special 
lab required 
?3) ?2) 
1)Depending on the element used for establishing the 
correlation. 
2 )only uranium assay possible. 
3 )Data taken from the literature: proposed as an in-line 
method. 
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Analytical Methods for Plutonium End Product Assay 
The plutonium containing end product in a reprocessing plant 
is obtained in most cases as an acid nitrate solution with a 
concentration of about 200 g/1 (30). This is a "highly pure 
material" whose total trace content is specified to be <500 ppm. 
On account of the high plutonium content extremely stringent 
requirements for the accuracy of the assay have been made at 
this point. The following measuring techniques have been selec-
ted under this aspect. The high accuracy could be achieved by 
good and properly trained personnel. 
Methods of End Product Assay 
Plutonium concentration 100 - 150 g/kg 
Anal ytical lYlethod Variation Co- Number of Costs of capability of 
efficient of Measurerrents Analysis Verification 
thelYlethod per day per 
( 1 cr) (8 hours) Sarnple 
(DM) 
REOOX titration 0. 1-0.3% 4 250 expensive, special 
lab required 
Coulorretry 0.1-0.3% 4 250 expensive, special 
lab required 
Gamma ab-




spectroscopy rv1% 24 50 simple, wi th 
calibration 
standards 
Gravimetry 0.1% 2 50 simple, although 
requiring special 
lab 
Density/acid 'V0.5% 8 150 simple, at special 
correlation lab 
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Analytical Methods for Plutonium Assay in Waste Salutions 
In the waste from a reprocessing plant the plutonium content 
undergoes Variations over a large range. Typical plutonium 
contents in the waste lie between 10- 6 to 10- 1 g/1 1391. On 
account of the low concentration also the requirements for 
accuracy are less stringent. 
The following measuring techniques are applied in this 
case: 
Methods of Waste Analysis 
Plutonium contents vary in the ~g-range 
Analytical Method Variation CO-
efficient of 
the Method 
( 1 CJ) 
Spectral photo-
metry ~10% 
< 1 rng/1 
Extraction 
followed by ~ 8% 
a-spectroscopy and 
counting, resp. 
< 1o-6 rng/1 
Emission spectros-
copy after plasrna ~10% 
excitation 
< O, 1 mg/1 
X-ray fluorescence 
spectroscopy ~10-20% 
< 5 mg/1 
Cerrelation of ~1-5% 
specific a-activity 
and a-activity ratio 
(Bq/g Pu I Pu 238 
Pu-239+240 





































The majority of analytical techniques cited in this report 
have been tested and are measuring methods proven in 
practical application. Part of them are being used already 
now in process control. 
Remark: 
I wish to thank Mr. R. Berg (GWK) for valuable discussions. 
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Introduction 
At the workshop we had in December 1980 our opinion was confirmed 
that R+D work related to Near-Real-Time Accountancy should be started 
with simulated process data. With the assistance of Dr. Shipley from 
LANL we elaborated a basic working schedule during that workshop 
(see Minutes of the meeting/Annex V). Part A ofthat schedule refers 
to "model construction": Part B refers to "model validation". In 
these days we still have to finish Part A, Although the basic concept 
of the process model has been worked out, anomalaus process behavior 
has not yet been covered. The results abtairred in the main areas of 
interest ("Base Data for the Reference Fa,cility", "Solvent Extrac-
tor Modelling", 11 Results of Simulation") will be described below. 
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I, Base Data for the Reference Facility 
The basis for the simulation studies is a 1000 tHM/a reference reprocessing 
facility*. The flow sheet of the main process stages containing the bulk 
of the Pu inventory has been presented at the first meeting of the work-
shop tagether with nominal flow rates, Pu concentrations and Pu inven-
tories. 
1.1 Tanks 
All tanks are assumed to be equipped with capabilities for volume measure-
ment, homogenization and sample taking. Since all transfers are measured 
batchwise in tanks, no on-line instruments for flow and concentration 
measurements are required. 
Preliminary values have been established for those parameters which 
determine the working cycle of tanks but which cannot be derived from 
the flow sheet. Starting from these values inventories and transfers 
have been calculated for given time intervals (assuming constant flow 
rates) in order to study the influence of varying liquid volumes on the 
sensitivity of NRTA while the total inventory remains constant. 
1.2 Solvent Extractors 
No measurements of pulse column inventories are foreseen in the present 
studies. 
We have started to estimate the variability of (unmeasured) column 
inventories under normal operating conditions on the basis of 
simplified assumptions. 
* M. Kluth, H.O. Haug und H. Sehrnieder 
KfK-Report, KfK 3204, September 1981 
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2. Solvent Extractor Modelling 
In order to develop a computer program to simulate the flow of Pu 
through the extraction and purification sections of a reprocessing 
facility, mathematical models for the various process components are 
needed. Since the associated algorithms are called a very large nurober 
of times in the course of a simulation run, the models must be kept as 
simple as possible, but at the same time reproduce in a reasonable way 
the behavior of the actual components. In this contribution we describe 
I 
a model for pulsed columns similar to one developed at Los Alamos and 
incorporated into the simulation program developed in the F.R. Germany 
for a looo t reference reprocessing facility. 
The model is depicted in Fig. I. The C. represent Pu concentrations (in 
~ 
g/1) and the Fi flow rates (in I/hr). VI and v3 are disengagement volumes, 
V is the total volume of liquid in the mixing section and VI 2 is the 
volume of the liquid phaseentering in streams FI and F
2
. For example, 




would correspond respectively to feed, 




to the product and waste 
streams, VI and v3 to product and waste disengagement volumes and v12 to 
the volume of the aqueous phase in the extraction section. This model 
has been used to simulate the HA, HS, IBX, IBS, 2A, 2AS, 2B, 3A, 3AS and 3B 
columns of the reference flow sheet. 
The main assumptions made in deriving the model equations are: 
(i) constant volumes VI, v3 and V 
(ii) exponential Pu concentration profiles ~n the mixing section 
(iii) perfect mixing of streams I and 2 
(iv) proportionality between the mass flow in streams 5 
to that in streams I and 2. 
1
E.A. Hakkila et alii, 
"Coordinated Safeguarcis for Materials Management in a Fuel Reprocessing 






c1 F1 c2 F2 
y 
V 
( V 12 ) 







, c5 F5 
Fig. 1: Pulse Column Model 
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These assumptions lead to the foltowing equations for the Pu concentrations 
tn the two phase~ of the mixing section 
cl2(y) == c12 e- o.y 
c3(y) = C3 +(FICI+ F2C2)(e- ay- e- aL)/F3 
with = (CIFI + C2F2)/ (FI + Fz) 
and II - ln (C5 1c 12 ) /L = - lnkiL 
\.fuere k is the constant of proportional i ty f1Jr assumpt ion ( iv) above. 
These equations are integrated to determine the Pu hold-ups tn the 
mixing section: 
H12 v 12 c 12 (k-1) 1 lnk 
H3 (V-v 12 ) c 3
/(l-k) + c
3
1Lnk - c4k/(1-k) - c 4llnk 
The hold-ups tn the disengagement sections are simply 
H V C 
4 I 4 
HS V3CS = V3 Cl2k 
and the total hold-up tn the pulsed column at equilibrium 1s 
We consider the flow and concentrations to be slowly varying functions 
of timet and use the notation F(l) = F(t=t 1) etc, 
where the a. are in litres and are given by 
l 
~ 1 v12 (k-l)llnk 
az (V-VI2) (l+lnk-k) I (1-k)lnk 
a
3 
= (V-v 12 > (l+klnk-k) I (1-k)lnk 










<cF) " J C(t)F(t)dt /.:l.t 
t I 
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For small time increments this integral is approximat2ly 
(cF)= \c(t)F(t) + c(2)F(2)} 1 3 + {c(t)F(2)+C(2)F(1)}16 
The calculation of column hold-up and output flows and concentrations 
for successive time increments in the process similation proceeds as 
follows: 
All quantities at time t=t
1 
are known 
H ( I ) , C.(l), F.(l) 1 = I ..• 5 
1 1 
Input flows and concentrations at time t=t are either taken from the 
2 
output of.preceding process units or are generated stochastically with a 
random walk procedure -
C.(2), F.(2) 
1 1 
i. = I , 2, 3 
The phase volume v12 1s also treated as a slowly varying stochastic 
variable -






are then given by the volume 
conservation condition. For example 
Finally, the output concentrations are given by 











F3)- c 4 (1)F4 (t)l3- c 4 (t)F4 (2)16 
- c 12 (2)(a. 1+a.5)1.1t- c 3 (2)a.21 t + H(l)l.1t} / 
{ ( (14- (!3) I .1t + F 4 ( 2) I 3 + F 4 ( I ) I 6 } 
In preparation for the next step, 




H.(l) ::: H.(2) 
1 l 
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3. Results of Simulation 
Based on the general input data and on the model equations described 
above, our simulation model has been developed. With this simulation 
we assume that each cycle is surveilled by an operator and that the 
Operators are controlled by a supervisor. Operators and supervisor 
essentially have to handle information supplied by the instruments in 
the central control room. In addition, now and then a note will be 
available on the positive result of an analysis carried out on the 
contents of a full tank. In a rather simplified manner the operators' 
duty consists in two major tasks: 
(I) They try to keep to nominal values of all the process variables. 
(2) They handle transfers, for example between tanks. 
As to (I), certain process fluctuations will occur because it usually 
will take some time until 
- an operator will recognize a deviation from nominal 
behavior 
- a counteraction has taken place 
- the process starts to return to nominal behavior. 
As to (2), the operators have to cornrnunicate before a transfer can be 
performed, For example, the contents of a tank can only be released if 
- all valve settings have been checked 
the contents of the tank have been stirred for a time 
lang enough to homogenize the inventory for sample 
taking 
- the sample has been taken and analyzed, and the result 
of this analysis allows the respective transfer 
- the volume of the tank filling is known. 
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Summing up it can be stated that simulation must cover the different 
respause properties of the operators and that it has to perform all 
these tedious steps related, for example, to a transfer. Of course, 
in order to get the estimates of the Pu inventories in the tanks of the 
whole plant, simulation must follow the interactions of all changes in 
flow-rates and in concentrations. 
For translation into the computer program we applied a special language 
called SIMULA. This language was developed araund 1966 by the Norwegian 
Computing Center in Oslo. The experts told us that SIMULA affered some 
flexibility which might be necessary if, for process operation, we have 
to accomodate strategies different from those described above. We wish 
to point out again that, for the time being, no special process states 
have been considered; the results given below were obtained under 
steady-state conditions. 
The main program runs on the central computer of KfK. Using some very 
special equipment of KfK/IDT it is possible to transfer selected simula-
tion results to the IDT computer area, where further handling (for 
example graphical display or plotting) is possible. 
To test our simulation model we have selected the 2nd Pu cycle of 
our reference facility; this proved to be a reasonable decision. 
However, this cycle is not adequate for presenting exciting results. 
The Ist U cycle offers much more possibilities for a demonstration; 
but our current simulation covers only the 2nd Pu cycle. 
Figs. 2 through 4 present results of simulation obtained for the 
Pu-inventories of the extractors 2A and 2B and of the 2B mixer-settler 
during a 3o hour interval. The inventory variation is mainly induced 
by the variation of the feed of the 2A extractor, 
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Activities Regarding a Simulation Model 
for the NRTA Measurement System of a 
Large Reference Reprocessing Plant 
G. Nägele 
Kernforschungszentrum Karlsruhe, EKS 
Paper presented at the NRTA-Workshop 
in Karlsruhe, February 24-26, 1982 
I. Objectives 
1. The Task 
Starting from a set of "true data" on the flow and inventory 
distributions in the reference reprocessing facility, it is 
the task of the simulation program under discussion to simu-
late the effect of the NRTA measurement system on these data 
as well as those parts of the accountancy system necessary to 
transform the measurement data into a time series of MUF-
values, which then will be an input for the sophisticated 
NRTA data evaluation procedures developed by D. Sellinschegg. 
Besides this simulated time series of MUF-values, the program 
has also to provide the information about the covariance 
structure of these MUF-data needed by the data evaluation 
procedures. 
The ''trus" set of data will be generated by the simulation 
models for facility operation developed by Canty, Spannagel 
and Voss. 
2. Intentions 
Currently, the characteristics of NRTA Data Evaluation Pro-
cedures - i.e. false alarm probability, sensitivity and time-
liness of detection - are investigated in Karlsruhe as a 
function of various diversion seenarios and facility para-
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meters by Monte Carlo simulation runs using a rather simple 
Simulation model. Before such procedures can become a routine 
safeguards measure, it will be necessary to dernarrstrate their 
good performance and the robustness of the derived conclusions 
under more realistic conditions. The implications of the simu-
lation model are twofold: on the one side, for application of 
NRTA evaluation procedures a covariance structure of the data 
series to be analyzed has to be assumed in the procedure, on 
the other side the data series directly reflects the under-
lying covariance structure. Our intentions with the measure-
ment simulation program under development are therefore: 
(i) To find out how various features of the measurement 
system and error model affect the covariance structure 
of NRTA data series. 
(ii) Investigate the sensitivity of the evaluation procedures 
versus changes in the covariance structure. 
(iii) Test the robustness of the procedures in case of dis-
crepancies between assumed and "real" covariance 
structure. 
These intentions imply some constraints for the measurement 
simulation program to be developed: It should allow to model 
a NRTA measurement system for the reference reprocessing 
facility as realistic as possible especially allow for all 
such error features which might play a role in reality. On 
the other side, it should be so flexible to allow for design 
changes in the facility and the measurement system as well as 
the treatment of simplified models. Finally, it should be fast 
enough to allow Monte Carlo simulation runs. 
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II. The Basic Elements of the Model 
Three basic elements are used in modeling the NRTA measure-
ment system of the reference reprocessing plant: 
(i) the error model for an individual measurement, 
(ii) the measurement model which describes how the account-
ancy data are determined from measurement values, 
(iii) the basic structure for the measurement system and its 
operation. 
1. The Error Model 
The error model for an individual measurement is like usual 
assumed to be a linear function of mutually independent 
normally distributed error components (8). In order to allow 
for correlations between different measurements with the same 
instrument or procedure, we distinguish systematic (o
8
_) and 
random (oz.) components. Random errors are newly generated 
for every measurement, whereas the systematic contributions 
are newly generated only. upon recalibration of the instrument 
and remain constant within one calibration period. The possi-
bility of a non-zero expectation value for systematic contri-
butions allows to introduce long-term systematic effects. 
Because we mainly deal with the measurement of variables of 
a broad range of values including zero, both systematic and 
random errors may have additive as well as multiplicative 
contributions as function of the true value (T) of the measured 
quantity. I.e. we use the general model: 
2. The Measurement Model 
In general, the plutonium content (Y) of a batch of nuclear 
material cannot be directly measured but will be determined 
from a series of measured quantities (X., is{1, ... ,n}) related 
l 
to Y - e.g. Pu-concentration and volume. Because batch to batch 
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correlations will be - in general - different for the 
various quantities to be measured, we have to take this 
into account and consider the following general model: 
I.e. Y is a function of the vector X formed by the complete 
set of quantities (more exactly types of quantities like Pu-
concentration, volume, etc.) measured for Pu-determination 
in the plant. In principle, F might be specific for each 
specific batch entering the material balance. We assume, how-
ever, that there will be only a small nurober of functions 
used in the NRTA measurement system and only the indication, 
which quantities are to be measured and which of this set of 
functions is to use for Pu-determination will be batch 
specific. 
For the determination of the covariance structure, the linear 
error propagation model of Gauss is used: 
n 
t-,Y = Y-F(T1, ... ,Tn) rv i:1 (~~i )· ((öSA+öZA) + Ti(öSM+öZM)) 
( X 1 1 • • • 1 Xn ) = ( T 1 , • • • 1 T n ) 
3. Basic Structure of the Measurement System Model 
Measurement errors are assumed to be characteristic for a 
specific set of measurement equipments and/or procedures. 
This implies the following structure of the measurement system: 
For each type of quantity, which will be measured at some 
place or time for NRTA purposes, a set of measurement instru-
ments or procedures (at least one) must be defined. This is 
done by specifying the parameters in the general error model 
specifically foreachindividual 11 instrument 11 • In addition, 
for every instrument it has to be specified at what points in 
time during a simulation run it will be 11 recalibrated 11 , i.e. 
a new realization for the systematic error contributions will 
be generated. Currently only periodic recalibration strategies 
are foreseen. 
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This set of instruments is operating on the nuclear material 
distributed over and flowing through the facility's process 
area. In our model we assume that - at the time of measure-
ment - nuclear material inventories as well as transfer 
flows are structured in "batches" defined by containments, 
e.g. buffer and process tanks. For accountancy purposes we 
distinguish between inventory and transfer batches. Output 
transfer batches are identified by a negative sign of the 
material amount. For clarity and to simplify a possible 
later introduction of subbalance equations the set of 
material batches is further structured in "process areas" 
or "transfer streams", respectively, and "key measurement 
points". In our model, a batch is realized by a specification 
of the set X= (X 1 , ... ,Xn) of quantities available for 
measurement. Further, the time has to be specified when the 
batch "existed" and was available for measurement. For in-
ventory batches, this is the time of inventory taking, for 
transfer batches the time when the transfer actually (or 
formally) occurred. 
The correlation between the two structures of the model, 
the batch structure on the one and the "measurement instru-
ments" on the other side, is assumed to be batch specific. 
I.e. for every potentially existing batch it is specified 
which of the quantities x
1
, ... ,Xn aretobe measured and 
with which specific "instrument". This also defines function 
F(X1 , ... ,Xn) tobe used to calculate the Pu-content of the 
batch. 
-122-
I'II. The Computer Program 
1. The Function and the Output of the Program 
The functions of the measurement simulation program and its . 
output data are defined by the input requests of the NRTA 
data evaluation programs developed by D. Sellinschegg. One 
function is quite obvious, namely to provide simulated time 
series of MUF-data for NRTA data evaluation. It should be 
possible to manipulate these data in such a way as to re-
flect fluctuations due to facility operation and realistic 
effects of the measurement system in order to study the per-
formance and robustness of the proposed evaluation procedures. 
The other function is to derive from the measurement system 
model the parameters for the stochastic model assumed in the 
data evaluation procedure. The data evaluation procedure pro-
posed by D. Sellinschegg is based on the CUR test statistic. 
Meanwhile, Mr. Sellinschegg developed two completely diffe-
rent approaches to determine this test statistic from the 
original MUF-data time series, which also require completely 
different model parameters as input. 
The first approach he developed was based on Kalman filters. 
As it is well known in this approach a Gauss-Markov process 
is assumed as stochastic model. In this model the subsequent 
state is completely determined by the preceding state and the 
transition matrix between these two states. Systematic errors, 
however, can be introduced only by a special treatment (i.e. 
inclusion in the state equation of the system) . 
The measurement system simulation program in the Kalman fil-
ter version has, therefore, to provide as model parameters 
the error variances and covariances for inventory and for 
net transfer and separately for the systematic and random, 
additive and multiplicative components of the error model. 
However, it is sufficient to provide only the covariances be-
tween two succeeding material balance periods. 
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In the secend approach, now followed by Mr. Sellinschegg, 
the matrix which transforms the series of MUF-data into the 
vector of measurement residuums is directly determined in a 
recursive way, starting from the covariance matrix of the 
MUF-data series. Systematic errors no longer require a 
special treatment, therefore the various error contributions 
can be combined. But instead the complete covariance matrix 
for the MUF-data series has to be provided by the measure-
ment simulation program. It turned out that this cannot be 
done by a simple extension of the Kalman filter version be-
cause of excessive storage requirements. A new version of the 
measurement simulation program is in work to overcome this 
problem. 
2. The Interface with the Facility Operation Simulation Program 
For the measurement simulation program, the facility opera-
tion is reduced to the generation of sets of (physical) 
source data for batches of nuclear material. Because these 
batches are defined by the physical Containments in the 
facility (e.g. buffer or process tanks), no principal inter-
face problems should exist between facility operation model 
and measurement simulation model as long as both assume an 
identical facility design. 
Because of the complexity of the Simulation model for the 
chemical process in a reference reprocessing plant being 
developed by Canty, Spannagel and Voss, we found it prefer-
able to have a simpler model of the facility operation avail-
able for test and special simulation runs. For test purposes 
a very simple static facility model was integrated in the 
measurement simulation program. This model assumes a static 
inventory in all containments. Only in input and output 
buffer tanks is the inventory determined as to maintain 
validity of the material balance equation. This model was 
further developed by F. Voss so that it is now able to simu-
late the filling and emptying of all buffer and process tanks 
of the facility, assuming a constant inventory for all pro-
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cess components. It is now available as a subroutine to the 
measurement simulation model. The interface of the complex 
process simulation model will be realized by data exchange 
via external disc storage. 
Common to all three facility operation models now available 
or under development is that they provide only the solution 
volume and the Pu-volume concentration as source data of a 
batch and thereby limit the inherent possibilities of the 
measurement model to this simple case. 
3. The Program Structure and Operation 
In the measurement simulation program (in its version for 
Kalman filter evaluation and using the stationary facility 
operation model by F. Voss) the facility Operation model and 
the rneasurement systern rnodel (i.e. the set of available 
"instruments" and the specification of the error model for 
thern) are realized by two subroutines WAAMOD and MESSIM, 
respectively, whereas it is the function of the main program 
to establish the coordination between both models. Within 
this structure further subroutines are used to realize 
special functions as convenient. These three main program 
elements are thernselves subdivided each in an initializing 
part and an computational or sirnulation part. This is realized 
for the two subroutines by rneans of a secend entry directly 
leading to the computational part. The operational sequence 
of the program system is as follows: 
First the rnodel structure, i.e. the data fields and their 
(maximal) dirnensions, is defined. Then these rnodels, i.e. 
their actual dimensions and data values, are specified by 
means of input data. Included in this specification part are 
the definition of the balancing strategy (i.e. balance period 
and nurober of balances to consider) as well as the periods 
for recalibration of the individual "measurernent instrurnents". 
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The computational part of the program is formulated for one 
material balance and will be iterated as often as requested. 
It starts with a section where the data of the last 3 balance 
periods, as far as required for determination of the co-
variance of MUF(k) and MUF(k-1), are saved. Then the facili-
ty model subroutine is called which determines transfers and 
transfer times within the period and the true batch source 
data for transfer and for inventory batches. Afterwards the 
transfer batches are ordered according to measurement time 
and in a Do-loop over all batches, transfers and inventory, 
the Subroutine MESSH1 is called to simulate the measurement 
of the batch source data. Then the Pu-content in the batch 
and the failure propagation coefficients for this determin-
ation are calculated by corresponding subroutines. 
In the next step the true and the measured value of the Pu-
inventory are summed up separately to the net transfer TK 
and to the inventory IK (where K denotes the balance period 
number) over all batches. At the same time the various con-
tributions to the covariances of TK and IK with the corres-
ponding terms: TK, II<' TK_ 1 , IK_ 1 , TK_ 2 , IK_ 2 are summed up 
separately for the four error components of the error model. 
Finally, the true and measured value of MUF and the co-
variances of MUF(K) with MUF(L), L = K and K-1, are computed 
and the calculational results written on a TSO output data 
set for use by the data evaluation program. 
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IV. First Results 
Until now no realistic simulation runs with the measurement 
simulation program have been carried out combined with a sub-
sequent NRTA data evaluation run. Nevertheless some quali-
tative conclusions which were not expected in this clarity, 
can already be drawn from the test runs made so far, though 
no realistic failure estimates but only invented numbers 
which appeared not too unrealistic, have been used. 
The first surprising result were the small values for the 
error variances of inventory and net transfer as well as of 
MUF-values. This in spite of the fact that just to limit this 
effect, relatively large additive contributions to systematic 
as well as random errors had been chosen. It turned out that 
in case of no recalibration the additive systematic contri-
butions c.ancelled better than the multiplicative ones, where-
as the random errors were clearly dominated by the additive 
contributions. 
The next unexpected result concerned the covariance structure 
itself. Covariance terms revealed as dominating which were 
expected to be neglectable and vice versa. However, this 
turned out to be not a stable effect but due to peculiar 
assumptions concerning error model specification and recali-
bration strategy. As the NRTA data evaluation strongly depends 
on the covariance structure of the data to be analyzed, 
these influencing factors have to be further investigated. 
In all cases treated so far, the covariance structure was 
remarkably simple and determinated always by some few domi-
nating terms. All the complicated correlations taken into 
account in the model, even inventory changes by up to 30 %, 
resulted only in small fluctuations of this main structure. 
This gives rise to the hope that it might be possible to des-
cribe adequately the real covariance structure by a rather 
simple model. The application of NRTA evaluation procedures 
-127-
as well as the determination of the required error parameters 
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1. Are Estimates Necessary? 
The essence of near-real--time materials accountancy is that physical 
inventories should be taken at relatively frequent intervals, such as daily 
or weekly, on an in-process basis, and that the resulting HUF data should be 
analyzed using techniques which recognize its time sequential nature. Since 
the inventories are taken on an in-process basis, it rarely is possible to 
measure all nuclear material physically present. The unmeasured material 
appears as HUF during the first material balance period; thereafter only 
variations in the quantity of unmeasured material appear as HUF. 
For reprocessing facilities, it has been suggested that n.r.t. accoun-
tancy could be implemented by including only buffer storage tanks in the 
measured in-process inventories. The solvent extraction systems, in this 
simplified model, would be treated as containing a constant but unmeasured 
quantity of plutonium. The in-process inventories would be scheduled to 
coincide with the routine emptying of the product evaporator so that the 
evaporator inventory also would be small and constant, if not actually zero. 
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Such a model, it is argued, would involve little or no increased effort 
on the part of facility operators, and would avoid political questions as to 
how much information relative to solvent extraction systems should be 
released to inspectors. It is also argued that this simplified model should 
produce results which would be essentially equivalent to those based on a 
more complex model in which solvent extraction system inventories are 
measured or estimated. 
Obviously, the success of this simplified model is heavily dependent on 
the extent to which the solvent extraction system plutonium inventory is 
truly constant. If, as some claim, solvent extraction system plutonium 
inventories vary no more than ± 5% or so during normal operation, then 
obtaining a more precise direct estimate might be of questionable value. 
There is no published data to support such a claim, however, and the next 
section argues that in fact the plutonium inventory probably will vary over 
a much wider range. Since a process variation of, say, 5000 gms Pu, has the 
same effect on MUF as a measurement with a standard deviation of 5000 gms 
Pu, the question is not trivial. 
2. ~gonstant Are Solvent Extraction System Inventories 
2.1 Variables Affecting Pu Inventory 
The plutonium inventory in a solvent extraction system is a function of 
the following variables: 
a) type of contactor used. Centrifugal contactors have very small 
residence times, and therefore very small plutonium inventories. Pulse 
columns and mixer-settlers have significantly langer residence times, and 
therefore correspondingly larger inventory holdups. For a given plant 
capacity pulse columns have the largest holdup. 
b) plant capacity. For a given type of contactor increasing a plant's 
design capacity translates more or less linearly into a corresponding 
increase in the size of the solvent extraction systems, and therefore the 
plutonium inventory. 
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c) burnup level of spent fuel processed. The primary component of 
spent fuel is uranium, which has a solubility limit in nitric acid solution 
in the range of 200 g/1. Most flow sheets are designed to oparate at about 
180 g/1. At 30 000 MWd/t the corresponding plutonium concentration is on 
the order of 2 g/1. At 10 000 HWd/t it may be only 1 g/1. In the first 
extraction cycle these variations translate directly into inventory varia-
tions. Later extraction cycles may be somewhat less affected, but to a 
first approximation variations in feed concentration are transmitted through 
all cycles until the product evaporator is reached. 
d) operator-controlled process variables. The process operator has the 
ability to vary a number of parameters which will (or at least may) affect 
the total plutonium inventory. Examples include varying the flow rates of 
aqueous feed, organic extractant, nitric acid scrub, or aqueous strip solu-
tions. Since a solvent extraction system operates full (to overflow lines) 
at all times, varying one flow rate does not necessarily require varying a 
second, and generalities as to the effect on inventory are difficult. 
e) distribution coefficient changes. A fresh sysem, i.e., one that has 
recently been cleaned out and charged with clean organic extractant, has a 
distribution coefficient which is determined by the nature and concentration 
of the organic extractant, the nitric acid concentration, temperature, and 
the competing influence of fission products. As this system continues to 
operate, crud formation occurs, leading to a gradual deterioration of the 
distribution coefficient. (Crud is the technical term used to describe a 
solid phase, usually finely suspended in the organic phase. It consists 
primarily of fission products, but it decreases the ability of the organic 
phase to extract uranium and plutonium.) Deterioration of the distribution 
coefficient in turn leads to a flattening of the aqueous/organic distri-
bution curve, and to a gradual increase in the plutonium inventory. 
f) non-eguilibrium operation. If the process operator has varied one 
or more process parameters to too great an extent, any of several process 
upset conditions may occur. The most common is flooding, which usually is 
caused by an insufficient pulse stroke relative to input flow rates. The 
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result, in terms of materials accountancy, is that the plutonium inventory 
first increases significantly, then decreases as the accumulated plutonium 
leaves the system via the aqueous waste stream. 
2.? Inventory Variation Under "Normal" Conditions 
If a solvent extraction system is operating "normally", most of the 
variables listed above are fixed, either by plant design or by operator 
control. Type of contactor is fixed, plant capacity is fixed, burnup level 
remains relatively constant over periods of at least a few weeks, and the 
operator is presumed to make relatively few adjustments to process variables 
for fear of upsetting a somewhat unstable equilibrium. 
This analysis unfortunately omits one very important factor, the quan-
tity of fuel charged to a dissolver and the time allowed for dissolution to 
proceed. Data collected during n.r.t. accountancy field testing indicate 
that this input Pu concentration may vary over a range of at least 1.87 
(maximum/minimum), not counting rinse batches which are more dilute by a 
factor of at least four. Adjacent input batches often differ from each 
other by as much as 15%, even though the fuel dissolved is nominally iden-
tical. Within one reactor discharge input concentration variations as large 
as 1.50 (maximum/minimum) have been observed. 
Since this feed solution is transferred more or less directly to the 
first extraction cycle, inventory variations in the first cycle may be 
presumed to be approximately of the same magnitude. In the absence of 
intermediate concentration steps, the same variations will be transmitted to 
the second and third cycles. 
2.2 Inventory Variation Under Non-Normal Conditions 
No published data is known to exist concerning the extent of crud 
formation in solvent extraction systems. It cannot be avoided in any strict 
sense, especially in the first cycle where both radiation levels and fission 
product concentrations are high. Since crud is in some way a function of 
radiation darnage to the organic solvent, one may suppose that facility 
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specific questions of organic purification and recycling will significantly 
affect actual crud formation. 
To the extent that crud does form, the effect is one of reducing the 
distribution coefficient, which in turn means that more solvent extraction 
stages are needed to achieve the same levels of purification. Reasonable 
crud levels normally are not an actual operating problem, because extra 
stages are included in the design for exactly that reason, but the flatten-
ing of the distribution curve leads to a gradual increase in the plutonium 
inventory. 
Turning the question around, assume that n.r.t. accountancy is imple-
mented without estimating the plutonium inventory in solvent extraction 
systems, and that some sequential data test ttdetects" a constant MUF of 
perhaps a few hundred grams per week. If the operator "explains" the 
apparent MUF loss by arguing that crud formation is leading to a gradual 
increase in the solvent extraction system plutonium inventory, how is the 
inspector to know whether he should accept this explanation? 
The operation of a solvent extraction system is to a significant extent 
an art rather than a science. In cold scrap recovery or other purification 
processes where pulse columns can be made of glass and the operator can 
directly see what is happening, process upsets can be rare occurrences. In 
spent fuel reprocessing, where the operator has no chance for even momentary 
glimpses of actual operation, occasional process upsets must be accepted as 
unavoidable. 
The most common process upset is termed flooding. It can occur under 
either of two circumstances, where the pulse stroke is inadequate to counter 
the downward flow of the aqueous phase, or where the pulse strake is 
excessive, leading to emulsion formation. In either case the plutonium 
inventory first increases, as aqueous flow continues without a balancing 
outflow of plutonium-·rich organic, then decreases as unextracted plutonium 
flows out in the aqueous waste. Corrective measures are virtually non-
existent; the operator must shut the system down, wait for the phases to 
settle out, and then carefully restart the system. Once back in operation, 
there is also a quantity of plutonium in aqueous waste to be recovered. 
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If the operator is monitaring his aqueous waste carefully, frequently, 
and on a real time basis, it is possible to detect conditions leading to 
flooding before the column actually floods. In this case it may be possible 
to change the flow rates or the pulse strake, or both, in time to prevent an 
actual upset. 
3. A Simplified Inventory Model 
Consider a solvent extraction system which is totally empty. At time 
t
0 
a flow of Vf litres per minute of aqueous feed containing Cf grams 
per litre of plutonium is started and, simultaneously, a flow of organic 
solvent is also started. Flow continues until at some later time t
1 
the 
system becomes full and both aqueous and organic phases begin to flow out of 
their respective outlets. At the instant t
1 
the plutonium inventory in 
the system is given by 
( eq. 1) 
This result is totally independent of whether extraction occurs. 
However, it does assume that neither Cf nor Vf changed during the time 
period t 1 - t 0 
= R (defined as the system residence time). 
nor 
a.ny 
If at time t 1 a steady state equilibrium exists, and if neither Cf 
Vf change as a function of time, equation 1 will continue to hold for 
time after t
1
. These are, of course, exactly the conditions which the 
system operator would like to achieve, but there are many secondary factors 
which ca.n affect system operation, and mainta.ining a. steady sta.te equili-
brium for a lang period of time is easier said than done. It is, therefore, 
necessa.ry to consider the effect on plutonium inventory of various devia-
tions from desired behaviour. J 
If Cf varies over time but extraction conditions do not change, 
equation 1 still remains at least theoretically valid. If the change 
occurred at least R minutes prior to the time in question, the system may be 
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treated as having "settled in" on a new Cf, and equation 1 is valid. If 
the change occurred more recently some approximation presumably can be 
reached using an average Cf. 
Similar arguments hold with respect to Vf. If the system has had 
time to settle in on new operating conditions then equation 1 is valid. If 
the system is still in a transition state then either the equation must be 
treated as a time integral or some approximation must be found. 
In any operating solvent extraction system only some fraction of the 
stages are actually needed for extraction. The remaining stages serve 
important functions, notably raffinatewashing and organic scrubbing. Of 
primary importance here, some extra stages are usually provided to ensure 
that extraction will be complete even if less than ideal conditions lead to 
a deterioration of the effective distribution coefficient. 
It is not necessary for safeguards that the exact nurober of stages 
needed for complete extraction be known, so long as the "knee" in the 
aqueous plutonium concentration curve remains constant. Indeed, in most 
systems the definition of a "stage" is more theoretical than physical, and 
the operator hirnself may have only a general knowledge of the exact location 
of this knee. 
Of more importance is the possibility that crud formation, or some 
other secondary factor, has led to an alteration of the shape of the extrac-
tion curve, shifting the knee in the aqueous plutonium concentration to a 
later stage. If the alteration is significant it should also lead to an 
increase in the plutonium concentration in the aqueous waste. This latter 
effect may not be measurable if enough extra stages have been included, but 
one may hypothesize that if the effect is not measurable it may also not be 
significant. Thus it seems logical to suggest that a better representation 
of the plutonium inventory in a solvent extraction system can be given by: 
( eq. 2) 
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where A = Vf X R 
C = Pu concentration in aqueous waste w 
B constant or function to be defined 
The first part of this equation, A x Cf, represents the plutonium 
inventory under the assumption of steady state equilibrium conditions. The 
second part, B x C , represents a correction for non-equilibrium operating 
w 
condi tions. 
To date no one has suggested a physical definition for the parameter 
B. Indeed, no one has demonstrated that practical variations in extraction 
system operation can be measured by measuring the waste concentration. 
Theoretically the effect must be there, but practically speaking it may not 
be detectable. 
4. Experimental Data 
Relatively little experimental data is available, at least partly 
because relatively little reprocessing is occurring. As previously noted, 
field test data which are available indicate that input Pu concentrations 
are likely to vary by as much as a factor of two under normal operations, 
and by larger factors when dissolver rinsing occurs. 
Equation 1 has been used to compute solvent extraction system inven-
tories for the same field test data. The mean inventory (calculated) was 
3092 gms Pu, and the standard deviation was ± 1601 gms Pu, or about 52~. 
This compares with a "guesstimated" constant inventory of 2500 gms used in 
earlier results. Introduction of these inventory calculations into the 
n.r.t. accountancy data results in a qua1itatively noticeable smoothing of 
the CUMUF graph, but it is not known whether the calculated values truly 
represent the actual Pu solvent extraction system inventory. It is also not 
known whether the systemwas at equilibrium at all times (indeed, it is 
strongly suspected that it was not always at or near equilibrium). 
Obviously, further work is needed. 
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The application of the principle of material accountancy to international 
nuclear material safeguards has been laid down in the model agreement between 
the IAEA and the states subject to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (IAEA 1970); 
the statistical problems, which are connected with its use and which arise from 
the inevitable measurement uncertainties, have been analyzed since more than 
20 years (Stewart 1958). Nevertheless, there still exists a number of open 
questions which should be answered as soon as possible in view of some recent 
developments, both on the "political-administrative" side, e.g. 
emphasis on short detection time, 
- emphasis on a high probability of detection for specific diversion 
strategies ('''abrupt", "protracted"), 
as well as on the "scientific-analytical" side, e.g. 
- emphasis on "batteries of tests", each constructed for a specific 
diversion strategy (Shipley 1980), 
- emphasis on the use of estimation theories, especially Kalman Filters 
(Pike and Morrison 1975). 
At the moment, the situation may be characterized by a certain confusion: 
There are many objectives, boundaries and qualitative constraints on one hand 
and many test and estimation procedures on the other hand, however, there is no 
agreement on 
- the quantitative formulation of objectives and boundary conditions, 
- the priori ties of objectives in case they are in conflic t to each other 
(which actually happens), 
- the diversion strategies which have to be taken into account, and 
- the appropriate choice of statistical evaluation procedures (or, more modestly 
expressed, the direction into which the development of procedures should be 
. guided). 
It is the idea that a limited number of experts in this field shall discuss these 
questions and work out a kind of program which can help to structure the future 
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international development. In the following, the pending problems shall be 
discussed in more detail; at the end of this paper a list of questions is given 
which may serve as a guide for the experts' discussion. 
General Formulation of the Problem 
Let us first establish the data base and furthermore, let us quantitatively 
formulate the problems to be solved: 
We consider a well-defined material balance area and a reference time interval 
[t ,t], e.g. one year. At time points t ,t
1 
... ,t physical inventories are 
o n o n 




], [t 1 ,t;J, ... , [tn-l ,tJ the net transfers 
T1,T2 , ••• ,Tn (inputs minus outputs) are determined. The distributions of the 
measurement errors of these quantities are assumed to be known. Under the null 




I. I + T. - I. , i= I , ••• , n, 
L- L L 
are assumed to be zero. 
It should be noted that there may be plant internal lasses which cause 
non-zero expected MUF values. We will come back to this point; for the 
sake of simplicity, however, we assume for the moment that such lasses 
do not exist. 
The general problern is to make with the help of the 2n+l observed quantities 
I ,I 1, .•. ,I, T1, ... ,T statements about the possible diversion of nuclear o n n 
material during the inventory periods [t
0
, t 1], ... , [tn-l, tn]: In case of diversion 
of the amount Mi in the interval of time [ti-l'ti]' i=l, ... ,n, the expected value 
of I. 1 + T. -I. is M., therefore, a decision has tobe made if a non-zero L- L L L 
observed value of I. 
1 
+ T. - I. can be explained by measurement errors, or if 
L- L L 
material has been diverted. 
Naturally, part of the problern is to determine the appropriate nurober n of 
inventories during the reference time [t ,t ]. 
o n 
-142-
For one inventory period, the solution of the decision problern is simple: 
the null hypothesis H is (if we omit the index i) 
0 
H : E(MUF) = O, 
0 
and the alternative hypothesis is 
H
1
: E (MUF) M > 0. 
The decision procedure is, if MUF ~s the observed value of the random variable 
MUF, 
MUF < s: H true 
0 
MUF > s: H
1 
true. 
The relation between the significance threshold s and the false alarm probability 
a 1s 
2 
where 0 := var(~JF), and where ~ is the normal distribution function. The 
probabili ty of detection 1-ß as function of the false alarm probabili ty is 
where U ~s the inverse of ~. 
Objectives and Boundaries 
Any statistical decision pe.rmits the possibility of a false accusation. Therefore, 
first it has to be decided which false alarm probability can be tolerated and to 
which area and interval of time its value shall be related. 
It has been proposed at several occasions that it shall be related to 
one material balance area and that also in case of sequential decision 
procedures it shall be fixed for a well defined reference time interval 
under consideration. 
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For a gi ven value of the false alarm probabili ty for one material balance area 
and the reference time interval [t , t J it has been shown under very general 
o n 
assumptions (Avenhaus and Frick 1974, Frick 1979, Avenhaus 1980) that it is best 
in the sense of the overall probability of detecting a diversion of the total 
amount M of nuclear material not to take into account the in-between inventories 
I 1, ••• ,In_ 1, but to test only the overall balance 
~MUF. 
1 i 
I HT.-I . 
o i 1 n 
It should be noted, however, that it is assumed that this is the best inspection 
strategy against any diversion strategy leading to the total diverted amount M. 
If the inspector knew that the operator, e.g., will divert the same amount 1 ·M 
n 
per inventory period or, e.g., that he will divert the total amount M with 
probability q. during the i-th inventory period, i=l, ... ,n, then a different test 
1 
procedure than that based on the global balance would lead to a higher overall 
probability of detection. 
The objective "short detection time" poses several problems. First, this object-
ive cannot be formulated quantitatively so easily as the one discussed so far: 
As there exists a non-zero probability that a diversion will not be detected 
during the reference time, we cannot simply take as a criterion the expected 
detection time 
n 
~ i. p.' 
i=1 1 
where p. is the probability of detecting a diversion for the first time at the 
1. 
end of the i-th inventory period, as we have 
n 
~ p. < I. 
i=l 
1 
One possibility would be to take the expected detection time under the condition 
that detection actually takes place during the reference time. 
Another difficulty of the conditional expected detection time is that it is not 
necessarily a monotone function of the nurober of inventory periods per reference 
time (Avenhaus and Frick 1974) and that the minimum depends on the numerical 
data and cannot be determined analytically which means that simplified "fist 
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formulae" cannot be derived. 
1.et us assume that a quantitatively formulated objective "short detection time" 
has been agreed. As both criteria, high probability of detection and short 
detection time, may be conflicting it has to be decided in which way the trade-
off between these two objectives shall be resolved. The only theoretically 
satisfying answer to this difficult problern is to define payoff parameterB for 
both the inspector and the operator for the different outcomes of the "inspection 
game" (detected or not detected diversion during the i-th inventory period) 
which take into account the risk as well as the time aspect (Avenhaus 1980) and 
to analyze the appropriate game theoretical model. Naturally, the values of 'these 
parameters can hardly be estimated, therefore, a conclusion should be drawn if 
at least ratios of such payoff parameters can be estimated or, if even this is 
not possible, in which way the different objectives shall be weighted. 
In 1979,. a Peer Review Group was established by the USNRC in order to 
answer five questions concerning the applicability of game theoretical 
models to material accountancy problems (Bennett et al. 1979). The group 
members based their findings primarily on one specific paper (Siri et al. 
1978) which did not address to those concrete questions which are dis-
cussed here thus, their results are only of general value for our purposes. 
It follows already from the fact that the expected detection time - contrary to 
the overall probability of detection - cannot be derived from a game theoretical 
model that the expected detection time does not represent a natural objective. 
Lt has already been mentioned that recently specific diversion strategies have 
been discussed which shall be detected with as high a probability of detection 
as possible, In principle, one can construct tests which are best for a uniform 
(protracted) diversion or which are best for an abrupt diversion, but naturally 
there exists no test which is best for both these extremes and their mixtures. 
One solution to the problern of finding the best test procedure against any of 
these diversion strategies would be to use all the single best tests simultan-
eously. This, however, poses the difficult analytical problern of determining the 
overall false alarm probability: As in all tests the same data are used, the 
different test statistics are highly dependent. 
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Another possibility would be to treat the two problems of detecting an abrupt 
and a protracted diversion as completely different inspection problems which 
would mean that different false alarm probabilities would be fixed for the two 
test procedures, and the fact would be ignored that the same data are used for 
both tests. 
This idea is an extension of the idea of separating the physical protection 
problern (detection of a diversion on the subnational level) from the 
international safeguards problem, even though in practice many measures 
may serve both purposes at the same time. 
In addition to the objectives and boundaries discussed so far, there exist 
further constraints which frequently cannot be formulated quantitatively 
("non-intrusiveness", "minimization of plant operations disturbances" etc.). 
It should be attempted, however, to establish a list of these constraints and 
to give arguments for possible consequences of these constraints to the test 
procedures to be developed. 
Role of Estimation Procedures 
The detection of a diversion of nuclear material can principally be achieved 
only by means of test proc~dures. Nevertheless, in the last years estimation 
procedures have been discussed at length also in connection with international 
nuclear material safeguards, even though it is not their objective to estimate 
the diverted amount but only to detect it. 
One objective for the development of such procedures is the estimation of plant-
internal lasses. This is important also for international nuclear material 
safeguards, because these lasses contribute to a non-zero MUF-value, therefore, 
their distribution has to be known in order that they can be separated from an 
eventual diversion. We demonstrate this for one inventory period (again omitting 
the index i) : 
The null hypothesis H now is given by 
0 
H MUF = e+.Q,,, 
0 
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where e ~s the total measurement error and t the. loss, with known moments 
E(e) = 0, 
2 
= cr ' L, var(t) E (t) var(e) 
Furthermore, the alternative hypothesis H
1 
is given by 
H
1
: MUF = M+e+t, 
where M is the diversion. Then the decision is 
MUF-L < s: H true 
0 
MUF-L > s: H
1 
true, 
and the probability of detection as function of the false alarm probability is 
1-ß <P( M 
~ 
- ul ). -a 
Another objective for the development of estimation procedures is the expect-
ation that one might .arrive at this way at "best" test procedures in cases 
where' optimal tests cannot be constructed directly. In fact, there exist many 
relations between so-called "sufficient" statistics and best tests (see e.g. 
Witting 1980). The idea is that the operator uses a certain diversion strategy 
during the reference time which can be "revealed" in the first inventory periods, 
and that this information can be used in later periods for the ~pplication of 
appropriate tests. However, this does not work necessarily: Stewart's estimate 
of the starting inventory does not lead to the best test in the sense of the 
overall probability of detection. 
Analysis of Test Procedures 
Let us assume that the objectives and boundaries have been agreed upon. Let us 
assurne, furthermore, that it has been agreed that one should try to establish a 
theoretically fully sauisfying game theoretical model of the problem, but that 
in addition to this simple and practical test procedures shall be developed 
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without the use of payoff parameters. Which way should one proceed? 
First, it has to be clarified whether or not tests with indifference regions 
make sense and also whether or not sequential procedures shall be taken into 
account (Shipley 1980). 
Both questions can be answered only if it is clear which action levels 
follow after a specific decision: Shall the plant be shut down in case 
of a significant MUF value? Shall different actions be taken in the 
cases of "indifference" and of "significance"? 
Thereafter, it shall be decided if "batteries of tests" shall be envisaged which 
means to solve difficult analytical problems, or if single tests shall be 
applied which may be best for one specific diversion strategy and hopefully not 
so bad for others, or if completely separated procedures shall be applied, 
independently of their statistical dependencies because the same dana base ~s 
used in all procedures; 
Conclusion: List of Questions 
In order to structure the discussion of the experts about the topics outlined 
so far, a list of questions is formulated which should be answered as precisely 
as possible. Naturally, this list cannot be exhaustive (e.g., the important 
aspect of data verification has not been mentioned at all), nor can it be 
expected that all questions will find a satisfying answer. 
1. To which framework in space and time shall the value of the false alarm 
probability be related? 
2. Which quantitative cri terion for the objecti ve "short detection time" 
shall be used? 
3. Do models which use payoff parameters make more sense than a purely 
theoretical one? 
4. How can the tradeoff between the two objectives "high probability of detect-
ion" and "short expected detection time" be resolved in a pragmatical way, 
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L.e. without the use of payoff parameters? 
5. Which boundary conditions have to be taken into account? Can they be 
formulated quantitatively? Which consequences do they have? 
6, Which diversion strategies have to be taken into account? Abrupt diversion? 
Protracted diversion? Mixed strategies? Which priorities can be forrnulated 
with respect to these strategies? 
7. What is the purpose of estimating the amounts of diverted material in the 
framework of international nuclear material safeguards? 
8. Do tests with indifference regLons make sense, and do sequential tests make 
sense in VLew of the action levels which have been formulated so far? 
9. In which direction shall research and development in this area go: 
Shall batteries of tests be developed or shall one concentrate on one test 
which is optimal for one diversion strategy and not so bad for others, or 
shall one envisage cornpletely separated procedures without taking into 
account the dependencies of the statistics? 
Finally, an important organisational question is posed: 
10. Which steps can be taken in order to discuss the findings of this meeting 
with the international nuclear material safeguards cornrnunity and finally 
to reach a consensus? 
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Federal Republic of Germany 
Dear Dipak: 
At the July 27, 1982 meeting between us and Carl Bennett, you had asked that 
I draft Section 6 of the Overview report, the section dealing with 
descriptions of the 8 tests. It was my understanding that these 
descriptions be largely non-mathematical, pointing out in narrative form 
the differences between, and similarities of, the various tests. 
Enclosed you will find my draft. I would suppose that some editing will be 
required to fit this section in with the balance of the report. Please feel 
free to edit accordingly. Except for the required editing, I trust that 
this draft is generally responsive to what you had in mind. I am also 
sending this to Beedgen, Markin, and Sellinschegg to give them the 
opportunity to review and edit if what I have written is not properly 
descriptive of their test procedures. By this copy, I ask that they send 
any comments directly to you. 
I look forward to seeing you at the Symposium 1n November. 
Best regards, 
~ 
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Tests Descriptions 
In this section, a description 1s g1ven of the eight basic statistical 
test sequences investigated in this study. 
MUF 
The MUF test is a test on the material balance for a g1ven period. 
Letting Di be the observed MUF for period i, loss detection is said to 
occur if Di exceeds some critical value determined by the value of a and 
the values of the measurement error standard deviations. The MUF test 
does not take into account any prior history. It is aimed at detecting 
an abrupt loss, one that occurs somewhere within the material balance 
period in question. As a test sequence, the MUF test is applied at each 
material balance period and loss detection over the P periods occurs if 
at least one of the MUF tests returns a significant result, i.e., if at 
least one MUF exceeds its critical value. The a value over all P 
tests is controlled by reducing the size of the significance level for 
each individual test. 
CUMUF 
The test statistic to be applied 1n period i is denoted by Ti and 
1s the sum of the individual observed MUF's beginning at some point 1n 
time and extending through period i: 
T· 1 D· 1 
At a g1ven point 1n time, Ti is independent of how the losses are distributed 
throughout the i periods. This is the cited advantage of the CUMUF 
test. As a test sequence, the CUMUF test is applied at each material 
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balance period, as is the MUF test. Clearly, there ~s a close correlation 
between success~ve CUMUF's. 
In this study, CUMUF is applied in sequence on the one hand, and 
only at the end of the 35 periods on the other. The single test ~n 
this latter instance is, of course, more powerful than is the 35th such 
test applied as the last test in the sequence. However. this increase 
~n power ~s counterbalanced by the lack of timeline~s, i.e., the inability 
of the test to detect losses that occur early in the sequence of time 
periods. Since the MUF test and the CUNUF test are directed at quite 
different loss patterns, in Phase 1 of the study for one test sequence 
under investigation, both the MUF and CUMUF tests were applied at the 
end of each material balance period. 
Uniform Diversion 
The test statistic ~s designed to detect uniform losses. Since 
uniform lasses over a nurober of successive balance periods were the 
pr~mary loss patterns studied in Phase 2, it would be expected that the 
uniform diversion test statistic would exhibit good detection capabilities 
~n this study. 
The linear statistic ~n question ~s the minimum variance unbiased 
estimate of uniform loss. Specifically, in this study, the statistic 
was defined for each group of four successive MUF's. It is a moving 
weighted average of four such NUF's, and it is clear that successive 
test statistics would be closely correlated. 
The weighted average is derived as follows. Let 
Ti = a1Di+a2Di+l+a3Di+2+a4Di+J 
where the aj's sum to 1 for j=l, 2, 3, 4. The aj's are chosen to minimize 
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the variance of Ti· The first test statistic 1s calculated at the 
end of the fourth balance period. 
When j=l-4 as here, the calculation of the aj 's is quite simple. For 
more complex cases, calculational algorithms are helpful. The oft-mentioned 
Kalman filter is a calculational algorithm used in this instance. 
CUMUFR 
CUMUFR 1s an acronym for cumulative sum of standardized MUF Eesiduals. 
It is designed to detect changes 1n loss patterns. A uniform lass that occurs 
in all balance periods would not be detectable with the CUMUFR test. 
The MUF residual for period i, MUFRi, is defined as 
MUFRi = Di - E(Di,Dl, D2, ... , Di-1) 
where E(DijDl,D2, ... , Di-1) is an appropriate linear function of D1, D2 ... , 
Di-1• so chosen such that MUFRi has minimal variance. The standardized MUF 
residual 1s found by dividing MUFRi by its standard deviation, CJi and the 
CUMUFR test statistic for balance period k is found by summ1ng MUFRi/ cr i from 
1 to k. 
The time ser1es of MUFR's is a linear transformation of the time ser1es 
of MUF's. They can be calculated exactly by applying this transformation or 
approximately through use of a Kalman filter. 
The CUMUFR test may be applied as a two-sided test or as a one-sided 
test. In a two-sided test application, periods of losses followed by periods 
of no losses would also be detectable, whereas for a one-sided test, only 
periods oflosses following periods of no lasses would be detectable. 
-3-
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Note that in applying the CUMUFR test sequence, use Ls always made 
of all the MUF data extending back to period 1. This is a principal 
distinction in this study between CUMUFR and the Dn test discussed next. 
Like CUMUFR just discussed, Dn is aimed at detecting changes in 
loss patterns. Unlike CUMUFR, in this study n was fixed at 5, i.e., at 
the end of each balance period, and beginning with period 6, the current 
MUF Ls compared with some constant ß times the sum of the 5 previous 
MUF's, where ß is chosen to minimize the variance. Specifically, 
the test statistic for period L LS 
T· L Di+5- ß ~+4 D· 
j=l J 
where ß LS a simple function of the error varLances Ln measurLng net 
transfers and inventories. 
In this study, the testwas applied as a one-sided test. Thus, a 
period of losses followed by a period of non-losses would not be detectable. 
Sequential Probability Ratio Test 
The sequential probability ratio test LS related to the CUMUF test 
Ln that the test statistic is the cumulative sum of the MUF's. However, 
the test is now a sequential test in the true sense of the word, as 
distinguished from a sequence of fixed length tests. 
With a sequential test, when the value of the test statistic Ls 
calculated at the end of each period, the decision is made to either 
reject the hypothesis of no loss (i.e., declare that a loss has been detected), 
accept the hypothesis of no loss, or continue testing. When the hypothesis 
of no loss Ls accepted, then the test is restarted, and all prLor data 
are ignored. This restarting of the test and deletion of prior data is 
what distinguishes the sequential probability ratio test from the CUMUF 
test described earlier. With the CUMUF test, the MUF data extending 
-4-
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backward to period 1 are always retained. 
Modified Pages Test 
The Modified Pages test is also a sequential test in that the test may 
be restarted with all prior data eliminated when the accumulated evidence 
indicates that there has been no loss of material. 
For the Modified Pages test, the test statisti~ 1s 






In effect, the test statistic is the current CUMUF m1nus the largest 
previous CUMUF, o being a constant. 
The upper threshold (critical value) 1s a function of some parameter, 
A, which controls the false alarm rate, and of the period number, i. The 
lower threshold is zero for the Modified Pages test. 
Truncated Sequential CUMUF 
Like the sequential probability ratio test, the basic statistic is the 
cumulative sum of the MUF's.' Also, the test 1s sequential in nature. This 
test procedure 1s called a truncated one because after a fixed number of 
material balance periods, a decision must be made as to whether or not a lass 
has occurred. 
In evaluating this test procedure, a saddle-point solution is also found. 
The saddle point solution gives a guaranteed efficiency in the sense that it 
gives the detection probability corresponding to the least favorable lass 
pattern, i.e., it reacts to a diversion scenario in which the adversary chooses 




On Evaluation Methodology for Near-Real-Time Materials Accountancy+) 
Prepared for the second International Workshop on Near-Real-Time 
Accountancy in Large Reprocessing Facilities, 24th to 26th February 
1982, KfK, Karlsruhe, F.R. Germany 
by 
Hideo Nishimura, Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, Tokai, Japan 
In the TASTEX Task-F study, simulated material balance data and 
experimental MUF values were analyzed using the statistical evaluation 
procedures which have been developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory, 
For this purpose a computer code "SADAC" (SAfeguards Data Analysis 
Code) has been developed. 
Following descriptions are referred to: 
JAERI-memo 9532, STUDY OF THE APPLICATION OF NEAR-REAL-TIME MATERIALS 
ACCOUNTANCY TO SAFEGUARDING REPROCESSING PLANTS, K. Ikawa, e. al, May 1981. 
+) b . d . . . su mLtte as prLvate communLcatLon 
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Statistical Evaluation Procedures 
Statistical evaluation procedures used in the study are essentially 
those developed at the Los Alamos National Laboratory. The complete 
computer package includes four statistical tests, a Straightforward 
cumulative sum (CUSUM) test, a uniform diversion test based on the Kalman 
filter statistic, a variance test, and a two directional test based on 
two Kalman filter models operating in opposite directions. The purposes 
of these tests are as follows : 
(a) CUSUM - this statistic provides a relatively powerful test which is 
in general not dependent on an assumed diversion pattern, 
(b) uniform diversion - as the name implies, this test is more sensitive 
when the divertor follows the nominally optimum strategy of diverting 
a uniformly small quantity during each material balance period, 
(c) variance test - if a would-be divertor attempts to defeat the 
statistical tests by diverting in a random manner, the observed vari-
ance of the MUF data will be significantly larger than the variance 
derived from the measurement uncertainty for each material balance. 
The variance test is designed to give an increased detection sensitivity 
against randomized diversions by detecting this increased variance in 
the data, 
(d) two-directional test - this test recognizes that a revised estimate 
of the inventory at any earlier point in time can be derived from a 
consideration of subsequent flow and inventory data. In borderline 
situations it is expected that a t\'70-directional test would be more 
sensitive to possible abrupt diversions. 
Although early feasibility studies using simulated data considered 
all four of these tests, most work has been with only the first two. It 
seems likely that in actual practice primary reliance will be on the CUSUM 
and uniform diversion tests, and that the other tests will be used only 
to provide supplementary evidence, or to suggest the need for further 
investigation of possible borderline situations. 
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Development of Computer Code 
In order to analyze material balance data, a computer code "SADAC" 
(SAfeguards ~ata !nalysis ~ode) has been developed using the data analysis 
and sequential decision techniques. 
The sequential decision procedure adopted in SADAC has a small ad-
dition to the original one. These additions are as follows; 
(1) SADAC tests against both gain and loss, and it indicates an alpha-
betical symbol if the material unbalance is positive, while indi-
cates a numerical, if the unbalance is negative. 
(2) When a decision test obtains a result with a false alarm probabillity 
greater than 0,5 at the first point of a subsequence, i.e., at the 
point of {r 1, r 2) \ r 1 = r 2}, the decision test indicates the 
symbol 'T' at this point on the alarm-sequence chart and is termi-
nated immediately in the original decision test procedure. On the 
contrary, in SADAC, the decision test continues examination of the 
subsequent material balance data so long as the false-alarm proba-
bilities of succeeding tests continues to decrease. 
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C.A. Bennett, Battelle-HARC, Seattle, USA 
II/IS/82 
PARAMETRie DESCRIPTION OF LOSS PATTERNS 
I. Scope of the Description 
I. I A description is needed to provide 
(a) a space of alternate hypotheses for applying methods of 
determining "best" tests; 
(b) as a framewerk for comparative studies based on simulation 
procedures. 
1.2 Consideration will be restricted to a single l~A. The most 
general problem in this case considers a continuing sequence of 
inventories y. at timest., i = 0, + I,+ 2, and the corresponding 
~ ~ -





~ ~ ~ 
JL + n. 
~ ~ 
~"'o, ... ,n 
i = I, .. , ,n 
D. 
~ = Y· I + x. - y. = L. + n. I - n. + s. 
~- ~ ~ ~ ~- ~ ~ 
1.3 Consideration will be stricted to random errors n. und s. 
~ ~ 
with E( n.) = E.( s.) = 0 and known distributional properties. 
~ ~ ~ 
This means that we are not interested here in describing or testing the 
nature of the random errors in the determination of the values of x. 
~ 
and y .• Variance components corresponding to measurement biases will 
~ 
usually be assumed to be described by the variance-covariance matrix of 
these observations, but in some instances the existence of constant 
biases will be postulated, 
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1.4 The concern here is therefore with characterization of the 
expected values ~· of the inventory and L. of the inventory 
~ ~ 
differences. 
2. Extent and Nature of Available Observations 
2. I First consider limitations on the sequence of observations to be 
considered. In general, we can assume that: 
2. I. I The sequence extends from initiation of facility to present, 
i.e., from some initial inventory ~ = 0 to a sequentially increasing 
0 
value of ~. (We may choose to base our estimation procedures on a subset 
of these observations, but are not restricted from doing so.) 
2. 1.2 However, for operational or legal reasons we can be restricted 
to either: 
2. 1.2. I the observations subsequent to some initialtimeT or 
0 
2. 1.2.2 the observations during a fixed period of time (i.e., a calendar 
year). 
2.2 There is no inherent reason why the times t. of inventory 
~ 
taking should be equally spaced. Hypotheses (assumptions) concerning the 
general loss pattern L. may involve the time periods ~. = t. - t. 1 ~ ~ ~ ~-
between inventories. 
3. Whether or not the sequence of observations is limited, we may 
wish to limit our consideration of possible lasses to some subset of 
periods, There are two reasons for this: 
3. I For legal or administrative reasons we may wish to limit our 
consideration only to those losses which occurred during a predetermined 
time period. 
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3.2 If the total lass is of concern we may wish to prevent the lass 
rate from becoming arbitrarily small. This has been traditionally clone 
by assuming that after some period of time possible prior lasses should 
be neglected. This can also be clone by weighting the importance of past 
lasses by an exponentially or geometrically decreasing function of the 
elapsed time since the lass is assumed to have occurred. In either case 
the assumption is with respect to a period prior to the present time, not 
a fixed period as in 3. I. 
4. Sensible descriptions of the lass patterns and the form of the 
associated estimates or decision procedures depend on whether the lasses 
are assumed to originate from normal material handling and processing or 
from delibe~ate diversion. 
4. I For process lasses: 
4. I. I There is no reason to arbitrarily limit the nurober of observa-
tions to be considered. 
4. I. 2 There is no reason to consider any statute of limitations on 
lasses, especially since consequences may be latent and/or cumulative. 
4. I. 3 Lass mechanisms can be assumed not to depend on any deliberate 
choice of an optimumlass strategy, but tobe the result of some inde-
pendent process characteristic or operational procedure (e.g., hold up or 
unmeasured waste). 
4.2 For diversion: 
4.2. I The lasses, and hence de facto the observations, tobe considered 
may be limi ted. 
4.2.2 Lass mechanisms must be assumed to be deliberately chosen to 
minimize the chances of detection. Several cases: 
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4.2.2.1 Knowledge of detection procedure and past data available to the 
divertor. 
4.2.2.2 Past data but not detection procedures known to divertor, 
4.2.2.3 Neither past data nor detection procedures available. 
4.3 In either case, the absence of consequences may be considered as 
prima facie evidence of the absence of diversion in past periods. 
5. For the case of process lasses neither arbitrary limitations on 
the length of the sequence of observation or the nature of the lasses 
makes any sense. There are three models of interest, all with parallels 
in the usual methods of process control: 
5. I A constant lang term loss rate, characterized by an expected 
loss L per unit of time and a variance crz about this fixed rate 
associated with a specified time unit. This model best characterizes 
unmeasured process lasses, waste lasses or unknown measurement biases. 
Note that the loss may be proportional to throughput, time between 
inventories, or both. 
5.2 Drifts in loss rate, similar to models for tool wear. Simplest 
model is linear increase in lass rate with time, starting at some initial 
point. 
5.3 Shifts in expected lass rate due to process changes or changes 
in the character of the material or equipment. 
6. For deliberate diversion, the possibilities can be described as 
follows: 
6, I A single acquisition over a fixed period. The divertor strategy 
with respect to the loss pattern over this period will depend on: 
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6. I. I Whether the data on which the decision is based is limited to an 
established period. If so, the acquisition will be: 
6.1.1.1 optimally allocated with respect to successive data sets 
(optimum timing); 
6.1. 1.2 within each data set, the totaldiversionwill be distributed 
over the period of acquisition (e.g., distribution of the 
required diversion 1n equal amounts over k of the n periods 1n 
the data set (optimum lass pattern). 
6. I. 2 If the diversion is not tied to a fixed data set, then must 
consider: 
6. 1.2. I Balance between rate of diversion and timeliness of acquisition. 
6.1.2.2 Fora fixed period of acquisition, timing with respect to 
individual material balance periods, and either random or 
systematic variation of rate. 
6.2 When considering a fixed lang termrate of diversion, the 
strategy must take into account: 
6. 2. I The optimum induced random variability 1n the lass rate. 
6.2.2 The possible feedback of information into the detection strategy. 
7. There are two specific cases which seem to bracket the patterns 
of interest: 
7. I The concern is with a lass restricted to a fixed period (e.g., a 
g1ven calendar year). Corresponding to this fixed period we have n + I 
observed inventories and n observed net transfers. We wish to detect the 
attempt to divert a fixed total amount M during the year based on these 
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2ri + I observations. Testing can be carried out following any inventory 
and net transfer determination based on all data available up to the time 
t. 
~ 
of the ith inventory. Under these circumstances studies of optimum 
decision procedures require the ability to determine for a fixed testing 
procedure with an established false alarm rate (probability of "detection" 
when diversion has occured): (I) what is the divertor strategy which 
minimizes the chances of detection by the end of the year of an amount M 
at some value of i; (2) the increased probability of detection as a 
function of the increased time between acquisition of the total amount and 
detection. This is the classic case of abrupt vs. protracted diversion 
over a fixed one-year period where protracted means throughout the year 
but not necessarily constant. Conversely, for fixed diversion strategies 
or classes of strategies it may be possible to establish test procedures 
which have optimum properties, or whose effectiveness is independent of 
the assumed loss pattern. 
7.2 In the absence of administrative and legal considerations the 
problern that should be considered is the prompt detection of the intro-
duction of some loss pattern. The simplest cases are those in which the 
shift to a constant loss of varying size is to be detected. The shift is 
ciescribed by a single parameter L. If the expected nurober of periods re-
quired to detect the shift is used as a measure of the effectiveness of 
the test, then the optimum choice of L should maximize the difference 
between this nurober and the nurober of periods M/L required to accumulate 
a fixed quality M at a loss rate L. A more complex formulation would 
consider both the nature of the shift in the expectation L. of D. and 
~ ~ 
the deliberate variation cr
1
. in the i-th loss which would maximize 
this expected time from accÜmulation of an amount L. to detection. In 
~ 
particular, one could study the effect of an additional variability cr1 
associated with a constant shift, as well as additional tests to 
determine the shift in variability. 
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TIMELY DETECTION OF MATERIALS LOSS 
J. T. Markin 
Los Alamos National Laböratory, Los Alamos, USA 
Tirnely detection of rnaterials loss frorn a high-throughput 
nuclear facility is not attainable under the practice of closing 
a rnaterials balance at 6-rnonth or yearly intervals. ~owever, 
where a near-real-tirne accounting systern is in plac;:e to gather 
process rneasurernent data and sequential statistical testing pro-
cedures are applied to these data, the possibili ty of tirnely 
detection is improved (see, for exarnple, Refs. 1, 2). This paper 
cornpares several sequential testing procedures using expected 
time to detect a uniform rnaterials loss and the probability of 
detecting an abrupt loss as the rneasures of test performance. 
Sequential tests were selected for evaluation because they 
{1) allow an immediate decision about rnaterials loss as accounting 
data are acquired, (2) are sensitive to both low-level rnaterials 
loss over extended periods and abrupt loss in a single period, 
( 3 ~ signal a loss rnore quickly on the average than fixed length 
tests, (4) have bounded false-alarrn rates, and (5) allow past 
data to be elirninated when the procedure decides no prior rnate-
rials loss. 
Detection of rnaterials loss is modeled as the statistical 
problern of deciding betwe·en two hypotheses about the rnean of a 
probability distribution given observations from that distribu-
tion. In rn?terials accounting the rnaterials balance mean ll is 
to be deterrnined by deciding between the hypothesis H0 of no 
materials loss (l.l = 0) against the alternative hypothesis H1 





consist of a statistic that depends on the 
observed rnaterials balances, and upper and lower decision thresh-
olds TU and TL. 3 At each Observation the statistic is cornpared 
to the thresholds and a decision is rnade according to the rule: 
accept H
0 
when S 2 TL, accept H
1 
when S ~ TU, and continue testing 
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otherwise. Acceptance of H0 causes prior observations to be 
removed from consideration and the test to be restarted. Where 
procedural or legal requirements require a decision at a particu-
lar time, test truncation rules allow a decision when the test 
statistic has not crossed a threshold. Type I and Type II errors 
for sequential tests are controlled by appropriate choice of the 
decision thresholds. 
The sequential tests to be compared are Page's test, Page's 
test with a modified decision threshold, and the sequentia1 prob-
ability ratio test. Page's statistic4 is defined as 
S(N) = C(N) - Min C(i) 
1<i<N 
where C ( i) 
a constant 
i 
is the cumu1ative sum l: j=1 
parameter to be determined. 
(MBj - o) where 
The decision rule 
is 
for 
this test is to accept H0 when S(N) = 0, accept H1 when 
S(N) > h > 0, and continue testing otherwise. The false-a1arm 
rate and detection probability for this test are control1ed 
through the parameters c and h. 
Recently hypothesis testing procedures of power 1 have been 
deve1oped in which a thresho1d of the form T(N) = {N[A2 + 
. Log(N) ]} 1 /
2 
is used to test for an increase in the mean of 
I C(N)) I, where 
rate e::. 5 ' 6 
A is a parameter_ controlling the false-alarm 
Under this procedure when H0 is true, 
P[ IC(N) I > T(N), N > 1] = e:: 
and under H1 
P[IC(N)I > T(N), N > 1] = 1 
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Because IC(N) I has the same probability distribution as 
Page 1 s statistic S(N) under the hypothesis H0 (Ref. 7), the 
threshold T(N) has been adapted to Page 1 s test. The test proce-
dure consists of accepting H0 when S(N) = 0, accepting H1 
when S(N) ~ T(N), and continuing testing otherwise. When H0 
is accepted, the test is restarted by eliminating all previous 
data and restarting the threshold at its initial value. 
The sequential probability ratio test 3 is based on the 
probability ratio that is a measure of the relative likelihood of 
each hypothesi s under the Observations. The test statistic is 









+ Log(A) = -2-
l-11 
where A and B determine the fa1se-a1arm and detection probabil-
ities. The test procedure is to accept H
0 
when C(N) ~ TU(N), 
accept H1 when C(N) ~ TL(N), and continue testing otherwise. 
Note that this test requires 
unl i ke the Page 1 s test where 
the value of l-1 1 to be 
the hypothesis H1 on1y 
specified, 
specified 
that l-1 > 0. 
Test performances against both uniform and abrupt 1osses are 
eva1uated with simu1ated materials balance data. Materials bal-











under H1 . Each ba1ance is assumed uncorre-
other balances. 
5 . 0 and o = 0. 5, 
2. 9 and o = 0, 
For 
for 
Page 1 s test 
the Modi fied 
the parameter 
Page 1 s test 
and for the SPRT they are 
A = 2.94, B = -2.94, and 1-1 1 = 0.38. These parameter values 
were chosen by simulation to attain a 0. OS false-alarm rate per 
year when balances are drawn weekly. 
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For a uniform loss rate of 0.5 per balance, Figures 1 and 2 
compare the runlength distribution of the Modified Page's test 
with Page's test and the SPRT, respectively. These results imply 
that the average run length to detect a uniform materials loss is 
significantly smaller for the Modified Page's test compared with 
the other tests. 
Test performance in detecting an abrupt materials loss is 
ceropared by simulating abrupt diversions in the last balance 
period of balance sequences of length 10 and 25. Detection prob-
abilities given in Tables I and II show the Modified Page's test 
to be the best for runs of length 10 balance periods and Pages's 
test to be the best over 25 balance periods. 
The Modified Page's test has been applied to materials 
accounting data generated wi th the model process diagrammed in 
Figure 3. Process measurement errors and their uncertainties are 
given in Tables III and IV, where correlated errors have been set 
to zero to achieve independent materials balances. The operation 
of the Modified Page's test on a representative materials balance 
sequence from the model process appears in Figure 4. These data 
represent normal opera tion du ring balances l-50 and a uni form 
loss of 0. 8 per balance during balances 51-100. Note that each 
time S (N) = 0 the threshold is returned to i ts ini tial value. 
Detection of materials loss is in balance 99 when S{N) crosses 
the upper threshold. 
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PLUTONIUM/ RELATIVE STD. DEV. 
IN YENTORY ( KG) 
RANDOM SYSTEMATIC 
196.5 0.01 0.0 
7.6 0.01 0.0 
50. 0.005 0.0 
134. 0.005 o.o 
62.5 0.005 0.0 
I;= 450.6 
ENTORY OF ODEL FACILIT ND 








PLUTONII UM/ RELATIVE STD. DEV .I 
BATCH (KG) 
RANDOM SYSTEMATIC 
INPUT 16.73 0.01 0.0 
PRODUCT OUTPUT 25. 0.002 0.0 
WASTE OUTPUT 0.2 0.25 0.0 
~- --····--··- ---
PLUTONIUM CONTENT OF INPUT AND OUTPUT BATCHES 
AND CORRESPONDING MEASUREMENT UNCERTAINTIES, 
THREE INPUT BATCHES, TWO PRODUCT OUTPUT BATCHES 
AND ONE STE OUTPUT BATCH PER DAY ARE ASSUMED 









Los Alamos National Labaratory 
Los Alamos, New Mexico 87545 
Energy Division 
Safeguards Systems Group, Q-4 




oATE August 26, 1982 
IN REPLY REFER TO: Q- 4/82-417 
MAll STOP: E 54 1 
TELEPHONE ( 5 0 5 ) 6 6 7- 7 7 7 7 
( FTS) 843-7777 
D 7500 Karlsruhe 1, Federal Republic of Germany 
7826484A KFK D 
Dear Gupta: 
I am enclosing some test resu1ts for use in the study being 
done by the International Workshop on Near-Real-Time Accounting. 
The tests are the modified Pages test and the sequential prob-
abi1ity ratio test with decision thresholds adjusted for a .05 
fa1se a1arm rate. They were app1ied to uniform 1oss scenar ios 
under the conditions described in the tables. 
JM:ew 
Enc.: a/s 





An Equal Opportunlty Employer/Operated by Unlverslty of Callfornla 
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MODIFIED PAGES TEST 
cr 
0 
/cr E = 2 • 5 
M Io rn Detection Probability 
·~~-~~~-,·=-~ 
--~--. ----
p: ,) 1 5 1.0 
1 10 .94 
11 5 1.0 
11 10 .91 
21 5 .96 
21 10 .80 
2 ~) 1 5 1. 0 
1 10 1.0 
11 5 1.0 
11 10 1.0 
21 5 1.0 
21 10 1.0 
'=~=~~"~~~ 
MODIFIED PAGES TEST 
cr "' , 55 
E: 
r; E ja 0 = 2. 5 
Io m Detection Probability 
15 1 5 .08 
1 10 .05 
11 5 .08 
11 10 .05 
21 5 .08 
21 10 .05 
2.5 1 5 .16 
1 10 . 1 1 
11 5 .12 
11 10 .1 0 
21 5 . 1 1 
21 10 .10 
M total amount diverted 
I 0 initial balance for material loss 
m number of balances in which loss occurs 
uE standard deviation of net transfer random error 
a
8 
standard deviation of net transfer systematic error 
Modified Page Test Results 
Sigma Sigma Epsilon Abrupt Loss 
Epsilon S1gma Delta Uniform Loss lst Balance Last Balance 
5 15 25 5 15 25 5 15 25 - - - - - - -
0.1 1.5 0.05 0.25 0.79 0.83 1.0 1.0 0.25 0.74 1.0 
4.5 0.05 0. 20 0.48 0.75 1.0 1.0 0.20 0.70 1.0 
9.0 0.05 0.11 0.20 0.08 0.92 1.0 0.08 0.46 0.69 
1.0 1.5 0.5 0.08 0.11 0.06 0.10 0.92 0.05 0.08 0.46 
4.5 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 
9.0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
10.0 1.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
4.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 







SEQUENTIAL PROBABILITY RATIO TEST 
0' = 0.1 
€ 








































SEQUENTIAL PROBABILITY RATIO TEST 
0' = .55 
€ 
Io m Detection Probability 
15 1 5 .36 
1 10 .17 
11 5 .42 
11 10 .18 
21 5 .42 
21 10 .17 
25 1 5 .83 
1 10 .40 
11 5 .85 
11 10 .41 
21 5 .85 
21 10 .41 
M total amount diverted 
I 0 initial balance for material 1oss 
m number of ba1ances in which loss occurs 
0'8 , standard deviation of net transfer random error 
crc5 standard deviation of net transfer systematic error 
p~==~-~~'~ ~==",..--=,-= 
~~-~· 
Sequential Probability Test Results 
Sigma Sigma Epsilon ~.brupt Loss 
Epsilon Sigma Delta Uniform Loss lst Balance Last Balance -
5 15 25 5 15 25 5 15 25 - -
0.1 1.5 0.07 0.15 0.21 0.71 1.0 1.0 0.62 1.0 1.0 
4.5 0.05 0.12 0.18 0.64 1.0 1.0 0.56 1.0 1.0 
9.0 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.30 1.0 1.0 0. 27 1.0 1.0 
1.0 1.5 0.5 0.07 0.09 0.24 1.0 1.0 0.20 0.98 1.0 
4.5 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.60 0.99 0.05 0.49 0.91 
9.0 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.10 0.42 0.05 0.06 0.30 
10.0 1.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.05 
4.5 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 






Determination of the Detection Probability as a 
Function of Various Loss Strategies--Phase 2 
Part 1: Design of Study 
John L. Jaech 
Exxon Nuclear Co. Inc. 
Bellevue, WA 98009 
April, 1982 
Phase 2 of the subject study extends the ranges of the model parameters, 
introduces additional test statistics, and changes the lass patterns from 
the initial study phase. This report presents the study to be performed 
at Exxon Nuclear Company on Phase 2. The Mathematical model and notation 
are contained in my earlier report, same title exclusive of ".Phase 211 • The 
notation will be extended as necessary. 
Lass Pattern 
The lo·ss patterns to be studied in Phase 2 are as follows. To correspond 
to computer notation, Li is replaced by L(I) in the description of the lass 
patterns. 
Lass Pattern 1: 
L( I) for I= 10 , I 0 + 1, ... I 0 + m- 1 
m 
== 0 elsewhere 
The quantities M, m and 10 are model parameters to be varied in the study. 
The lass pattern is a uniform pattern beginning at period 10 and ·continuing 
through rn periods. 
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Loss Pattern 2: 
For even m, L(I) 
For odd m, L(I) 




















= 0 elsewhere 
= 
O.SM for I= 
m 
l. SM for I 
m 
for I = I 0 +m-1 
m 
= 0 elsewhere 
These are periodic loss functions for losses occurr~ng during the m 
successive periods. More generally, the coefficients 0.5 and 1.5 could 
be replaced' by any two quantities that sum to 2, including the possibility 
that one coefficient could be negative. 
Test Statistics 
Four sets of test statistics will be investigated. Calling the test 
statistics, T1, Tz, ... , Tk these are defined for the four sets of test 
statistics. 




~ l: n. 
j=l J 
i=l' 2' ... ' k 
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Set 2. Dn st.atis'tic proposed in my 1976 INMM paper, "Can the 
Effects of Systematic Errors on LE-MUF be Reduced?", 
with n = 5. 
i+4 
T· = Di+5 ß E D· ~ J 
j=l 
2 + 5 00 
2 
where ß = an 
2 a 2 + 5 a 2 + 25 a 2 
n c o 
The first test is not made until the end of the sixth material 
balance period. 
Set 3. The uniform diversion test statistic calculated over 
each set of four successive material balance periods. 
This test statistic reduces to the following form, as 
is shown in the appendix. 
T· l. 8 l(Di+D.i+3) + 8 2(Di+l + Di+z) 
where 
2 2 
2 a + 
al .-
2(5 a2 + n 20 E 
2) 
3a2 +a2 
az D E 
2(5o 2 + 2 a 2 
n E 
Note that a1 and a2 sum to one-half. 
Set 4. The simple MUF test 
T· 
~ for all i. 
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Experimental Design 
A fractional factorial 3S design will be utilized for each combination 
of loss patterns and test sequences. The basic 3S fractional design 
involves 41 runs. An additional 9 runs will be made at other selected 
points in the design space, giving a total of 50 MULNR runs per loss 
pattern, test sequence combination. There being 8 such combinations, 
the total nurober of MULNR runs is 400. The total nurober of response 
surfaces is eight. (In Phase 1, 150 MULNR runs were made.) 
The five factors to be varied are the following. (As in Phase 1, an 
is fixed at 1 unit so that all values involving quantities of material are 
relative to a ). 
n 






Factor 3: M 
Factor 4: I 0 
Factor 5: m 
Values in Test Design 
0.1, 1) 10 
1.5' 4.5' 7.5 in basic design 
3' 6, 9 in additional runs 
5, 15' 25 1n basic design 
0' 10, 20 in additional runs 
1' 11, 21 
5, 10' 15 1n basic design 
1, 20, 35 in additional runs 
The specific design matrix for a given combination of 1oss pattern and test 
statistics is in Tab1e 1. The first 41 runs are from the basic fractional 
factorial design with runs 42-50 being the supplemental runs made to explore 




Case or Run Oe: a0/ae: M Io m - -
1 10 7.5 15 11 10 
2 10 1.5 15 11 10 
3 . 1 7.5 15 11 10 
4 . 1 1.5 15 11 10 
5 1 4.5 25 21 10 
6 1 4.5 25 1 10 
7 1 4.5 5 21 10 
8 1 4.5 5 1 10 
9 1 7.5 15 11 15 
10 1 7.5 15 11 5 
11 1 1.5 15 11 15 
12 1 1.5 15 11 5 
13 10 4.5 25 11 10 
14 10 4.5 5 11 10 
15 .1 4.5 25 11 10 
16 '1 4.5 5 11 10 
17 1 4.5 15 21 15 
18 1 4.5 15 21 5 
19 1 4.5 15 1 15 
20 1 4.5 15 1 5 
21 1 7.5 25 11 10 
22 1 7.5 5 11 10 
23 1 1.5 25 11 10 
24 1 1.5 5 11 10 
25 10 4.5 15 21 10 
26 10 4.5 15 1 10 
27 . 1 4.5 15 21 10 
28 .1 4.5 15 1 10 
29 1 4.5 25 11 15 
30 1 4.5 25 11 5 
31 1 4.5 5 11 15 
32 1 4.5 5 11 5 
33 1 4.5 15 11 15 
34 1 4.5 15 11 5 
35 1 4.5 15 11 15 
36 1 4.5 15 11 5 
37 1 7.5 15 21 10 
38 1 7.5 15 1 10 
39 1 1.5 15 21 10 
40 1 1.5 15 1 10 
41 1 4.5 15 11 10 
42 1 3 0 11 1 
43 1 6 10 11 1 
44 1 9 20 11 1 
45 1 6 0 11 20 
46 1 9 10 11 20 
47 1 3 20 11 20 
48 1 9 0 1 35 
49 1 3 10 1 35 
so 1 6 20 1 35 
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Inputs to MULNR 
The basic MULNR program deck was given to the sponsor, Kar1sruhe Research 
Centre, as part of the Phase 1 product. In this section of the report, the 
inputs to the program are given for the four test sequences under study in 
Phase 2. 
Program inputs inc1ude a specification of the fo11owing quantities: 
K number of tests made 
s(l,o) 1 ( a t a 11 time s ) 
Z (I, 0) for I = 1, 2, ... , K 
R(I,J,O) for I= 1, 2, K-1 
and J > I 
In a11 cases, Z (I,O) is defined by 
Z(I,O) 






vvCI) . V(J) 
The quantities C(S), M(I), V(I), and COV(I,J) are defined for the four test 
sequences. C(S) is defined in genera1 by 
1 00 




1 - (0.95) 
and is the critica1 value per test to give an overall Cl. of 0. OS assuming 
the tests are independent. M(I) is the mean value for the test statistic, 
V(I) its variance, anrl COV(I,J) the covariance between tests I and J. 
-193-
Test Sequence 1 
K = 35 
C(S) = 2.975424 
I 
M( I) 1: L(J) 
J=l 
V( I) 2 VAR(l) + I·VAR(2) + r2·vAR(3) 
COV(I,J) = VAR(l) + I·VAR(2) + I·J·VAR(3) 
where VAR (1) a 2 n 
VAR(2) a 2 
e: 
VAR(3) a 2 
0 
Test Sequence 2 
where 
where 
K = 30 
(The first test is applied at the close of the sixth material 
balance period.) 
C(S) = 2.927865 
M(I) 1+4 = L( I+5) - ß 1: 
J=I 
L(J) 
-VAR(l) + 5 VAR(3) 
= ß 2 VAR(l) + 5 VAR(2) + 25 VAR(3) 
V(I) = A(l+5 ß2)-2 ß(B1+4B2)+4 ß 2(2B1+3 B2) 
A = 2 VAR(l) + VAR(2) + VAR(3) 
B1 = - VAR(l) + VAR(3) 
B2 VAR(3) 
COV(I,I+l) = B1-ß (A+B1+8B2)+ ß2(8B1+4A+l3 B2) 
COV(I,I+2) B1-ß (A+2B1+7B2)+ ß2(6B1+3A+l6B2) 
COV(I,I+3) B2- ß(A+2B1+7B2)+ ß2(4B1+2A+l9 Bz) 
COV(I,I+4) Bz-ß (A+2B1+yBz)+ ß2(zB1+A+22Bz) 
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COV(I,I+5) Bz-ß(A+B1+8 B2) + ß 2(B1+24 B2) 
COV(I,I+6) Bz- ß (B1+9 B2) + 25 B2 ß2 
COV(I,J) = B2-10 B2 ß + 25B2 ß2 FOR J > (1+6) 
Test Sequence 3 
K = 32 
(The first test is applied at the close of the fourth 
material balance period.) 
C(S) = 2.947855 









D = 2 VAR(l)+VAR(2) 
E = -VAR(l) 
V( I) (D~+DE-~) + VAR (3) 
2(2D-E) 
COV(I,I+l) = 3D3+2D2E-5DE2+2E3 VAR(3) + 
4(2D-E)2 
COV(I,I+2) = 2D3+2D2E-4nE2+E3 + VAR(3) 
4(2D-E)2 
COV(I,I+3) = n3+2D2E-2DE2 + VAR(3) 
4(2D-E)2 
COV(I,I+4) = n2E + VAR(3) 
4(2D-E)2 
COV(I,J) VAR(3). for J > 5 , 
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Test Sequence 4 
K = 35 
C(S) = 2.975424 
M(I) = L(I) 
V( I) 2VAR(l)+VAR(2)+VAR(3) 
COV(I,I+l) = -VAR(l)+VAR(3) 
COV(I,J) = VAR(3) for J 'f I+l 
Appendix 
We include here a derivation of test statistic 3. Ti is defined by 
Since a4 = l-al-a2-a3, Ti may be rewritten 
The problern is to choose al, a2 and a3 to minimize the variance of Ti. 
To simplify notation, let 
E 
then it can easily be shown that 
VAR Ti = 2D a12 + 2D a22 + 2 (D-E) a-} 
+ (D+a l ) + 2(D+E) a1a2+ 2(D-E) ala3 
- 2 Da1 + 2D a2a3 - 2Daz-2(D-E)a3 
The partial derivations of VAR Ti are taken with respect to al,az, and a3; 
they are equated to zero and solved simultaneously. 
4Dal + 2(D+E)a2+2(D-E)a3-2D 
:::: 0 
2(D+E)al + 4Daz +ZDa3 - 2D = 0 
ö az 
ö VAR Ti = 2~D-E)al +2Daz +4(d-E)a3 - 2(D-E) = 0 
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az a3 D-E 
2(2D-E) 
and sJ.nce the a's rnust surn to 1, 
= D which cornpletes the derivation 
2(2D-E) 
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Determination of the Detection Probability 
As a Function of Various Loss Strategies . Phase 2 
Introduction: 
Part 2: Study Results 
John L. Jaech 
Exxon Nuclear Co. Inc. 
Bellevue, WA 98009 
August, 1982 
Phase 2 of the subject study extends the ranges of the model parameters, 
introduces additional test statistics, and changes the lass patterns 
from the initial study phase. In a previous report, which bears the same 
title as this one except that "Part 2: Study Results" is replaced by "Part 1: 
Design of Study", the details of the Phase 2 study were given. That is, the 
lass patterns were specified, the test statistics defined explicitly, and the 
design matrix was given. The initial design matrix was extended to include 
additional combinations of the factors as will be indicated later in this 
report. The reference report also provided the inputs to the MULNR computer 
program, including the variance of each test statistic and the covariances 
between all pairs. 
All the computer output was sent to D. Sellinschegg at Karlsruhe on 
August 24, 1982 along with a cover letter that describes it. The cover. letter 
also summarizes the information about the error parameters, losses, loss 
patterns, and test statistics in both phases of the study. 
The purpose of this report is to present the results of the Phase 2 
study. Emphasis 1s concentrated on the detection probability as of the end 
of time interval 35 as the response variable. The computer output gives the 
cumulative detection probability as of the end of each time interval. It would 
be of interest to relate the cumulative detection probabilities to the loss 
patterns for the various test statistics, but the limited resources did not 
permit such a study at this time. 
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Set· 1· Results 
The study results for Phase 2 are divided into 3 sets. Set 1 refers 
to the Table 1 Design Matrix given in the reference docurnent for both the 
uniform and up and down or periodic loss function. Set 2 refers to additional 
runs with the pararneter space redefined because of very srnall detection 
probabilities for so rnany Set 1 cases. Set 3 refers to a lirnited nurnber of 
additional runs rnade to permit direct cornparison of our results with those 
reported by other participants in this study. 
For Set 1, recall frorn the referenced docurnent that the values for the 
5 factors in the basic design rnatrix were as follows, using the notation of 
the referenced docurnent: 
a 0.1, 1.0' 10 e: 
a 6jae: = 1. 5' 4.5, 7.5 
M 5' 15' 25 
Io 1' 11, 21 
rn 5' 10' 15 
In addi tion to the 41 cases in the basic design, 9 rnore were run to test 
the adequacy of the ernpirica1 rnodel to be fit to the results. For these 
additional cases, a was fixed at 1 unit while the other factors assurned one 
e: 
of the following va1ues for each case: 
a 6/ae: 
= 3' 6, 9 
M = 0, 10' 20 
Io = 1' 11 
rn = 1' 20' 35 
Table 1 be1ow gives the detection probabi1ities for both the uniform 
and up and down 1oss patterns and for the four test sequences identified 






Cumulative MUF test applied at the end of each interval 
The D statistic proposed in my 1976 INMM paper, "Can the 
n 
Effects of Systematic Errors on LE-MUF be Reduced?", with 
n = 5 
The uniform diversion test statistic calculated over each 
set of four successive material balance periods. 
The simple MUF test applied at the ehd of each interval. 
The cases ~n Table 1 are those identified in Table 1 of the reference 
document and ~vill not be repeated here. The column headed "U" refers to the 
uniform loss pattern and that headed "U-D"to the up and down pattern. 
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Tab1e 1 
Detection Probabilities for Set 1 Gases 
TS-1 TS-2 TS-3 TS-4 
Case u U-D u U-D u U-D u U-D - - - -
1 .023 .023 .051 .051 .023 .023 .023 .023 
2 .024 .024 .051 .052 .025 .025 .033 .033 
3 . 071 .070 .109 .171 .255 .257 .189 .263 
4 .964 .962 . 994 .997 1.000 1.000 .207 .317 
5 .026 .025 .136 .242 .039 .039 .045 .052 
6 .049 .047 .040 .076 .042 .042 .048 .056 
7 . 023 .023 .050 .052 .025 .025 .029 .029 
8 .026 .026 .043 .044 .025 .025 .029 .029 
9 .024 .024 .055 .066 .026 .026 .027 .028 
10 .025 .025 .186 .330 .028 .028 .030 .031 
11 .036 .036 .062 .076 .054 .054 .086 .096 
12 .045 .045 .210 . 368 .197 .222 . 203 .303 
13 .023 .023 .052 .054 .024 .024 .024 .024 
14 .023 .023 .050 .050 .023 .023 .024 .024 
15 . 361 .356 .600 .836 .999 .999 .573 .819 
16 .045 .045 .067 .071 .088 .088 .063 .067 
17 .024 .024 .059 .068 .027 .027 .033 .034 
18 .025 .025 .188 .333 .035 .036 .042 .049 
19 .032 .032 .042 .049 .030 .030 .034 .035 
20 .048 .046 .039 .039 .037 .039 .045 .053 
21 .027 .027 .130 . 236 .030 .030 .032 .034 
22 .023 .023 .047 .049 .024 .024 .025 .025 
23 .057 .057 .152 .280 . 169 .170 .217 .322 
24 .028 .027 .050 .052 .032 .032 .054 .055 
25 .023 .023 .053 .053 .023 .023 .024 .024 
26 .024 .023 .048 .049 .023 .023 .024 .024 
27 .074 .073 .219 .319 .662 .665 .204 .299 
28 ,664 .636 .146 .230 .686 .688 .207 .303 
29 .029 .029 .076 .118 .035 .035 .041 .043 
30 . 032 .032 .615 .880 .066 .070 .081 .122 
31 .024 .024 .046 .047 .025 .025 .028 .029 
32 .024 .024 .055 .060 .025 .025 .029 .029 
33 .023 .023 .051 .051 .023 .023 .024 .024 
34 .023 .023 .053 .054 .023 .023 .024 .024 
35 .105 .104 .149 .187 .328 .334 .138 .173 
36 .250 .254 .645 . 842 .999 1.000 .618 .826 
37 .023 .023 .073 .098 .026 .026 .028 .028 
38 ,030 .029 .040 .051 .027 .027 .028 .029 
39 .030 .030 .081 .111 .070 .070 .104 .128 
40 .089 .083 .045 .060 .080 .081 .104 .128 
41 .027 .027 .069 .095 .031 .031 .035 .037 
42 .023 .023 .045 .045 .023 .023 .031 .031 
43 .025 .025 .990 .990 .029 .029 .084 .084 
44 .026 .026 1.000 1.000 .034 .034 .202 . 202 
45 .023 .023 .045 .045 .023 .023 .025 .025 
46 .023 .023 .050 .054 .024 .024 .025 .025 
47 .029 .029 .061 .077 .036 .036 .049 .052 
48 .022 .022 .045 .045 .023 .023 .024 .024 
49 .027 .027 .046 .048 .028 .028 .038 .038 
50 .027 .027 .046 .052 .027 .027 .030 .030 
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The following observations are made on these Table 1 results: 
1. For test sequences 1 and 3, it makes very little difference whether the 
loss pattern is uniform or up and down. Both test sequences are directed 
at protracted lasses, and how the protracted lasses occur is not too 
important. 
2. Test sequence 2 detects changes in loss patterns, and hence there' are 
factor combinations for which the detection probability is larger for the 
up and dmm loss pattern than for the uniform loss pattern. 
3. There are also factor combinations for which the simple MUF test (TS-4) 
detects the up and down loss pattern with larger probability than it does 
the uniform loss pattern. 
4. Attempts were made to fix the a error probabilities at around 0.05 by 
assuming independence of the tests. In fact, the a -values that 
resulted are a function of the factor combinations. For the M 0 values 
(cases 42, 45, 48), a 1s about 0.023 for TS-1, and TS-3, 0.045 for 
TS-2, and 0.025 for TS-4. 
5. There is no one test sequence that is generally super1or to the others, 
the ability of a given test sequence to detect losses being dependent 
upon the loss patterns. 
6 · Many of the detection probabilities 1n Table 1 are quite small. Because 
of this, the ranges on three of the factors were changed and a second set 
of cases were run. This is discussed in the next section. 
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Set 2·Results 
In this second set of runs, only the uniform loss pattern is considered. 
The design matrix for the first 41 cases is the same as that given in Table 1 
of the referenced document except for the following changes in the values of 
(J 
E: a cf E: , and M. 
o change 1 to 0.55 
E: 
change 10 to 1 
a of E: change 1.5 to 1 
change 4.5 to 2.5 
change 7.5 to 4 
M: change 5 to 15 
change 15 to 25 
change 25 to 35 
cr = 0. 55, cr ~b = 2. 5, M=25, 
E: \)/ E: 
Five additional cases were run with 
m-10, and 10 = 1, 3, 5, 7, and 9 for cases 42, 43, 44, 45, and 46 respectively. 
The detection probabilities for Set 2 are given in Table 2. Two columns 
of probabilities are g~ven. Column 1 gives the detection probability as 
calculated by MULNR, and column 2 gives the detection probability calculated by 
an empirical second order polynomial model fit through these data, using the 
same type of approach as was used ~n Phase 1 of the study. As in Phase 1, the 
response variable, y, was defined by 
1 
Detection Probability = 
I2TI 
The 22 parameter empirical model for a g~ven test sequence was of the form 
y b· ·x·x· 
~] ~ J 
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where 
X1 ( a -.55)/.45 e: 
x2 = ( a 0/a e: 
-2.5)/1.5 
XJ = (M-25)/10 
X4 (1 0 -11)/10 
X5 = (rn-10)/5 
As is noted from Tab1e 2, the second order po1ymomia1 empirica1 rnode1 
does not provide a very c1ose fit. In this phase of the study, no further 
attempts were made to provide a c1oser fit due to resource 1imitations. 
Such an effort, possib1y incorporating resu1ts from test statistics investigated 
by other study participants as we11, is deferred for the present. 
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Tab1e 2 
Detection Probabilities for Set 2 Cases 
Gase TS-1 TS-2 TS-3 TS-4 
HULNR EHPIRICAL HULNR EHPIRICAL HULNR EHPIRICAL HULNR EHPIRICAL 
1 . 031 .108 .133 .336 .044 .012 .053 .019 
2 .089 .030 .185 .092 .354 .745 .321 .353 
3 .463 .714 .748 .941 1.000 1.000 .584 .624 
4 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .621 .829 
5 .052 .050 .400 .655 .396 .580 .494 .512 
6 .436 .689 .051 .156 .462 .630 .494 .516 
7 .031 .009 .085 .038 .080 .068 .120 .080 
8 .103 .143 .043 .016 .095 .075 .120 .082 
9 .038 .015 .087 .059 .061 . 211 .090 . 139 
10 .050 .040 .801 .621 .289 .198 .350 .453 
11 .157 .187 . 220 . 247 .538 .490 .287 . 207 
12 .448 .609 . 977 .960 1.000 1.000 .986 . 974 
13 .049 .006 .278 .140 .126 .108 .173 .141 
14 .031 .116 .072 .154 .043 .022 .060 .069 
15 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .968 . 965 
16 .435 .662 .750 . 903 . 994 .997 .207 .258 
17 .034 .027 .096 .030 .099 .127 .173 .140 
18 .046 .026 .829 .928 .710 .766 .700 .784 
19 .128 .153 .048 .057 .125 .147 .174 .143 
20 .736 .719 .037 .269 .785 .806 .699 .787 
21 .054 .046 .374 . 338 .161 .086 .226 .233 
22 .033 .009 .076 .036 .048 .124 .068 .060 
23 .457 .665 .740 .845 1.000 1.000 .858 .853 
24 .102 .122 .153 .178 .413 .357 .188 .159 
25 .029 .101 .141 .171 .070 .059 .100 .088 
26 .091 .041 .042 .022 .083 .076 .104 .088 
27 .539 .739 1.000 .998 1,000 1.000 .601 .691 
28 1.000 1.000 .999 .986 1.000 1.000 .616 .699 
29 .072 .090 .164 .113 .194 .205 .295 . 243 
30 .144 . 341 .998 .992 .966 .976 .961 . 977 
31 .038 .010 .062 .084 .059 .049 .096 .095 
32 .045 .046 .272 .234 .255 .260 .256 . 395 
33 .036 .063 .080 .115 .053 .020 .077 .232 
34 .045 .019 .631 .528 .212 .372 .259 .227 
35 .793 .889 .933 .975 1.000 1.000 .313 .225 
36 1. 000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 .999 
37 .031 .021 .171 .152 .086 .109 .125 .111 
38 .110 .102 .040 .020 .103 .148 .129 .115 
39 .113 .090 .388 .498 .935 . 945 .498 .481 
40 . 907 . 907 .206 .222 .923 .944 . 503 .484 
41 .062 .062 .184 .184 .206 .206 .267 . 267 
42 .201 .249 .046 .089 .202 .220 . 238 .239 
43 .119 .198 .059 .104 .188 .217 .238 .249 
44 .093 .154 .105 .121 .183 .214 .238 .257 
45 .077 .117 .153 .140 .180 .212 .238 .262 
46 .067 .086 .153 . 161 .178 . 209 .238 .266 
-205-
Keeping in mind the limitations of the empirical fits, some computer 
plots were made of detection probability versus var~ous parameters. 
Twelve such plots are included in this report primarily to illustrate 
the motivation behind the attempts at empirical model building. If 
future plans call for refining the models, such plots and Variations 
thereof would be the final output for the various test sequences. They 
would be very useful in comparing the various test sequences in different 
reg1ons of the factors space. 
Figures 1-4 give detection probability versus I 0 for fixed 
a 
E: 
, aojaE: > and m; for 3 values of m; and for test sequences 1-4 
respectively. Figures 5-8 give detection probability versus a for 
E: 
fixed M, I , and m; for 3 values of a ja ; and for test sequences 1-4 
0 0 E: 
respectively. Figures 9-12 give detection probability versus M for 
fixed a e:, I
0
, and m; for 3 values of a 
0
/a E:; and for test sequences 
1-4 respectively. 
Some unusual behavior 1n these curves is due to model inadequacy. For 
example, 10 Figure 5, it appears that detection probabi1ity begins to 1ncrease 
4 with increasing OE: after a certain point. This, of course, 
1s not correct; detection probability wou1d continue to decrease. 
Set 3 Results 
In discussions with D. Gupta and C.A. Bennett on July 27, 1982, a third 
set of factor combinations was defined in order to compare the test sequences 
considered here and by other study participants at common sets of input values. 
The cases consisted of all 24 combinations of the following, with a 
0
/a E: 








at M = 0 to 
0, I, 0.55 
15, 25 






5, and a = 0.1 and 0.55, two cases were run E: 
a values. The case number identification is given 
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1n Table 3. Both the uniform and up and down loss patterns were studied here, 
but s1nce only the uniform loss patternwas studied by the other participants, 
the Set 3 results are restricted to this loss pattern. 
Table 3 
Se·t 3- Gases 
Case a M Io Case a M Io •t: m •t: m 
1 .1 15 1 5 14 .55 15 1 10 
2 . 1 15 1 10 15 .55 15 11 5 
3 . 1 15 11 5 16 .55 15 11 10 
4 . 1 15 11 10 17 .55 15 21 5 
5 . 1 15 21 5 18 .55 15 21 10 
6 . 1 15 21 10 19 .55 25 1 5 
7 . 1 25 1 5 20 .55 25 1 10 
8 . 1 25 1 10 21 .55 25 11 5 
9 . 1 25 11 5 22 .55 25 11 10 
10 . 1 25 11 10 23 .55 25 21 5 
11 .1 25 21 5 24 .55 25 21 10 
12 .1 25 21 10 25 . 1 0 11 5 
13 .55 15 1 5 26 .55 0 11 5 
A comparison of the results from the tests is g1ven 1n Tabale 4. The 
Table 4 resu1ts are for the uniform 1oss pattern. The 11 test sequences in 
Table 4 are identified as fol1ows: 
TS-1 to TS-4: Described in the Set 1 Results Section of this report 
TS-5: Truncated sequential CUMUF test (Beedgen) 
TS-6: CUMUFR test; two-sided sequential test with power one 
(Se11inschegg) 
TS-7: CUMUF; sequentially performed fixed-1ength test (Sellinschegg) 
TS-8: CUMUF(35); fixed length test at the end of 35 periods 
(Se11inschegg) 
TS-9: Same as TS-6 but one-sided (Sellinschegg) 
TS-10: Sequential Probability Ratio Test (Markin) 
TS-11: Modified Pages Test (Markin) 
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Table 4 
Detection Probabilities for Table 3 Gases 
Case TS-1 TS-2 TS-3 TS-4 TS-5 TS-6 TS-7 TS-8 TS-9 TS-10 TS-11 
1.000 .340 1.000 .687 1 1.0 1.0 .52 1.0 .92 1.0 
2 .995 .695 .991 . 211 1 1.0 1.0 .52 1.0 .27 .94 
3 .750 .993 1.000 ,682 .978 1.0 .9 .52 1.0 .93 1.0 
4 .435 .750 .994 .207 .811 1.0 .72 .52 1.0 .27 .91 
5 .299 .993 1.000 .678 .53 1.0 .57 .52 1.0 .92 .96 
6 .192 . 745 .995 .204 .355 1.0 .48 .52 1.0 ·. 29 .80 
7 1.000 .894 1.000 1.000 1 1.0 1.0 .88 1.0 1.0 1.0 
8 1.000 .999 1.000 .616 1 1.0 1.0 .88 1.0 .95 1.0 
9 1.000 1.000 1.000 1.000 1 1.0 1.0 .88 1.0 1.0 1.0 
10 .985 1.000 1.000 .608 1 1.0 .99 .88 1.0 .97 1.0 
11 .780 1.000 1.000 1.000 .989 1.0 .96 .88 1.0 1.0 1.0 
12 .539 1.000 1.000 .601 .909 1.0 .89 .88 1.0 .96 l.O 
u- . 301 .038 .296 .257 .583 1.0 .27 .09 .23 .36 .08 
14 .103 .043 .094 . 120 .20 .99 .07 .09 .10 .17 .05 
15 .048 .272 .255 .256 .06 .98 .05 .09 .98 .42 .08 
16 .042 .082 .085 .120 .052 .87 .05 .09 .92 .18 .05 
17 .033 .270 .246 . 256 .052 .96 .05 .09 .97 .42 .08 
18 .031 .085 .080 .120 .051 .90 .05 .09 .93 . 17 .05 
19 .736 .037 .785 .699 .763 1.0 .78 .13 .72 .83 .16 
20 .236 .046 .239 .267 .494 1.0 .22 .13 .26 .40 .11 
21 .084 .829 .706 .700 . 209 1.0 .09 .13 1.0 .85 .12 
22 .063 .184 .206 .267 ,088 1.0 .08 .13 1.0 .41 .10 
23 .046 .829 .710 .700 .064 1.0 .08 .13 1.0 .85 .11 
24 .039 .185 .198 :266 .055 1.0 .08 .13 1.0 .41 .10 
25 .027 .045 .034 .041 .05 .051 ,035 .051 .051 .05 .05 
26 .023 .043 .024 .044 .05 .050 .027 .050 .051 .05 .05 
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Note that cases 25 and 26 give the actual a- values. When compar~ng 
detection probabilities, these differences in the a- values should be kept 
~n mind. Ideally, they should all be about 0.05 for a fair comparison, but 
it ~s difficult in some instances to fix a precisely in advance. 
Note that test sequences 1 and 7 should give identical results, with 
the TS-1 results calculated by the multivariate normal distribution and the TS-7 
results by simulation. Taking into account the differences in the 
the agreement is good. 
a values, 
The results of Table 4 are plotted in a ser~es of figures, 13-23. These 
results were plotted as straight line segments rather than as smoothed curves 
to emphasize that what is plotted are the first 24 case results of Table 4 
with no model building involved. The straight-line interpolation between 
I 0 = 1 and I 0 = ll would be especially misleading for some of the test 
sequences if one were to focus on I 0 values between I 0 = 1 and I 0 11 rather 
than on the two point results. For test sequences 1-4, and for cr€ .55, 
M = 25, ·m = 10, the detection probabilities for I 0 = 1,3,5,7, and 9 are given 
as cases 42-46 in Table 2, and are plotted as open circles in Figures 13-16. 
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Preliminary Evaluation of Near-Real-Time 
Materials Accountancy Models in A 
Large-scale Reprocessing Plant 
K. Ikawa 
Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute 
ABSTRACT 
The capability of near-real-time materials accountancy models as 
applied to a large-scale reprocessing plant has been evaluated using the 
computer simulation technology. In this study three different material 
balance periods, i.e., 8 hours, 2 days, and l week, were assumed and two 
structures of material balance areas were considered for comparison 
purposes. Assumed modes of diversion are abrupt diversion of 8 kgs Pu 
per 2 weeks, protracted diversion of the diversion rates of 52 kgs, 32 
kgs, 24 kgs, 16 kgs and 8 kgs plutonium per year. Simulation 
calculations covered four months of plant operation. The preliminary 
result shows that abrupt diversions of 8 kgs Pu I 2 weeks can be 
detected in every cases before such diversions are completed. On the 
other hand, detection capabilities for protracted diversions varies from 
case to case • The results suggested that more long-term simulation 
calculations are neccessary to obtain reliable conclusions. It also 
suggested that if the present chemical process line is divided into two 
parallel lines of a half process capacity, the detection capability for 
protracted diversion might be significantly improved. These problems 
will be investigated in the next step of this study. 
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1. Introduction 
A study of the feasibility of applying the concept of near-real-
time materials accountancy (n. r. t. accountancy) to large scale spent 
fuel reprocessing facil-ities has been investigated using the Allied-
General Nuclear Services fuel reprocessing plant at Barnwell (BNFP) as 
the reference facility. This study has been carried out basing on the 
experience obtained by the past study of the n.r.t. accountancy system 
using the existing Tokai Reprocessing Plant under the TASTEX (Tokai 
Advanced Safeguards Technology Exercise) programme, Although a similar 
study had been performed at the Los Alamos National Labaratory (8), this 
study has been carried out for the following two major purposes: 
(i) to investigate the feasibility of applying the ten-day-
detection-time model, which was developed for a medium sized 
reprocessing plant under the TASTEX programme, to a 
large-scale reprocessing facility, and 
(ii) to investigate the practical detection goals such as detection 
goal quantities as a function of significant quantities, 
detection times and probabilities related to detection 
capability and false alarm rates. 
Now this study is on an early stage and have given us a very 
limited result which can not permit us to get clearcut conclusions for 
the problems above mentioned. Therefore this paper has a 
characteristics to describe a preliminary result of our investigation. 
2. Model Plant 
In this study the Allied-General Nuclear Services fuel reprocessing 
plant at Barnwell (BNFP) was used as the reference facilitiy. The BNFP 
is designed to process spent fuel at rates up to 5 ton (heavy metal) I 
day. The facili ty uses conventional PUREX recovery process which is 
designed to process 1500 ton heavy metal per year of nuclear fuel and to 
recover 15 ton I year of plutonium as the nitrate solution. The process 
flow through the plant and basic process data were referred to Ref (8). 
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3. Operator's Materials Accountancy System 
3.1. Conventional Materials Accounting System 
The conventional materials accountancy is assumed to be based on 
the periodic clean-out physical inventory takings and measurements of 
all input into and output from the material balance area. In this study 
seven material balance areas (MBA) with sixteen key measurement points 
(KMP) as illustrated in Fig. 1 were assumed for the conventional 
materials accountancy. Nuclear materials and types of measurements at 
flow and inventory key measurement points are, respectively, shown in 
Tables 1 and 2 with the associated measurement accuracies. Although the 
model facility is divided into seven MBA's as shown in Fig. 1, MBA 6 and 
MBA 7 can be treated as a single other facility which is independent 
from the reprocessing facility, because these are waste storage areas of 
temporary use. 
Among these seven MBA's, only MBA 3 is a pure MUF-MBA and all the 
others are S/RD MBA's or pure storage areas. Characteristics and 
activities of these MBA's are as follows : 
(A) MBA 1 : Spent Fuel Receiving and Storage 
Since MBA 1 includes only the cask-unloading and spent fuel 
storage pond, this isapure storage area, i.e., non-MUF and 
non-S/RD area, and therefore the item accountancy shall be 
adopted to take a material balance in this area. However, 
when NDA methods for verifying declare-d burnup and cooling 
. time and for assaying fissile content of spent fuel with 
sufficiently high accuracies were developed, characteristics 
of materials accountancy in MBA 1 may become different ones. 
If such NDA methods became available for the use at KMP 2, 
shipper I receiver differences could be determined within MBA 
1. In this case MBA 1 shall be treated as an S/RD area, and 
the MBA structure could be modified by making the chop and 
leach area (present MBA 2) and the chemical separation area 
(present MBA 3) into a single process MBA. 
(B) MBA 2 : Chop and Leach 
A chop and leach area is in usual case included either in the 
front area, i.e., MBA 1 in this study, or in the succeeding 
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area, i.e. the chemical separation process area. In this 
s tudy, however, this is trea ted as an independent material 
balance area, where the shipper/receiver difference can be 
determined by applying the gravimetric method. Pu/U ratio is 
measured at the dissolver tank for this purpose. Therefore, 
MBA 2 is a pure S/RD MBA. If MBA 1 is used as a S/RD-MBA as 
previousely described, however, MBA 2 can be included in the 
succeeding chemical separation process area or could be left 
as it is in order to make the reliability of S/RD 
determination higher by the duplicate determinations of an 
S/RD. 
(C) MBA 3 : Chemical Separation Process 
MBA 3 is a pure MUF-MBA, which includes the solvent extraction 
processes from the input accountability tank to the product 
tanks. Plutonium nitrate product solution is transferred to 
the plutonium product storage area, MBA 4, through KMP 7 by 
batches (N400 L,w250 gPu/L). Uranium nitrate product batches 
( .v 4460 L, "'380 gU/L) are transferred to the uranium product 
storage area through KMP 9. 
(D) MBA 4 : Plutonium Nitrate Storage 
This MBA is assumed to be an S /RD MBA in this s tudy. The 
input measurement is made at the boundary between MBA3 and HBA 
4, i.e., KMP 7, which produces shipper's data for MBA4. The 
shippment of the plutonium product is made through KMP 13, 
where the accountability measurement is expected to be carried 
out. If a plutonium-nitrate-to-oxide conversion plant is 
located at the next door of this reprocessing plant, however, 
the measurement for accountability purpose at KMP 13 could be 
replaced by the input accountability measurement at the 
entrance of the conversion plant. When the accountability 
measurement at KMP 13 is eliminated, suitable 
containment/surveillance measures should be provided in MBA 4 
to assure the integrity of the material accountancy data in 
this area. 
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(E) MBA 5 : Uranium Nitrate Storage 
This MBA has similar characteristics with MBA 4. 
(F) MBA 6 and MBA 7 : Waste Storage 
These MBA's are used to store waste from MBA 2 and MBA 3. The 
accountability measurements of waste are made at KMP's 5, 11 
and 12. After the quantities of plutonium and uranium are 
determined, waste drums are sealed and stored. Item 
accountancy can be made by checking seals provided and summing 
up the d·ata recorded. Therfore this MBA is a special storage 
area in which the containment and survaillance is used as a 
principal safeguards measures. 
3.2. Near-Real-Time Materials Accountancy in The Plutonium Purification 
Process 
In this study a near-real-time materials accountancy system is 
assumed in the plutonium purification process of the chemical separation 
process, MBA 3, in order to evaluate its effectiveness from the view 
point of the materials accountancy for safeguards. At an early stage of 
this study, it was considered that the area tobe coverred by the n.r.t. 
accountancy should be taken as the whole area of MBA 3 in order to get 
generic conclusions on the effectiveness of n.r.t. accountancy. A 
simulation programme for such a purpese was developed and tested. The 
result of test calculations indicated that a long-term simulation 
calculation of the whole material balance area requires very much 
computer time. Since the budget of this study was restricted, the time 
and space covered by simulation programme bad to be limited in shorter 
and smaller' ones, i. e., four months and the plutonium purification 
process instead of the whole processes. 
Main conditions of the n.r.t. accountancy are as follows 
(A) Sub-MBA structures 
Two se t of sub-MBA s truc tures f or the n. r. t. accountancy 
system were considered. These are shown in Fig. 2 by names of 
sub-MBA model. These sub-MBA's require additional measurement 
points to get near-real-time material balances in these areas. 
These points are listed in Tables 1 and 2. 
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(B) Material Balance Periods 






2 days ( 48 hrs) 
1 week (168 hrs), which corresponds to 'the 
ten-day-detection-time model' developed in TASTEX 
project. 
(C) Frequencies of Calibration of Analysis and Flow Meters 
Two cases were assumed as follows : 
case 1 every 24 hrs 
case 2 every week 
(D) Measurement Accuracies of n.r.t. accounting 
In this study only one set of data of measurement accuracies 
were assumed and used for simulation calculations. These data 
are shown in Table 3. 
4. Ef fec tiveness of N. R.T. Materials Accoun tancy Models 
4.1 Effectiveness Evaluation Method 
Effectiveness of a materials accountancy system of an actual 
operating reprocessing plant could be evaluated, if sufficient data 
relating the materials accountancy system were obtained and became 
available for analysists to make thier evaluation analyses of 
effectiveness. In an actual situation, however, operating histories 
from an existing plant have not always been available, and therefore it 
is not easy to carry out such effectiveness evaluation analyses. 
Difficulties of this kind will become more significant if the plant is 
still under the design stage. 
In such a case, it is very convenient to utilize the simulation 
technology. Simulated data are useful for evaluation of a material 
measurement and accountancy system. .For this purpose, a dynamic 
mathematical model of the reference plant was developed. The model 
includes almost all major processes in the plant, but some parts, e.g., 
waste disposal processes, were excluded because of their less importance 
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from the viewpoint of safeguards. Based on this model, a simulation 
system "DYSAS-R II" (.Qy_namic Safeguard ..§_imulation code for _ßeprocessing 
facilities) was developed. Experiences obtained by performing TASTEX 
project had been fully utilized for this development work. 
Using this simulation code, process materials flows and holdups at 
various operating conditions can be simulated. Operations of start-up, 
flush-out, clean-out and diversions can also be included. Measurement 
simulations can be made by a code "SIMAC" (Simulation of Measurements 
and Accountancy), and simulated measurement data can be analyzed by 
statistical and sequential-decision techniques, which were programmed by 
"SADAC" (Safeguards Qata !rJ.alysis f.ode). These two codes were developed 
and used in TASTEX project. 
4.2 Outputs of Simulation Runs 
Simulations of materials flows were made only for the plutonium 
purification process where equilibrium conditions were assumed. 
Simulated plutonium holdups and plutonium concentrations of solutions in 
major tanks, columns and concentrators are shown in Figs. 3 and 4. 
These data are used in the measurement simulation code where they are 
treated as true values of corresponding measurement data. Material 
balance data are -calculated by these simulated measurement data. 
Simulation runs of 43 cases, 18 no-diversion cases and 25 diversion 
cases, have been carried out. All computer outputs from Simulation runs 
were re-treated for graphical expressions. Detailed analyses on 
capability of each of the n.r.t. accountancy models can easily be made 
by these graphic expressions. In this paper a few examples of them are 
shown by Figs. 5 to 7. 
Simulation conditions are as follows 
N .R.T. MBA Model 2 shown in Fig. 2 
N.R.T .. MB Period Fig. 5 8 hrs 
Fig. 6 2 days 
Fig. 7 1 week 
-217-
Diversion Mode Abrupt 8 kgPu/2 weeks (720 hr - 1056 hr) 
Material Balance No. Material Balance No. 
of Initiation of Cease 
Fig. 5 91 132 
Fig. 6 16 22 
Fig. 7 5 7 
Calibration Period 24 hrs 
Simulation covered 2 months 
The top of each figure is a material balance (Shewhart) chart. For 
each chart, n.r.t. material balances (MUF) are plotted sequentially with 
1 (5 error bars. An alarm chart was produced for every Shewharts. 
However, almost all of alarm charts could indicate small number of 
material balance alarms in comparison with other type of alarm charts as 
described later. Therefore, the alarm charts associated with Shewhart 
were not cited in this paper. 
The middle of each figure is a CUMUF (CUSUM) chart, for which 
cumulative summations of n.r.t. material balances are plotted 
sequentially with 1 () error bars. The associated alarm chart indicates 
letter symbols which mean the length and significance of sequences of 
n. r. t. material balances that generate alarms. Since the theoretical 
base of decision analysis were introduced from Los Alamos National 
Labaratory (8,9), the definition of letter symbols are identical with 









B 2 5 X 10-
3 10-3 
c 3 10-3 5 X 10-4 
D 4 5 X 10-4 10-4 






T T 0.5 
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The CUMUF chart of Fig. 5 indicates a significant number of 
alarms. The first alarm appears at the 104 material balance nurober with 
symbol 'A' and symbol 'E' appears at 126 material balance number. 
The bottom of each figure is a Kalman-filter estimates of the 
average amounts of missing material per balance period which are plotted 
sequentially with 1 <> error bars. 
The Kalman-filter estimates of Fig. 5 shows that it has a 
capability to detect abrupt diversion assumed in this simulation, 
although it is, in principle, suitable to detect protracted diversions. 
The results of simulation runs mentioned as examples show that the 
n.r.t. accountancy models of material balance periods less than two days 
can detect an abrupt diversion of 8 kgPu/2 weeks, and that of material 
balance period of one week may detect such a diversion. 
4.3 Characteristics of the N.R.T. Accountancy Models 
Characteristics of the n.r.t. accountancy models are summarized in 
Table 4. These are obtained by four months simulation calculations 
under the normal equilibrium operations. Figur~s of CUSUM and CUSUM 
are calculated for four months plant equilibrium operation which does 
not include any start-up and clean-out operations. 
From this table, any significant difference is not seen between the 
two n. r. t. sub-MBA models. When graphical simulation outputs were 
carefully analysed, it became clear that the appearance of false-alarms 
increases if the calibration periodwas taken tobe less than the n.r.t. 
material balance period. To avoid this problem, twenty-four 
hours-calibration period is used as a fixed value in the succeeding 
diversion sensitivity analyses. 
4o4. Results of Diversion Sensitivity Analyses 
The srsults of simulation runs for diversion sensitivity analyses 
are summarized in Table 5o In this study, the term 1 diversion 1 is 
defined as 'to remove nuclear material from the process line without any 
declaration' o Such a removal is assumed at the point of flow from 3P 
concentrator (3PCP), where the most concentrated plutonium nitrate 
solution in the plutonium purification process is produced. 
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Diversion modes assumed are as follows: 
Abrupt Protracted 
Diversion Diversion 
Diversion Time from 720 hr from 0 hr 
to 1056 hr to 2880 hr 





Essences of Table 5 are as follows 
(A) Gapability to Detect Abrupt Diversions 
n.r.t. Time required Total amoun.t 
MBP for detection diverted before 
detection 
·-
8 hrs 136 hrs = 5.7 days 3.2 kgPu 
2 days 192 hrs = 8 days 4.6 kgPu 
1 week 288 hrs = 12 days 6.9 kgPu 
(1) In all cases simulated, the abrupt diversion can be detected before 
the total plutonium amount diverted does not exceed 8 kgs. 
(2) So lang as the results of simulations up to now are evaluated, the 
following is suggested; A n. r. t. accountancy model of a single 
n. r. t. MBA for the whole plutonium purification process with a 
weekly in-process inventory ,i.e., weekly material balance, may 
meet IAEA provisional criteria for detecting the abrupt diversion 
of 8 kg of plutonium. 
(3) However, if the weekly material balance is adopted, there may be 
possibility that an order of 7 kg of plutonium could be diverted 
without detection, because the nurober of alarms may be so small and 
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their level of significance may be so low that an inspector may not 
decide that the diversion has occured. An example of this case is 
shown in Fig. 7. 
(4) If the chemical separation process is divided into two seperate 
parallel lines, however, Ionger ( than 7 days) material balance 
period may be sufficient to counteract the abrupt diversion 
strategy. 
(B) Capability to detect protracted diversions 
(1) In case of the 8 hrs-material balance period, the diversion of the 
minimum diversion rate, i.e., 8 kgPu per year, could be detected at 
3.5 months after the diversion was initiated. The total plutonium 
amount diverted did not exceed 2.3 kgs when detected (Case P-19). 
(2) In case of the 2 days-material balance period, the n.r.t. 
accountancy model of the MBA model 1 could detect the diversion of 
the rate of 52 kgPu per year at 36 days after the initiation of the 
diversion, and the total plutonium amount diverted was restricted 
to 5.2 kgs (Case P-2). If the MBA model 2 was adopted instead of 
the model 1, the diversion of the same rate could be detected at 
3.8 months after its initiation, and the total amount at detection 
was restricted ·to 16.4 kgs (Case P-5). 
(3) In case of the weekly material balance, the diversion of the rate 
of 52 kgPu per year could be detected at 4 months later, and the 
total amount diverted was restricted to 17 kgs (Cases P-3b, P-6b). 
4.5. Evaluation of the Results of Simulations 
(1) The time covered by the simulation runs is too short to bring a 
clearcut conclusion on the capability to detect the protracted 
diversion. Longer simulations (6 months ~ 1 year) are desirable. 
(2) The capability of the n. r. t. accountancy should evaluated for the 
case that the plant consists of two parallel process lines, taking 
correlations between the two lines into consideration. 
(3) The capability should also be evaluated when the n.r.t. accountancy 
system is extended to cover the whole chemical separation process. 
Cerrelations between two material balances of the 
dissolution-coseparation process and the succeeding plutonium 




The study of the feasibility of applying the n. r. t. accounatncy 
system to safeguarding large-scale reprocessing plants is still an an 
early stage. Quantitative evaluations of the capability of attaining 
detection goals by the n.r.t. accountancy system has just been started 
in Japan. From the study performed up to now several useful suggestions 
















Fuel transfer pool 
Accountability tank 
MBA 2 laboratory samples 
TABLE 1 
FLOW KEY MUSUREHEllT PODlTS FOR CONVEN'riONAL MATERIALS ACCOUNTING 
IN THE MODEL FACILITY (Ref. 8) 
Material Description 
Irradiated fuel assernblies 
~1% U-235, ~1% Pu 
Dissolver solution 
300 g U/L 
3 9 Pu/L 










Di~solver acid surge tank HN03 (Recycle Acid) 
Trace of U 
Volumer 
Leached hull basket 
Inspection sample 
Receipt/Shippment 
Pu product sample tank 
Pu product interim 
storage tanks (3) 
Pu rework tank 
Labaratory samples 
U product sampl~ tank 
Trl!lce of Pu 
S. S., Zr 
Traces of U, Pu, FP 
Inepection aample 
Plutonium nitrate 
250 g Pu/L 
Plutonium nitrate 
250 9 Pu/L 
Plutonium nitrate 
250 g Pu/L 
Plutonium nitrate 
uumyl nitrate 



































































U rework tank 
Labaratory samples 
Solid-waste drums 
HLW sample tank 
General process waste 
check tank 
Solvent-burner feed tank 
Central stack 
Pu nitrate output 
accountabllity 




FP = fission products. 
s.s. = stainless steel. 
TABLE 1 (cont) 
Material Description 
Uranyl nitrate 
370 g U/L 
Uranyl nitrate 
very low-level solid waste 
Traces of u, Pu 
Concentrated high-level waste 
3 9 U/L 
0.1 g Pu/L 
Concentrated low-level waste 
13 g U/L 
Trace of Pu 
waste solvent 
Trace of U 
Trace of Pu 
Off-gas 
Traces of U, Pu 
Plutonium nitrate 
Uranyl nitrate 
Very low-level waate 
Condenced high-level waete 


















































































INVENTORY KEY MEASUREMENT POINTS FOR CONVEHTIONAL MATERIALS ACCOUNTING 















Feed-adjust tanks (2) 
1BP surge tank 
Off-spec product tank 




Solvent-system feed (2) 
C9 Solvent-batch strip 
ClO Service-concentrator feed 
Cll Service-concentrator check 
Cl2 Sump collection 
D Labaratory 
Material Description 
Irradiated fuel assernblies 
Diasolver solution 
310 g Pu/L 
3 g Pu/L 
U, Pu, FP in HN03 
300 g U/L 
3 g Pu/L 
U, Pu, residual FP in HN03 
10 g U/L 
5 g Pu/L 
Off-spec uranyl nitrate 
370 g U/L 
Off-spec plutonium nitrate 
250 g Pu/L 
Miscellaneous solutions 
Trace of U 
Trace of Pu 
The following tanks contain 
neg1igib1e quantities of U 
and Pu in recovered acid, 























Traces of U by 
f1uorimetry or 
spectrophotometry 















































Plutonium nitrate storage 
tank 








250 g Pu/L 
Uranium nitrate 
Very low-level waate 
Condenced bigh-level waste 





























MEASUREMENTS ADDED FOR n. r. t. ACCOUNTABUITY IN THE PLUTONIUM PURIFICATION PROCESS 
OF THE CHEMICAL SEPARATIONS PROCESS OißA3) (Ref. 8) 
Measurement Point 
lBP stream 











u, Pu, residual FP in HNOJ 
400 L/h 
5 g Pu/L 
U, Pu, residual FP in HNOJ 
5 g Pu/L 
U, Pu, residual FP in aqueous, 
organic phases: Pu inventory 
U, Pu, residual FP in HNOJ 
500 L/h 
<0.1 g Pu/L 
U, Pu, trace FP in aqueous, 
organic phases, Pu inventory 
u, trace Pu in solvent 
150 L/h 
Trace Pu 
U, Pu, trace FP in aqueous, 
organic phases, Pu inventory 
U, Pu, trace FP in HN03 
215 L/h 
<0.1 g Pu/L 
U, Pu in aqueous, organic 
phases; Pu inventory 
U, trace Pu in solvent 
105 L/h 
Trace Pu 
Pu in aqueous phase, trace 

























































Concentrated plutonium nitrate 
250 g Pu/L 
Residual Pu in HN03 
32 L/h 
<0.1 g Pu/L 
Plutonium-nitrate product 
8 L/h 


























Case n.r.t.* n.r.t.** 
MBA MBP 
( h r s) 


















Table 4 Characteristics of n.r.t. materials accountancy in the plutonium 
purification process 
Throughpu t/ 
Averaged over n.r.t. MBP 11MUf After 4 months Calibra-
tion *** N-H.T MBP _ Transfer 
In-process aMUFd 
hol<.lups component 
comr~~rt Absolute ( h r s ) ( Kp) ( Kp ) 
(Kg) 
24 57.474 0.308 1. 019 LH1 
168 57.474 0.309 1. 019 1.471 
24 101.456 0.831 1.002 1.634 
168 101.45f) 0.923 1.002 1.682 
24 355.097 1.556 0.996 2.098 
168 355.097 2.49q 0.996 2.868 
24 41.391 0148 0.995 1.<113 
168 41.391 0.149 0.995 1.413 
24 101.455 0.599 1.002 1.528 
168 101.456 0.813 1.002 1.624 
24 355 097 1.124 0.993 1.799 
168 355.097 2.912 0.993 3.232 
24 16.414 0.305 0.216 0 432 
168 16 414 0.306 0.216 0.~132 
24 98.484 0.821 0.0 0.821 
168 98.484 0.907 0.0 0.907 
24 344.694 1.538 00 1.538 
168 344.694 2.427 0.0 2.427 
* n.r.t. sub-MBA 
** n.r.t. material balance period ( n.r.t. MBP ) 






















( li(p ) ( li(p ) 




6. 576 8.000 
10.420 6.641 


















A - I Abrupt Dh•. 
A - 2 II Kr I 2 'M:ei< 
A- 3m 
A • Jb 
A- 4 
A - S 
A- 6s 
A- 6b 
P .. I 
rrotncl~ Dlv. 
P-2 52'1.f/yur 




r · 6 a 
P- Sb 
1'-7 320Cr/ yur 
P- II 
1'-9 




p - 14 
p -15 
p . 16 161tr/yur 
r -11 
p -II! 
p . 19 8"tlye•r 
p . 20 
p - :ll 
Table 5 Capability of the n.r.t. materials accountacy in the chemical separation 
process of the model facility ( 1500 t/a ) Simulation study -
Calibratior Simulation Average At the E"nd Detection Total at N. R. T. MIIA :-:.I!.T.Milr Elf simulatioQ_ 
period covered at-«.!fd c II s uM -·-uCUSUM time detection 
Model: I Lt~ 8 hrs 24 " .. 2 months 1,476 V l 0,258 V 4. 767 9 136 hrs 3 24 Kr 
45 .. w I. 640 9.928 4.662 192 4.57 
1611 w . 2. 105 . 12.325 4,612 288 6.86 
168 168 . 2.872 HHJ21l 7.205 - JU 
Model :2 ~~ 8 24 .. 2, 419 7.7?6 3.5~7 120 2.!!6 
48 .. . I, 533 7.389 3.523 192 (.57 
168 . . I. 809 7'.393 3,4110 288 6 86 
161! 166 .. 3.2:13 11.113 8.350 - JO 
Model: I ~---& 8 24 4 months I. 470 B. 743 6.576 712 4.27 
48 w .. t 633 !1.369 6.533 864 5 18 
168 . . 2.096 !1.053 6.562 1.001! 6 05 
168 166 .. 2.1166 10,436 IOAU - 17.3 
Model:2 ~~ 8 24 . I. 413 1<1.266 U58 456 2.74 
41! . . l. 528 1:!.71!2 U124 2. 736 16 4 
168 . . t. 7911 IJ.SH 4.847 - 17.3 
168 ISS .. 3.229 1-1.286 12.088 - 17.3 
Model :t ~-tt 8 24 ~ I. 413 8.019 4.860 840 3.05 
411 ~ . I. 528 7.627 4.826 - 10.7 
168 . . 1. 798 7,631 4,849 - 10.7 
Model:t ~-& ll . . I. 471 -222 6.583 8110 2.42 
46 . .. I. fiJJ -450 6,540 - 8.0 
168 . . 2. 097 138 6,569 - 80 
Model:2 ~-~ 8 . . I. 41 J 5.314 4.861 .2.480 I:. SI 
48 . . I. 52A 061 4.1'127 - 80 
168 . . i. 798 4,942 USO ·- 8.0 
Model :2 ,1..-~ II . . I. 413 2.600 4,862 2.496 4 57 
48 . . I. 528 2.264 4.1!28 - 5.3 
168 . . I. 798 2.2H 4.851 - 5.3 
Model :2 Lt-Lt !l . . l. 41 J - 140 4.963 2.512 2.30 
48 . u I, 5211 -420 4.1!29 ·- 2.1 
166 . . I. 791! -483 ,,852 - 2.7 
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Plutonium purification process 
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1. simulation covered : 2 months 
2. no diversion, abrupt div., protracted div. ( 8 kgs-pu/2 weeks ) 
3. n.r.t. sub-MBAl of sub-MBA Model 2 : &~~ 
4. n.r.t. material balance period . 8 hrs . 
5. calibration period : 24 hrs 
. 4~r---------.---------~----------.----------r---------,----------.----------r--------~r----------·- RBRU!'t DIII{RSIO'~ 10 RO/t·IIUKBJ 
::::1 PROC[SG 1-7 , 0118P • 8H 
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Fig. 5 Diversion sensitivity analysis ( Case A-4 ) 
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1. simulation covered . 2 months . 
2. no diversion, abrupt div., protracted div. ( 8 kgs-pu/2 weeks ) 
3. n.r.t. sub-MBAl of sub-MBA Model 2 : &AJ& 
4. n.r.t. material balance period . 48 hrs . 
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Fig. 6 Diversion sensitivity analysis ( Case A-5 ) 
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1. Simulation covered : 2 months 
2. no diversion, abrupt div., protracted div. ( 8 kgs-pu/2 weeks ) 
3. n.r.t. sub-MBAl of sub-MBA Model 2 : &~ffi 
4. n.r.t. material balance period : 168 hrs 
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